The Price of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization, Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in Shanghai by Xu, Fang
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Graduate Center
6-2016
The Price of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization,
Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in
Shanghai
Fang Xu
Graduate Center, City University of New York
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds
Part of the Chinese Studies Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons,
Inequality and Stratification Commons, Linguistic Anthropology Commons, Place and
Environment Commons, Politics and Social Change Commons, Regional Sociology Commons, and
the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
by an authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact deposit@gc.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Xu, Fang, "The Price of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization, Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in Shanghai" (2016). CUNY
Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1296
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Price of Cosmopolitanism:  
Globalization, Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in Shanghai 
 
By Fang Xu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology as partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 
 
2016 
  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 
 
FANG XU 
 
All Rights Reserved 
  
iii 
 
The Price of Cosmopolitanism:  
Globalization, Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in Shanghai 
 
By  
 
Fang Xu 
 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction 
of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Date           
_______________________________________ 
Sharon Zukin 
Chair of Examining Committee 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Date           
_______________________________________ 
Philip Kasinitz 
                                                             Executive Officer 
 
 
 
Supervisory Committee: 
 
 Philip Kasinitz 
 
 Jillian Cavanaugh 
 
 Xiangming Chen 
 
 
 
 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
  
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Price of Cosmopolitanism:  
Globalization, Class Structure, and Language Endangerment in Shanghai 
 
By Fang Xu 
 
 
Advisor: Dr. Sharon Zukin 
 
 
Over the last two decades, Shanghai has experienced an unprecedented transformation, as 
China’s economic globalization and urban expansion have increased rapidly. Looking beyond 
statistics and architectural spectacles, I examine a seemingly personal choice in Shanghai, 
speaking Putonghua Mandarin, the official language, or the Shanghai dialect. This study 
contextualizes the contested urban linguistic space, and illustrates the political, social, and cultural 
conditions in this China’s globalizing city.  
Through archival research, fifty in-depth interviews, two hundred and fifty survey 
questionnaires, and ethnographic fieldwork in Shanghai in the fall and winter of 2013, I document 
the impact of three sets of state policies driving the Shanghai dialect to the brink of extinction, and 
reactions of Shanghairen (Shanghai people) to preserve their linguistic heritage, and to safeguard 
their place-bound identity. First, state language policies systematically put Shanghai dialect at a 
discriminated position, through a nationalist agenda associating the official language with 
patriotism, and upward social mobility. In response to this state-sponsored language oppression, a 
grassroots dialect preservation movements struggles to protect Shanghai’s linguistic heritage. 
Second, urban redevelopment policies to accommodate the infrastructure demanded by a 
global city displaced more than one million Shanghai households out of the urban center. It not 
only deprives them of the urban central residency, challenges their claim to urban public space, 
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but also disperses the Shanghai dialect community. Facing an urban built environment bearing 
little relevance to Shanghai’s history and long-time residents, Shanghairen rejects newly-built 
architectural spectacles and articulates an alternative image of cosmopolitan Shanghai located in 
the historical urban center.   
The third reason behind the rapid decline of Shanghai dialect speaking is the influx of 
millions of internal migrants, and the selective social integration of these non-speakers in Shanghai 
after reforms of the household registration (hukou) system. Instead of a dual society characterized 
by those with a Shanghai urban hukou and those without, my study suggests a more nuanced social 
class restructuring. On the one hand, migrants now have better overall chances for social 
acceptance and integration as institutional barriers represented by an individual’s hukou status 
have receded; on the other hand, social and cultural boundaries are effectively maintained through 
language and lifestyle. Only those highly educated and wealthy newcomers are accepted on the 
job market and in social circles, while less-educated rural migrants are excluded.  
To synthesize, in exchange for Shanghai’s global city status and improved standard of 
living, Shanghairen have been relocated away from the urban center, while their linguistic right to 
the city is threatened. They have also experienced relative deprivation of privileges in terms of 
exclusive access to employment and top quality social services. In this study, they come together 
to tell a story of the price locals pay when an authoritarian, centralized state fashions a city 
compatible with and competitive for globalization.  
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Introduction 
 
To celebrate International Mother Language Day on February 21st, 2014, Shanghai online 
news outlet Kankanews interviewed Xu Haoliang, an Assistant Secretary General of the United 
Nations and Director of the United Nations Development Programme in Asia and the Pacific. 1 A 
Shanghai native, as well as a UN official overseeing regional development, he commented on the 
importance of linguistic diversity, and in particular, the importance of preserving regional dialects. 
In his remarks, which he delivered in Shanghai dialect, he commented:  
If everyone in China speaks Putonghua, it would mean the disappearance of 
diversities, of regional cultures in the country. If in twenty years or so, I go back to 
Shanghai to live, it would be odd to hear Putonghua everywhere, which is not the 
environment I am familiar with, or grew up in. I mean, regional dialects and cultures 
everywhere should be protected and preserved.  
 
Xu Haoliang chuckled when describing the ‘unimaginable’ scenario of hearing Putonghua, or 
Standard Mandarin Chinese, spoken everywhere on the streets of Shanghai. But it is probable that 
he had not returned to Shanghai in some time as his unthinkable scenario has already happened by 
the time of the interview. Shanghai now faces a crisis of native language endangerment. At the 
core of this crisis is a struggle between local identity, the authoritarian state, and globalization.  
I understand Xu Haoliang's anxiety about the loss of Shanghai dialect and with it, the loss 
of the city. As a native Shanghainese, I lived in Shanghai until the age of 26, and have experienced 
displacement from the urban center to the periphery in 2005.  Leaving China for North America 
in 2006, I was not fully aware of the linguistic and cultural impact of urban transformations in 
Shanghai until going back for field research in 2009, and 2013. Today, on the streets of Shanghai, 
                                                          
1 “On the 'International Mother Tongue Day', Xu Haoliang, the Assistant General Secretary of the United Nations 
Gave an Interview in the Shanghai Dialect.” February 21, 2014. Kankanews.com. To watch the full length of the 
video in the Shanghai dialect: http://www.kankanews.com/a/2014-02-21/0014269910.shtml. 
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Putonghua is heard everywhere. This momentous change reflects three sets of state policies: 
language standardization, urban redevelopment, and internal migration. In Xu Haoliang’s words, 
the linguistic change renders Shanghai unfamiliar and alien to native Shanghairen (Shanghai 
people).2 His comments make clear that cultural and linguistic diversity should not be sacrificed 
for the sake of any official goal, not even economic development. 
In this dissertation, I critically examine how public policies came together to create Xu's 
"unthinkable scenario."  I explore three dimensions of urban change in Shanghai: what is the 
current composition of urban population in Shanghai? Which language(s) do they speak in public? 
And in what kind of urban built environment do they speak these languages. The first dimension 
of Shanghai’s transformation is the recent change in population; local Shanghairen, who have lived 
in Shanghai for two to three generations, have seen the massive influx of internal migrants from 
other parts of the country. Second, the city’s unique urban lingua franca has been replaced by 
Putonghua, as the state has pushed for a standardized official language, at the expense of regional 
dialects. Third, the urban built environment was dramatically transformed, from old, familiar 
alleyway housing and narrow streets lined by sycamore trees to new, indistinguishable glass-
façade skyscrapers and elevated expressways. In this work, I illustrate a battle lost by highly 
educated, middle class Shanghairen in multiple dimensions, as their home city becomes a global 
city.  
To capture these dimensions of social transformation, I looked beyond statistics of 
economic achievement, beyond the grandeur of the skyscrapers on both sides of the Huangpu River, 
and beyond the neon lights, to investigate the fate of the Shanghai dialect in global city building. 
The dialect is a hybrid tongue that evolved from the ancient Wu linguistic family’s Songjiang 
                                                          
2 I will examine the multi-layered and contested conceptualization of “Shanghairen” in detail in chapter five.   
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County branch in the early 20th century. It became the lingua franca of Shanghai, adopted and 
enriched by countless migrants who settled in this cosmopolitan metropolis over the course of 
more than a century, and who called themselves Shanghairen.  
Since China’s economic reform reached Shanghai in the 1990s, transformations in 
Shanghairen’s lives have been documented mostly around the grievances of displacement. Yet the 
fact is that their lives have been affected more than in housing conditions. The change has come 
in multiple ways: language, social mobility, social circles, and finally, even Shanghairen identity. 
By documenting the transformation of the city beyond the urban built environment, I highlight the 
domination of new national political and economic elites in Shanghai, the marginalization of native 
Shanghairen socially and culturally, and the impact of developmental strategies of the authoritarian 
state in building Shanghai into a global city. 
This is not a study about the Shanghai dialect itself; rather, I use the endangerment of the 
dialect as a lens to understand the urban changes in Shanghai. As Milroy and Milroy assert “it does 
not seem possible to account fully for linguistic change without inquiring into the social origins 
and social mechanisms of change” (1985:55). In this context, the decline of speaking Shanghai 
dialect does not take place in a social vacuum: rather, it is the changing social circumstances that 
prompt and explain the endangerment. Conversely, the dialect endangerment provides a 
comprehensive view of the dynamic social landscape. Changes in linguistic practices surrounding 
the use of Shanghai dialect show the many ways in which the globalizing city has transformed the 
lives of Shanghairen.  
 From changes in linguistic practices, I demonstrate how the social construction of a 
hegemonic, monolithic national identity can crush vernacular language practices and local 
identities. From Shanghairen’s attachment to the urban central neighborhoods on the west bank of 
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the Huangpu River, I show the disorientation, alienation, and marginalization they experience 
through the waves of urban redevelopments that have altered the city beyond recognition. And 
from voluntary and involuntary adoption of Putonghua at home and in public among Shanghairen, 
I explore changes in migration policies, and the selective social integration of highly educated and 
better off non-speakers of Shanghai dialect into middle class Shanghairen’s social circles and 
families.   
Furthermore, since the disbursement of social services has not kept pace with the growing 
migrant population, native Shanghairen feel relative deprivation compared to what they have 
expected based on the city’s rising prosperity. This in turn triggers hostility between Shanghairen 
and recent migrants. In those conflicts, the responsibility falls on the Shanghai dialect to identify 
who counts as a Shanghairen, and what resources, services, and prestige one is entitled to, factually 
and nominally. In the end, changes and conflicts surrounding the Shanghai dialect are byproducts 
of the unequal economic development in the region, the redistribution system in transition from a 
planned to a market-based mode, and a nationalist agenda that imposes a standardized linguistic 
culture and a homogenous national identity. In this period of rapid growth, as China rises to 
become the world’s largest economy, the state has built Shanghai as its flagship, to show its 
ambition (Campanella, 2008:58).   
These issues are not limited to China. Megacities in less developed countries are growing 
and globalizing rapidly. Beyond GDP percentages, population size, and the speed of urbanization, 
my examination of micro urban dynamics and practices in Shanghai provides a bottom-up view of 
the impact of global city building in an authoritarian state on locals’ everyday life. Qualitative 
urban studies like this dissertation stand at the frontier of research on megacities in the developing 
world, and the case of Shanghai will contribute to the theorization of urban conditions in the so-
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called Global South, in regions where recent migrants and longtime urban residents come from 
different ethnic origins and speak different languages; and especially as China’s economic success 
inspires leadership in other developing countries to engage in global city building. 
 
Linguistic and Social Background 
The three main social and cultural contexts of this dissertation are: the modern Chinese 
language situation, class structure in the pre-economic reform era, and Shanghai undergoing 
globalization. First I will distinguish literary and vernacular Chinese, and explain the linguistic 
diversity in China. This serves as a background for understanding the tension between the official 
language and the Shanghai dialect. A brief explanation of social stratification in the pre-economic 
reform era will follow. More than merely serving as a point for comparison, the importance of 
birthplace for categorizing social groups will help us understand the sense of loss and relative 
deprivation among Shanghairen in current times. Lastly, I will review studies on Shanghai’s recent 
economic and cultural participation in globalization. My qualitative examination of the changing 
social dynamics and language practices in Shanghai fills the gap in earlier studies’ largely 
quantitative illustration of Shanghai’s urban transformation.   
 
Literary and Vernacular Chinese 
The Chinese language through the early 20th century appears to be a typical case of 
“diglossia” system, in which its literary and vernacular forms coexist, and have distinctive 
functions that rarely overlap (Ferguson 1959:328, 337-38). Literary Chinese is the so-called High 
Language used in court or other formal situations, and vernacular Chinese is the so-called Low 
Language used in everyday conversation. From this perspective, scholars studying the modern 
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Chinese language argue that by taking over the functions of vernacular dialects, the standardized 
official language, Putonghua, as the High Language, drives regional dialects to endangerment.  
The two forms of Chinese language have coexisted for millennia and diverged since ancient 
times. Snow points out that literary Chinese is “a classical written language that was learned in 
school by those fortunate enough to have the chance for education,” and was “not spoken by 
anyone as a native language” (2010:160). Rooted in canonical writings of the Warring States (403-
255 BC), literary Chinese has been “the pre-eminent language for writing in China for the past two 
thousand years” (Fuller, 2004:1). Throughout this period, literati “continued to model their prose 
on this early literary language, and the written languages began to take on an archaic aspect as the 
spoken language underwent a very different and by and large independent development” (Norman, 
1988:83). Yet even though every literate person was trained to write in the rigid style of the ancient 
writers until the early 20th century, they resorted to their varied native tongues in speaking 
(Ramsey, 1989:4).  
Regional vernaculars of the modern Chinese language are roughly divided into two groups. 
The northern varieties, conventionally known in English as the “Mandarin dialects”, were based 
on the educated speech in Beijing with regional accents since the fifteenth century. Varieties of 
Mandarin dialects cover more than three quarters of the Chinese language region, while southern 
regional vernaculars, so-called “non-Mandarin dialects” such as Cantonese, Hakka, or Shanghai 
dialect, occupy only the southeast coastal regions. More importantly, the Mandarin dialects are 
more or less mutually intelligible; but the non-Mandarin dialects differ greatly from each other, 
and from any variation of Mandarin; for example, there are five phonetically distinguishable tones 
in Shanghai dialect, and nine in Cantonese. The Shanghai dialect also has a series of voiced 
consonants b, d, g that Mandarin does not have (Ramsey, 1989:21). 
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These vast differences between literary and vernacular Chinese, and between Mandarin 
and non-Mandarin dialects, meant that the replacement of the diglossia system with a Beijing-
pronunciation based official language, serving both High and Low functions, was most painfully 
felt in non-Mandarin dialect regions. The diglossia system was eroded when both a national 
language (guoyu, 国语) and national pronunciation (guoyin, 国音) were created and promoted in 
the early 20th century, when the Kuomintang Party ruled the Republic of China. The victory of 
the Chinese Communist Party over Kuomintang, and the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China, introduced more thorough measures to replace the diglossia system.  
The new official language, Putonghua—literally meaning common tongue—inherited the 
Beijing-pronunciation based guoyin. It was promoted through the national school system and state-
owned mass media. The once separate functions and domains of literary and vernacular Chinese 
were further muddled and merged. Unlike Mandarin dialect speakers, non-Mandarin dialect 
speakers, such as Shanghairen, were forced to adopt a new spoken language in their daily lives. At 
the surface, this standardized and unified spoken language system simplified linguistic practice for 
non-Mandarin dialect speakers, who no longer had to “translate” written Chinese into vernaculars; 
for example, the word “clothes” written as 衣服, and pronounced as yi fu in Putonghua, but yi zang 
in the Shanghai dialect, which corresponds to  the archaic word 衣裳 (yi shang). 
However, this convenience championed by state language policy in essence surrendered 
the linguistic space once occupied by regional vernaculars to Putonghua. Besides the dominance 
of High Language in education and mass media in a diglossia community, Li points out the 
presence of large amount of native High Language speakers—native speakers of Mandarin 
variations, that also contributes to the encroachment of the High Language upon territories 
previously occupied by the Low language (2014:71). Using Putonghua as both written and spoken 
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language eliminates a functional separation in non-Mandarin dialect regions. The end result of the 
erosion of diglossia system is usually that the Low Language loses ground, driven out by younger 
generations educated in the more prestigious and economically more viable High Language 
(Hudson, 2002:30).  
The endangerment of the Shanghai dialect documented in this study is one recent example 
of the battles lost by a Low Language to a state-backed High Language.3 As Fishman points out, 
the High Language is “the language with stronger rewards and sanctions associated with it” 
(1980:8; 1985:45), and as such, has a better chance to win out. The rewards are more attainable 
and tangible in the economic reform era, when upward social mobility can be achieved through 
education and in the job market, rather than being pre-determined by one’s birthplace or family’s 
political background.  
 
Social Stratification in the Pre-reform Era (1949-1978) 
Social stratification in pre-reform era China was largely characterized by uneven regional 
development favoring coastal urban areas, and was closely related to the household registration 
(hukou) system, a kind of personal identification system, necessary for receiving any social 
services in the planned economy. The hukou system was implemented in the late 1950s, and 
divided Chinese citizens into two unequal tiers—the privileged urban and the underprivileged rural 
(see for example, Christiansen, 1992; Cheng & Selden, 1994). 
The hukou system was designed to directly regulate population mobility and control access 
to state-provided welfare benefits and opportunities. First, hukou registration allocated people into 
                                                          
3 The endangerment of languages in ethnic minority regions in China is beyond the scope of this study. If interested, 
see for example M. Zhou & H. Sun.2004. Language policy in the People’s Republic of China: theory and practice 
since 1949, and Dai, Q. & Dong, Y. 2001. The historical evolution of bilingual education for China’s ethnic 
minorities. Chinese Education & Society, 34(2), 7-47. 
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agrarian and non-agrarian (urban) categories based on birthplace, and then over time, became 
increasingly lopsided, and favored urban areas in the redistribution system in terms of food supply, 
education, healthcare, and wages. The hukou system is one of the major tools of social control 
employed by the state, and individual’s hukou status serves as ascribed status significantly 
affecting the personal life of individuals across the social spectrum (Chan & Zhang, 1999: 818-
19).  
Furthermore, there existed hierarchy among urban hukous, which meant that the higher the 
administrative level of the city, the more opportunities and resources were granted to an individual 
whose hukou belonged to that particular city (Lu, 2008).  Shanghai is one of the three top-tier 
municipalities directly controlled by the central government, enjoying the same rank as provinces 
of administrative divisions of China.4 Thus, a Shanghai urban hukou granted the holder access to 
top-tier education, healthcare, and job opportunities.  
The location of an individual’s hukou is the first of four structural and behavioral 
dimensions that Bian identifies in pre-reform stratification, which is the rural-urban divide in 
residential status (2002).  The second is what he calls state-collective dualism in economic 
structure: state workers, the majority of urban labor force, hold “iron rice bowls” of lifelong 
employment, insurance, welfare benefits, and pension, which are unavailable to either urban or 
rural collective workers. In state-owned danwei (work units), earnings were redistributed to 
individuals according to a politically defined and seniority ranked bureaucratic system (Bian & 
Logan, 1996; Walder, 1989). Work units themselves are ranked as well, determined by the 
administrative level of the government jurisdictions they belong to, which range from central 
ministries, to provincial and municipal bureaus, to city district offices. The higher the rank of the 
                                                          
4 The other two are Beijing and Tianjin. And in 1997, Chongqing, located in the Sichuan Province in southwestern 
China was granted this status, increasing the number of top tiered municipalities to four.  
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danwei, the greater the bureaucratic power its cadres have, and the greater the benefits it can offer 
its workers.  
Due to deliberate “de-stratification” policies, income differences among social groups and 
occupations were extremely low in the pre-reform era. Many economic rewards took the form of 
redistributive benefits, such as public housing, healthcare, and other social services provided by 
danwei to workers. An individual’s economic rewards varied more based on these redistributive 
benefits, associated with the type of workplace, than on income differences associated with 
individual attributes such as education and political position (Zhou, Tuma & Moen, 1997). 
However, this does not mean that political background was irrelevant in the pre-reform era.  
The third dimension of social stratification in the pre-reform era that Bian points out is the 
cadre-worker dichotomy in occupation classification. In that era, party membership was a 
significant predictor of occupational status in state-owned danwei (Walder, 1989). State cadres 
occupied prestigious managerial and professional jobs with above-average compensation packages, 
and were kept in reserve for training and promotion into party leadership positions (Bian, 2002). 
Though workers could obtain a relatively high occupational status through technical skill level and 
seniority, gaining promotion from worker to cadre was very rare. It was an achieved status 
excluding the majority of less-educated workers. 
The fourth dimension, according to Bian, is the “revolution-antirevolution” split in political 
characterization (2002). During the Maoist era, the “revolution” or “red” classes were of so-called 
proletarian background: peasants, urban poor, and the working class. The “anti-revolution,” or 
“black” class was of bourgeois background, such as previous landlords, business owners, and 
intellectuals. These were not entirely fixed categories, such as birthplace, but a mixture of family 
class origin and an individual’s political performances in numerous party-led campaigns.  
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The four dimensions of social stratification in the pre-reform era can be illustrated using 
the example of an individual at the top of the hierarchy: a senior Shanghai urban-hukou Chinese 
Communist Party cadre from a proletarian background working for a danwei controlled by a 
central ministry. All forms of stratification are present, and the benefits he received would be of a 
top tier that few others were able to attain. The redistributive economy and hukou system created 
rigid social categories, institutionalized social inequality, and allowed extremely limited 
opportunities for geographical and socioeconomic mobility. Structurally, that social stratification 
system also established the tremendous desirability of an urban hukou, especially in Shanghai. A 
city was once famed “Paris of the East” in the early 20th century, and in the economic reform era, 
is on the rise to be a global city (Sassen, 2009).   
 
Globalizing Shanghai  
Shanghai is one of the most studied Chinese cities for understanding early 20th century 
Chinese history, that  scholars tirelessly remind readers of the city’s past glory in the early 20th 
century as the “Paris of the East” (see for example Bergère, 2009; Lee, 1999; Lu, 1999; Yeh, 2008). 
Shanghai is also the epitome of contemporary Chinese urban conditions, as Chen puts it “Shanghai 
is a timely urban laboratory for understanding how local transformations occur in global or 
globalizing cities as a combined function of global impact and state power” (2009:xx). Over the 
last two decades, studies on Shanghai have examined multiple dimensions of the globalization 
process, from economic achievement, urban redevelopments, proliferation of Western consumer 
goods, to influx of foreign and domestic talents. In the following, I will examine these four aspects 
in turn.  
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Shanghai is a latecomer in terms of participation in economic reform and state-led 
globalization. It was not until the 1990s that economic reform reached Shanghai; its goal was to 
“re-create the city as a cosmopolitan, world financial, and commercial center” (Gamble, 2003: x). 
Zhu Rongji, former mayor of Shanghai and later China’s premier, described “Shanghai as China’s 
New York City” in his speech given at the Economic Club of New York over his visit to the United 
States in April, 1999. Contrary to the previously designated role as a domestic industrial producer 
at the heart of China’s centrally planned, socialist economy, Shanghai at the turn of the millennium 
was ready to embrace the status of a global city.   
Statistics about Shanghai’s economic achievements demonstrate the city’s participation in 
a network of global cities in terms of concentration of professionals, tertiary sectors, and Fortune 
500 companies’ regional headquarters. Out of the 500 largest foreign-funded industrial 
corporations in China in 1995, 69 were located in Shanghai, with 35 in Tianjin trailing far back in 
second place (Zhou, 2002:65). By the end of 1996, over 16,000 foreign-funded enterprises 
produced 34 percent of Shanghai’s industrial output. By early 2000, over half the world’s largest 
500 companies had established operations in Shanghai (Gamble, 2003: xi). Chen writes that “fifty-
five multinational companies set up regional headquarters in Shanghai after 2003; … more 
specifically, three business groups under General Electric moved their Asia-Pacific regional 
headquarters from Hong Kong and other Asian cities to Shanghai” (2009:xix). 
Other than regional headquarters, the emphasis on the transition from manufacturing to 
tertiary sector industries in the Chinese state-led global city building process has attracted more 
foreign enterprises to set up research and development centers in Shanghai. In 2005, among the 
more than 700 foreign R&D firms established in China, 23 percent were located in Shanghai 
(Wang & Du, 2007). Wu and Gaubatz point out that the significance of Shanghai to global 
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investors, compared to other Chinese or East Asian cities, is that “based on market capitalization, 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange is the fifth largest in the world. The sentiment among business 
watchers surveyed for the Global Financial Centers Index clearly favor Shanghai, ahead of 
Singapore and Hong Kong” (2013:125). China’s central government is working to position 
Shanghai as the country’s leading financial center by 2020 (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2010). 
Those numbers, showing the quick pace of Shanghai’s economic globalization since the 
1990s, explain the need for updating urban infrastructure and for urban expansion, because the city 
needed to be made physically capable of achieving global city status. The transformation of the 
urban built environment is the second aspect of globalization in Shanghai, which made the former 
premier Zhu Ruiji’s analogy between Shanghai and New York City most visible and relevant. 
There were virtually no modern high-rise office towers or expressways in Shanghai until the late 
1980s, but by the early 2000s, Shanghai had twice as many skyscrapers as New York City, and 
three times the number of expressways that Robert Moses built in the New York metropolitan 
region (Campanella, 2008: 15-6).  
Visually, globalization is characterized by architectural designs from international 
architectural firms, as well as an indistinguishable, modern look of urban built environment (Ren, 
2009:9). Standing next door to the Shanghai Municipal Government’s building at the center of the 
People’s Square in the west bank of Shanghai, is the Shanghai Grand Theatre. Opened to public 
in 1998, it was designed by a famous architecture design company founded by French 
architect Jean-Marie Charpentier. On the east bank, architectural spectacles such as the Shanghai 
Tower, were designed by the American architectural firm Gensler. It is currently the tallest 
building in China and the second-tallest in the world. 
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Looking down from those skyscrapers, we see an urban landscape bearing little vernacular 
characters, formed by two decades of massive demolition of old landmarks and residential 
neighborhoods. The unprecedented scale of the urban transformation in Shanghai since the early 
1990s resulted in scholars like Lu Hanchao proclaiming that “[b]y the late 1990s, much of the city 
had been literally destroyed” (2002:172). Large-scale redevelopment projects demolished most of 
the city’s central residential neighborhoods, which contained many varied examples of vernacular 
architecture, rooted in the late 19th century semi-colonial Shanghai. Besides the erasure of distinct 
features inherited from the past, Wang Xiaoming observes that this building frenzy is also part of 
a standardization process of Shanghai’s urban space, one that tends to match a vision of an 
imagined “international metropolis” (2010:24). In place of the old central alleyway housing 
neighborhoods, arose glass-façade skyscrapers, elevated inner-city expressways, shopping centers 
carrying transnational fashion brands, and a brand new subway system with gleaming marble 
platforms and spotless stations.  
These building forms are transplanted from elsewhere to project an “imagined” global 
image (King & Kusno, 2000). As representations of capitalist globalization, these typical urban 
architectural forms can be found almost anywhere in the world, and are venues that transcend 
differences between geographical, ethnic, and cultural communities in the practices of 
consumption (Sklair, 2010:138-39). Once the backbone of China’s industrial production, Shanghai 
has been turned into a city devoted to capitalist consumerism. The most ironic example of 
Shanghai’s embrace of this form of globalization, in terms of consumerist space, is Xintiandi. 
Located next to the birthplace of the Chinese Communist Party, Xintiandi is a prototypical upscale 
shopping and office complex, one of the many that resulted from the global urban growth coalition 
(He & Wu, 2007; Ren, 2008).  
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Consumerism, and the abundance of consumer goods, is the third aspect of globalization 
in Shanghai, separate from the ration system and sea of blue and grey Mao suits.  By late 1999, 
over 40 foreign brands had set up chain stores in Shanghai, such as the Hong Kong retailer Sincere, 
Carrefour of France, Chia Tai of Thailand and IKEA of Sweden (Gamble, 2003:142). Global 
luxury and fast fashion brands such as Louis Vuitton, Hermès, Prada, Zara, and H&M line the 
Huaihai Road and Nanjing West Road, two major thoroughfares in Shanghai. Access to Western 
consumer goods, to a certain extent, extends to Western cultural products. Side by side with 
Western popular culture—fashion magazines, TV shows and Hollywood movies, Western high 
culture, defined as “high-standard, elegant arts” (gao ya yishu) in governmental and state-owned 
mass media’s narratives, has been strategically promoted in Shanghai. Considering the rigid 
censorship of Western culture during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the municipal 
government’s financial support of the construction of cultural venues such as the Shanghai Grand 
Theatre, and to the organization of performances of Western classical music, ballet, or opera 
indicates an eagerness to promote consumption of global culture (Xu, 2013).  
While global capitalism mobilizes commercial resources in globalizing urban commercial 
space, members of the transnational capitalist class act like agents (Sklair, 2010:141). Among these 
agents that Sklair identifies, major transnational corporate owners and executives and their local 
affiliates, globalizing professionals, and merchants play significant roles in brokering and 
facilitating the prevalence of capitalist consumerism in Shanghai. Compared to the so-called 
“floating population,” those who recently migrated to cities from rural or small town China and 
work manual labor jobs at the bottom of socioeconomic hierarchy, the transnational capitalist class 
is a much smaller population in Shanghai. However, they are capable of wielding great power in 
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the local economic, social and cultural realms. Through studies on this latter group, I illustrate the 
fourth and last aspect of globalization in Shanghai.  
Members of this group of non-natives are the returning Chinese expatriates who have been 
educated abroad. Many of them are hired by foreign corporations for managerial positions or 
higher, in recognition of their English language skills and familiarity with Western corporate 
culture. According to Aihwa Ong, among these there are also “cultural entrepreneurs who 
selectively deploy business management in combination with cultural forms in an individualistic, 
instrumental manner” (2006:221). They are brokers of Western consumerism, through their own 
businesses in the fashion, art, and culinary industries. Together with their highly educated domestic 
counterparts, they make up the solid base for urban China’s new middle/upper-middle class, who 
are globally oriented and expect their living and working environments to resemble other global 
cities.  
Shanghai, after more than a decade of concentrated foreign direct investments, large-scale 
urban redevelopments, embrace of capitalist consumerism, and influx of transnational capitalist 
class and domestic labor force, has regained its pre-1949 cosmopolitan reputation. The city’s pre-
1949 glories were rediscovered and memorialized in the official rhetoric, to encourage great 
changes in Shanghai in the early 1990s. This nostalgia for the past served to justify the city’s 
ambition, or rather China’s ambition, to participate in globalization, and to play a larger role in the 
global economy, other than as a huge, notorious sweatshop. China aimed to build Shanghai 
because a “global city is a national means of ‘plugging in’ to global political, economic and social 
networks” (Bunnel, 2002: 287). 
To grasp the “plugging-in” Shanghai to the global network, orchestrated by the state, I 
examine a less visible field of the globalization process, the endangerment of the Shanghai dialect. 
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What is unique about this study is that the language is not indigenous or rural, but modern and 
urban. It was the lingua franca of a cosmopolitan metropolis a century ago, but is losing ground as 
the city regains its global city status in current times. The literature studying the endangerment or 
loss of regional dialects are seldom about a language native to a modern metropolis.5 Rather, they 
are centered on historically rooted, authentic, and indigenous claims and identities confronting 
national or global forces.  
Writers on global cities rarely touch on the suppressed local and urban linguistic heritage 
because those cities are likely to be the political, economic, and cultural center of the country, for 
example, London, Paris, and Tokyo.  National elites concentrated in those capital cities have the 
means to translate their dominance in other realms to the linguistic realm, establishing the 
hegemony of the language of the capital through institutions across the country. We do not need 
to look far to recognize that Putonghua, China’s official language, is based on the Beijing 
pronunciation. Shanghai, even as it grows to global city scale, is not the political or cultural center 
of China. It is a city ruled by delegates appointed by the central state in Beijing, and controlled 
largely by a transnational capitalist class speaking English, and national elites speaking Putonghua.  
On the concept of global city, Sassen acknowledges that the state remains a powerful actor 
in any global or globalizing city, mediating forces and local responses, even though transnational 
financial and social forces permeating national borders and setting up global networks (2006).  
Indeed, the fast-paced global city building process in Shanghai is attributed to the Chinese 
Communist Party’s sweeping state power. That is to say, it is the state’s will and national wealth 
that have arranged and orchestrated the globalization of Shanghai. As a result, the city first and 
foremost serves to represent the country on the global stage, rather than stressing its vernacular 
                                                          
5 Barcelona in Woolard’s 1989 study can be considered an exception, though the scale of Barcelona in terms of 
participation in economic globalization, population size, and urban landscape is not at the same level of Shanghai. 
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characteristics and its connectedness with other global cities. By design, Shanghai’s achievement 
and significance point inward, to the rest of the country, and that’s why the state needs to make 
sure, though channeling global economic and cultural influence, the voice of this global city is 
essentially national, rather than local. 
 
Analytical Framework 
To interpret the social dynamics produced by and in response to state power in a globalizing 
city, I situate my critical analysis on concepts of language ideology, right to the city, and 
nationalism. Converging in this study, they explain my findings and illustrate the changing face of 
Shanghai and the losing battle of the locals in the state-led globalization process.   
 
Language Ideology and Linguistic Capital 
My analysis of social conflicts surrounding language choice in this study, specifically the 
rising preference for Putonghua Mandarin over Shanghai dialect, is anchored by the linguistic 
anthropological concept of language ideology.  It is in this analytical framework that I examine 
the Chinese Communist Party’s state policy that institutionalizes the dominance of the official 
language Putonghua, the marginalization of the Shanghai dialect, and bilingual Shanghairen’s 
language practices. 
Silverstein highlights the subjective role of language users by defining linguistic ideologies 
as “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of 
perceived language structure and use” (1979:193). Irvine underlines the social dimension in 
Silverstein’s definition by pointing out that language ideology is “the cultural system of ideas 
about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” 
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(1989:255). That is to say, language ideologies are by definition always multiple, omnipresent, 
and held by diverse speakers to a varied degree to aid the understanding of their social world. 
Extending the significance of the concept of language ideology beyond users of a particular 
language in examining social dynamics, Irvine and Gal highlight that language ideologies “are 
ideas with which participants and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and 
map those understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them” (2000:35). 
It means that both non-speakers and not practicing a particular language have important meanings 
in social encounters as well.  
In cases similar to my study, which involves a dominant language ideology, and an 
alternative one, represented by Shanghai dialect preservation activists, language ideology is 
employed to present a dichotomy, differentiating between different languages and the social 
groups associated with them. Dorian generalizes from various studies on endangered languages 
about how language ideology usually assigns meanings and status, that “the standard language is 
typically considered a rich, precise, rationally organized and rationally organizing instrument; 
dialects and ethnic minority languages, by contrast, are considered impoverished and crude, most 
likely inadequate to organize the subordinate world itself and certainly inadequate to organize 
other worlds” (1999:8). From her study on Catalan-speakers in Barcelona, against the backdrop of 
Castilian Spanish being the country’s official language, Woolard identifies “two competing social 
dimensions of language use: on the one hand is power, prestige, dominance, status, and on the 
other hand, covert prestige, solidarity” (1985:739). Other studies in Western Europe, such as 
Jaffe’s study on Corsican under the French state’s language ideology and linguistic policies (1999), 
or Cavanaugh’s study on the struggles of Bergamasco (2009), a northern Italian dialect, exemplify 
the power dynamics inherent within language practices and the varied degrees of acceptance of 
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the state’s language ideology. In these cases, the dominant language ideology associates the 
country’s official language with power, prestige, and higher status; the regional dialects become 
associated with lower status. Meanwhile, among speakers of those endangered languages or 
regional dialects, another language ideology bestows vernaculars with covert prestige to ensure 
that it remains relevant and alive.  
The language ideology produced and sponsored by the state serves its social function in 
two ways, that Woolard calls aspects of linguistic hegemony, which are “knowledge or control of 
a standard, and acknowledgement or recognition of it; or in empirical sociolinguistic terms, 
behavioral proficiency and attitudes” (1985:741). Plainly, it means that in everyday encounters, 
linguistic competency of the official language asserts undisputable power, power granted by the 
state-produced language ideology, which is accepted by speakers of the official language and their 
audience.   
The modern national education system plays an important role in maintaining and 
reproducing the state’s language ideology, hence, the dominance of the official language, through 
codification in dictionaries and grammar books (e.g. Bourdieu, 1991; Gumperz, 1962:45; Milroy 
& Milroy, 1985:58) or access to higher education, for example, as Mixal’chenko (1994:181) points 
out, that during the Soviet regime, one could receive higher education only in Russian. Huang 
presents a case of the ramification of the state’s language ideology when language proficiency is 
associated with educational level and socioeconomic status in Taiwan (2009). In his study, the 
participants perceive, the official language, Mandarin, as associated with young, elegant, white-
collar urbanites, whereas dialects are spoken by old, vulgar, blue-collar, rural folks (Huang, 
2009:8-10).  
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However, this dichotomy, produced by the state’s language ideology, is only half of the 
story, because vernacular usage connotes local solidarity and covert prestige, acknowledged and 
honored by its speakers. This alternative language ideology serves as an important symbol of group 
cohesion and exclusive identity, as Milroy and Milroy reveal in their study on Singaporeans 
(1985).6 Milroy and Milroy find a paradox in their study, namely, that Singaporeans view standard 
British English as connoting a higher status as the “ideal” form of English, but at the same time, 
they practice Singaporean English to distance themselves from Englishmen (1985:109). Local 
resistance against dominant language ideology in Singapore has a political, post-colonial tone, 
while in other cases, the socioeconomic strength of dialect speakers supports the alternative 
language ideology regionally, such as in the case of Catalan (Woolard, 1982). By examining the 
economic structure in Catalonia, Woolard points out although Castilian Spanish is imposed by the 
state, local Catalans in general fare better socioeconomically than Castilian-speaking migrants 
(1985:742), and thus lays the economic foundation for the higher status of Catalan locally. Besides 
the political and economic circumstances prompted by the status of dialects, Labov points out the 
racial dimension in his study on American Black English, that a group-identity oriented speech is 
associated with a sense of black pride (1980:263).  
In all three studies above, though the roots of local resistance to the dominant language 
ideology and practice vary, the covert prestige and values associated with “illegitimate” languages 
co-exist with the recognition of the authority and status of the official language. These cases 
demonstrate that there is a spectrum of acceptance of the state’s language ideology, and of support 
for alternative language ideologies. Woolard points out “the competing sets of values create 
pressures in favor of the ‘illegitimate’ languages in the vernacular markets” (1985:744). The use 
                                                          
6 Singapore was under the British rule from 1819-1963. 
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of the idea of a market is better understood with the help of a concept taken from Pierre Bourdieu, 
that capital formed in one area of society can be converted into other kinds of capital (1986). It is 
the coexistence of multiple language ideologies, which value linguistic capital associated with 
vernaculars and the official language differently on parallel markets, that explains how a social 
group, having a minority language as their mother tongue, like the Shanghairen interviewed in my 
study, strategize their linguistic practices. 
Bourdieu differentiates four types of capital in an individual’s possession: economic capital 
rests on ownership, control, or proximity to wealthy or property; cultural capital does not refer to 
tangible resources, but rather represents knowledge or experience usually associated with high 
educational achievement; social capital is based more or less on social connections with others; 
and lastly symbolic capital refers to status, recognition, or prestige that results from certain 
knowledge or practice (1986, 1991). An individual’s possession of these kinds of capital matter 
for his or her social life in two dimensions: the total volume of diverse capitals, and the particular 
composition of them. The identification of various capitals is not only important to pinpoint the 
social position an individual occupies in a given society, but also demonstrates an individual’s 
unique stock of capitals convertible or tradable on the market.  
Bourdieu makes it clear that economic capital is the basis for any capital conversion, for 
example, social capital is acquired in higher education institutions, which are in large measure only 
accessible to those can afford the tuition (1986). In the case of language practice, Bourdieu 
distinguishes linguistic capital from other knowledge grouped together under cultural capital. He 
argues that the family initially endows children with linguistic and cultural capital, but it is the 
school system that recognizes the composition and convertible values of those capitals, and 
establishes and reproduces the authority and legitimacy of particular linguistic and cultural forms 
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(1991). The market for converting linguistic capital, according to Bourdieu, is integrated under the 
sponsorship of the state. In other words, proficiency in the official language, and the recognition 
of its dominance as taught in the school system—the two dimensions of language ideology—are 
assets produced and rewarded through the school system. Later, this linguistic capital associated 
with the official language will be available to be converted to symbolic, social, and economic 
capital on the job market and beyond.   
Extending this Bourdieusian conceptualization of linguistic capital conversion to the 
alternative market of “illegitimate” languages—regional dialects in the case of the Shanghai 
dialect—within the dialect speaker group, the proficiency and belief in the value of the dialect can 
be converted into symbolic, social, and to a certain extent, economic capital. Rather than a 
universal, state-sponsored market, this alternative market has few resources and support, and thus 
relies heavily on the particular speaker group. In chapter three, I will illustrate the co-existence of 
the two markets, and cases of successful capital conversion in both of them. 
The existence of parallel linguistic markets does not necessarily mitigate the pressure for 
linguistic conformity from the state felt by minority language speakers. From her study on Corsica, 
Jaffe argues that the resistance rather is directed at “a social process from which many people feel 
disenfranchised” (1999:30). To understand this kind of sentiment, Bourdieu argues that “social 
practice, language, dialect or accent are objects of mental representations when a group embarks 
on a quest for their regional identity, and are used strategically to meet the material and symbolic 
interests of their bearers” (1992:220). The material and symbolic interests of Shanghai dialect 
speakers are the focus of study. It is during the last two decades of economic reform and global 
city building that they experienced geographical displacement, felt linguistic marginalization, and 
are challenged right to the city.  
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Right to the Global City 
Henri Lefebvre initially theorized the concept of “right to the city”, and though hard to pin 
down the exact meaning, this idea has recently become widely used in social sciences to address 
the decline of democracy and enfranchisement in cities, and contentions regarding citizenship and 
globalization at large. In the context of capitalist society and liberal-democratic social systems, 
Lefebvre calls for a reorientation of the decision making, away from the state and toward urban 
inhabitants, in particular in the production of urban space (1991). At first this idea does not appear 
applicable to the authoritarian state of China. However, as David Harvey points out in his 
assessment of “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics”, economic reforms in China since the 
late 1970s coincided with the turn to neoliberal solutions in Britain and the United states, creating 
"a conjunctural accident of world-historical significance” (2005:120). In this new era in Mainland 
China, the central state has retreated in various aspects; local initiatives and private sectors have 
flourished; and local states have emerged to take a bigger role in the production of urban space.  
Against this background the municipal government of Shanghai has experienced a shift 
from a managerial role to an entrepreneurial one; and the concept of “global city” has become 
relevant in Shanghai. The trend of economic globalization in the last thirty years, according to 
Harvey, witnessed the declining powers of nation-states to control multinational monetary flows, 
and this left the local state and agencies able to attract and to negotiate with international finance 
capital for specific investments (2001:348). Without economic reforms, the municipal or district 
governments in Shanghai, under the planned economy, was not autonomous enough to conduct 
such negotiations directly with foreign investors. With the autonomy that came with economic 
reform in China, Shanghai was able to realize ambitions of growth and expansion. This shift fueled 
the municipal and district governments’ aspiration to become more profitable and prominent in the 
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region, which coincided with the central state deciding to build Shanghai into a global city. It is 
within this new urban space that I situate my examination of Shanghairen’s attachment to their old 
urban central neighborhoods and the rising importance of the linguistic space of the Shanghai 
dialect. Thus, the right to the global city in my study not only means geographical occupation of 
urban space, but also access to social resources, and freedom to speak the vernacular.  
The economic reforms that allow the municipal and district government in Shanghai direct 
contact with international finance capital, inevitably entails a subjection to “external coercive 
power” under inter-urban competition, which “brings individual cities closer into line with the 
discipline and logic of capitalist development” (Harvey, 2001:358). To realize its ambition to 
become the next global city, Shanghai needs to provide a “good business climate” to attract 
international investment, on par with those long established global cities such as New York, 
London, and Tokyo, in terms of infrastructure, labor force, and supportive services. According to 
Sassen, a global city is a significant production point of specialized financial and producer services 
that commands the globalized economy (2005). For Shanghai to grow into that role, to become a 
new node in this network of global cities, particular and expensive infrastructure such as airports 
and office towers, highly trained and specialized labor force such as professionals in law and 
finance, and lifestyle developments such as waterfront recreation areas and shopping malls, are 
required. With the construction of international and domestic airports, maglev train, and subway 
system, the establishment of special economic and industrial parks for foreign direct investors, and 
reforms that bypass the national hukou system to welcome foreign and domestic talents, Shanghai 
is swiftly meeting the expectations of its transformation.  
In particular, an urban built environment devoted to lifestyle-based consumption patterns, 
such as gentrification, consumer attractions, and entertainment, helps the city to achieve its new 
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status by appearing “as an innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live, or to visit, to play 
and consume in” (Harvey, 2001:355). This dimension of a global city is for some concrete access 
to these consumption spaces, while for others such spaces reside more in the imagination. Ghertner 
shows in his study of urban redevelopment in Delhi, even slum-dwellers, who were displaced 
without compensation from public land in the process, take up the vision of “world-city aesthetics” 
and aspire to live in such an exciting global city of the future (2011). In the last two decades, we 
have witnessed in Shanghai the construction of the Shanghai Grand Theatre, Shanghai Museum, 
Shanghai Stadium, Shanghai Ocean Aquarium, and to be opened in June, 2016, Shanghai 
Disneyland Park; the flourishing of luxury shopping malls, upscale restaurants, and waterfront 
recreation areas by the Huangpu River, and along the Suzhou Creek; as well as the organization 
of the Shanghai Biennale, the annual Shanghai International Arts Festival, and the 2010 Shanghai 
Expo. These amenities and events not only provide proof of global city status, they also supply a 
social imaginary of a creative, exciting, and cosmopolitan place to live in. To a certain extent, this 
imaginary extends the right to the global city to those unable to afford to consume in it. In this 
light, we can understand why displaced Shanghairen cheer about the city’s progress. 
These cosmopolitan and iconic architecture and urban events, in Sklair’s words, “are an 
essential element in the marketing strategies of globalizing urban growth coalition” (2010:141). 
Behind the production of Shanghai’s new urban space is a “growth machine” (Logan & Molotch, 
1986) with Chinese characteristics, comprising foreign and domestic investors, the central state, 
and the local government. From the case study of the development of the Lujiazui Central Business 
District in Pudong, along the east bank of the Huangpu River in the 1990s, Fu argues that 
Shanghai’s urban restructuring is neither entirely internally induced, as it was in the pre-reform 
 27 
 
era, nor solely externally produced by global capital; rather, it is the outcome of the interaction of 
global capital and the central and local governments (2002:107).  
This characterization is shared by other scholars looking at urban redevelopment cases 
across Shanghai, among which the most famous is the redevelopment of the Xintiandi area in the 
former French Concession by the coalition of the Shui On Group based in Hong Kong, Luwan 
District Government, and the Shanghai Municipal Government (See for example He & Wu, 2005; 
Ren, 2011: 110-123; Wai, 2006). Scholars have identified this as state-sponsored gentrification, in 
the sense that land ownership remained in the hands of the state, while huge incentives were given 
by the local government to lease the land to real estate developers (He, 2007; Zhang, 2006). In 
return, the municipal and district governments saw land value, revenue, and the fame of their 
jurisdictions rapidly increase. This newly vacated and highly desirable inner city land soon became 
crowded by modern office towers, shopping malls, and luxurious condos as a direct result of the 
private-public partnership in the global city building process in Shanghai.  
The right to occupy those newly built residential and commercial spaces is protected by 
the state, and access to them is only granted to those who successfully “got rich first” in China’s 
economic reform. Swept out of sight when presenting Shanghai’s glamourous new look to the 
world, is the displacement and dispossession of more than one million households of Shanghairen 
since the 1990s. Urban renewal projects and the construction of new urban infrastructure entailed 
relocating long-term residents from urban central districts to the peripheral areas of the metropolis. 
These urban central districts that the displaced once occupied, are being transformed beyond 
recognition, and in many cases, now deny their access. 
Mixed with the pride of living in a globalizing city is the bitterness and sense of loss among 
displaced Shanghairen. Despite the spaciousness and modern amenities of their new residences in 
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the city’s periphery, Shanghairen grieve about their demolished urban central neighborhoods. 
Those neighborhoods are regarded by Shanghairen as a sort of homeland, which according to the 
geographer Yi-fu Tuan, is a place viewed as “an archive of fond memories and splendid 
achievements that inspire the present” (1977:154). Tuan points out that people are attached to their 
homeland in two important ways; first, the homeland has landmarks of high visibility and social 
significance, and second, the daily routines in the homeland create a safe and familiar environment 
(1977:159). With many of the historic landmark buildings, such as Buddhist temples, and neo-
classicist buildings on the Bund preserved in the urban redevelopment process, it is the second 
sense of attachment that is most useful for us to understand the difficulty that displaced 
Shanghairen experience in accepting and adjusting to the new urban landscape.  
This is the kind of attachment associated with the rhythm of daily life, “with the memory 
of sounds and smells, of communal activities and homely pleasures accumulated over time” (Tuan, 
1977:159). They are not objects of personal possession, which people can pack up and move with 
them to the new location; rather, they are intangible experiences and connections anchored in 
places that are forever gone. Tuan suggests these connections are essential for us to reconstruct 
our past and to understand our identity; examples include visits to our old neighborhoods and the 
birthplaces of our parents, or contact with people who knew us when we were young (1977:187). 
With the demolition of old alleyway housing neighborhoods in Shanghai’s urban center, the loss 
is not only physical urban landscape, but also a way of life, and the imprints of urban history, 
community life, and personal past. Shanghairen are deprived of specific physical structures and 
forms to help them anchor their place-bound identity.  
The connection between space and time is not only apparent in reconstructing personal 
history with past experiences in particular spaces, but also in the very activities that comprise the 
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experience; Tuan relates time explicitly to space by stating that the movement that gives us a sense 
of space is itself taking place over a period of time, regardless how transient that period is 
(1977:118). In this sense, “every activity generates a particular spatial-temporal structure, but this 
structure seldom thrusts to the front of people’s awareness” (Tuan, 1977:131). The temporal 
dimension of the production of space is what I will now turn my focus to, in introducing the idea 
of linguistic space, to examine Shanghairen’s loss of the right to that space.   
In my study, occupation of linguistic space means language usage in social interactions at 
any particular time point. The basic spatial-temporal act of speaking adds time to three-
dimensional space. Thus, speaking the Shanghai dialect is an act of producing and claiming a 
linguistic space. To a certain extent, the sound of its vernacular affirms the identity of the locale. 
In this light, we can understand why the UN official, Xu Haoliang, mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, would no longer regard the urban space as “Shanghai” if he could hear only Putonghua.  
The occupation of the linguistic space by Putonghua was well underway when investment 
capital began to alter the physical urban landscape in the late 1990s. According to David Harvey, 
urban entrepreneurialism emphasizes the importance of the locality as a site of regulation of 
infrastructural provisions, labor relations, environmental controls, and even tax policy vis-à-vis 
international capital (2001:360). In this sense, not speaking the vernacular adds one more 
dimension to a desirable local business environment. The Shanghai dialect is unintelligible to most 
Chinese living outside of the Wu linguistic region, and surely to all foreigners learning to speak 
Putonghua, China’s official language. Thus, for rational urban governance, allowing the Shanghai 
dialect to occupy linguistic space is an obstacle for urban growth at the very least, or at worst, it is 
a sign of an unfriendly business environment. 
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Since the 1990s, the flow of a highly mobile labor force, including the relatively small 
proportion of the highly educated office workers and entrepreneurs, and the majority of less-
educated manual laborers, have flooded the linguistic space in Shanghai with Putonghua. The 
decisive power of linguistic practice in Shanghai is in the hands of the central state, channeled 
through millions of internal migrants. The nationwide public school system guarantees the 
acquisition of Putonghua for Shanghairen and their counterparts across the country. The state-
owned mass media reinforces the practices of Putonghua across the spectrum of age, gender, class, 
and home origin. Together, these forces prepared for the replacement of the Shanghai dialect with 
Putonghua in the globalizing Shanghai. The dispossession of linguistic space experienced by 
Shanghairen is a latent, though no less intended, consequence of the urban entrepreneurialism that 
seeks to attract and accommodate an international investment and labor force that speaks 
Putonghua.   
To conclude, the analysis of the right to the city in the globalizing Shanghai is situated at 
the intersection of urban entrepreneurialism with Chinese characteristics, place attachment, and 
the disappearance of the linguistic space of the vernacular. Tuan points out that in general, 
whenever a person feels the world is changing too rapidly to comprehend, “the response is likely 
to evoke an idealized and stable past”; on the other hand, “when people feel that they themselves 
are directing the change, and in control of affairs of importance to them, then nostalgia has no 
place in their life: action rather than mementos of the past will support their sense of identity” 
(1977:188). Facing urban transformation created by the urban growth machine, and controlled by 
national elites and their delegates in Shanghai, Shanghairen are dispossessed, bewildered, and 
powerless.  
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Most of them are nostalgic for a linguistic space dominated by the Shanghai dialect, and 
romanticize demolished overcrowded alleyway housing. Some others are looking for a way to 
reclaim their city. After all, “[t]he right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access 
urban resources, but a common right that depends on the exercise of a collective power to reshape 
the processes of urbanization, and to assert the freedom to remake our cities and ourselves” 
(Harvey, 2008:23). A social awareness and movement to rescue the endangered Shanghai dialect, 
to reinstall its linguistic space in the globalizing Shanghai is the bottom-up effort by Shanghairen 
to reshape Shanghai, which has undergone massive redevelopment and urbanization at an 
unprecedented pace under neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics. What anchors this effort is 
collective consciousness of a cosmopolitan mentality with roots in the history of the city, and what 
this effort fights against is a nationalist image imposed by the state. 
 
Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism 
Nationalism underlies both China’s state promotion of Putonghua and the state’s 
construction of Shanghai as a global city. This is another dimension crucial to understanding the 
language conflict currently ongoing in Shanghai, a city famed for its cosmopolitan past. This 
means a clash between the state power that enables the transformation, and the rise of forces of 
local identity, in the broader context of economic globalization. In the re-globalization process, 
Shanghai faces a unique dilemma, and the city and its people must negotiate between a nationalist 
agenda and the city’s historical connection with the world.  
Gellner defines nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political 
and the national unit should be congruent” (1983:1). Furthermore, “there is the objective need for 
homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism, as a modern industrial state can only function with 
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a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, and interchangeable population” (Gellner, 1983:45). The 
implication of Gellner’s argument in this study is that to maintain political and ideological control 
throughout China, particularly under economic reform, the Chinese Communist Party requires an 
educated and culturally homogenous population. The cultural standardization and conformity 
stands in contrast to a sentiment of cosmopolitanism prevailing in Shanghai for the last century.  
A standard national language appears essential in an industrial society, which according to 
Gellner, “requires sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers, involving a 
sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required” 
(1983:34). In this formulation, the adoption and promotion of a standard national language does 
not necessarily lead to replacement or endangerment of vernacular languages. The reason for the 
backlash and resistance that Putonghua faces in Shanghai lies in the official rhetoric connecting 
economic growth and nationalism, in terms of repression of local languages.  
Gellner points out that “early industrialism means population explosion, rapid urbanization, 
labor migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward-
turned communities, by a global economy and a centralizing polity” (1983:42). This process took 
place both at the beginning of the 20th century in Shanghai, and now again through sweeping 
economic reforms in China at the turn of the 21st century. Thus, industrialism and practical needs 
for communication are not sufficient explanations for the current endangerment of the Shanghai 
dialect, because when those forces reached Shanghai a century ago, the dialect thrived. What 
differs between these two periods is the role of the Chinese national state in Shanghai; one hundred 
years ago it was a weak presence co-existed with imperialist powers, and currently a strong 
authoritarian state under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. I will explore the history and hybrid 
nature of the Shanghai dialect in more detail in chapter two; the dialect has always been a meeting 
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point for many different cultures and languages, since it developed as an urban dialect with 
cosmopolitan roots born in an industrial city. 
The relation between the Chinese state’s vision of a strong and rising China, and a standard 
official language appears straightforward in light of the need of unity and conformity under 
nationalism. But it might be more muddled if we examine further, and in light of the two modern 
senses of “nation”; as Hobsbawm points out, one is a cultural relation between state and people 
based on political participation and is known as citizenship; the other is based on some imagined, 
shared cultural identity (1983). Gal elaborates Hobsbawm’s insight about nations on the issue of 
language that “the uniformity of language is…proof that the speaking subject is an authentic 
member of the nation, linking speaker and language to the past and its (invented) traditions” 
(1992:448).  
This insight explains the rationale and urgency of the Chinese state’s promotion of 
Putonghua in the country’s recent intensified participation in globalization. The state’s rigid 
rejection of foreign cultural influences, especially notions of democracy and freedom of speech, 
makes apparent its fear of forces potentially disruptive to its rule. Gellner argues that “school-
mediated, state-sponsored literacy is learned as citizens are ‘exo-socialized’ into the crypto-
religion of the state, which is nationalism” (1983:57). Through the public education system, 
Putonghua has been promoted across the country, together with a patriotic ideology. The official 
language is regarded by the state as a uniting force to synthesize a united history of the Chinese 
people, and to mitigate the internal tension resulting from rising income and regional inequality in 
the economic reform era. The imposed happy fusion between the Chinese nation and Putonghua 
exemplifies an illusion Gal identifies elsewhere, which is “a circumscribed and internally 
homogeneous language with a similarly configured nation” (1992:449).  
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Hobsbawm’s first idea of nation can be applied smoothly in terms of the connection 
between nation, citizenship, and language; while it is his second sense of nation that proves most 
useful to understanding the collapse of an imagined, internalized “Chinese” identity. As I will 
detail in chapter three, the entire Chinese legal structure, from the constitution down to local 
regulations, requires citizens to speak Putonghua, abiding to the first sense of the nation, in terms 
of political and social obligations. However, the idea of Chinese as a unified ethnicity is 
problematic. Within China, “Chinese” is more an imposed political identity than a historically 
rooted cultural identity. There is never an agreed upon national cuisine or a nationwide shared 
mother tongue with which to identify a uniform Chinese identity.   
The significance of language for a social group’s exclusive membership and autonomy was 
declared by Fichte as early as in the 19th century, that “wherever a separate language can be found, 
there is also a separate nation which has the right to manage its affairs and rule itself” (1845-46:453, 
cited in Woolard, 1992:239). Concordance with this idea was already evident in a Western 
European context, when in the “aftermath of the French Revolution, a need for a unifying national 
identity, expressed in part by a single national language, was suddenly perceived” (Dorian, 1999:5, 
citing Grillo, 1989:22-42; Kuter, 1989:76). Exported through colonialism, this socially constructed 
nationalist agenda of language domination is “globally hegemonic today…state policies as well as 
challenges to the state around the world are structured by this nationalist ideology of language and 
identity” (Woolard, 1998:16-7). 
In a former Western European colony, Indonesia’s state government uses the educational 
system and national anniversary every year to confer a nationalist program, instilling a public and 
formal recognition of a “unified people” speaking “one language” in a “single homeland” 
(Errington, 2000:208). Similar to Putonghua in China, Indonesian is more or less an artificial, 
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state-supported dialect, hardly spoken natively in the majority of this former Dutch colony by the 
time of the World War II. But by 1995 it had become the fully viable, universally acknowledged 
national language, native to relatively few, but clearly ascendant over hundreds of ethnic languages 
spoken among more than two hundred million Indonesians (Errington, 2000:208-09). 
Closer to Mainland China, the promotion of Mandarin in Taiwan under the Kuomintang 
government after 1949 was of no less harm to indigenous languages native to the island. The 
decline of Taiwan’s indigenous languages is often blamed on early prohibition and subsequent 
neglect in the areas of education and media (Li, 2014:74). By the 1990s, the island had become 
90% Mandarin-speaking, up from only 4% half a century before (Her, 2009:385-86), and the 
majority of the population had long since shifted to using Mandarin in all domains (Chen, 2010:86). 
Both cases exemplify Gellner’s argument about the co-development of nation-states and national 
languages (1983).7  
In Mainland China, earlier studies have pointed out the connection between the promotion 
of Putonghua and the nationalist agenda from the perspective of national unity and political control. 
For example, Ramsey argues that the promotion of Putonghua is the product of modern nationalism, 
made possible through modernization of the education system, transportation, and communication 
methods (1989:30). Zhou and Ross also argue that the nationwide advocacy for a single, 
standardized language reflects the cultural and political elites’ agenda of building up national unity 
on the one hand, and political controllability on the other (2004). In terms of the promotion of 
Putonghua, and a national identity anchored on language in ethnic minority regions, Guo stresses 
that Putonghua “serves as a tool for both political control of the country’s periphery and the 
construction of a homogenous identity of Chinese-ness” (2004). In my study, I will address how 
                                                          
7 Despite Chinese Communist Party leaders refuse to accept Taiwan as an independent country, the case of 
Kuomintang’s intention to build up solidarity and unity in Taiwan as a nation-state serves my argument here.  
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this language-based nationalist agenda is enforced at the frontier of China’s encounter with 
globalization, and how a homogenous national identity is challenged in Shanghai.  
Nationalism is a useful and powerful tool for population control when an authoritarian state 
opens itself even partially to the world, especially in the light that “[n]ationalism is not the 
awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in 
reality the consequence of a new form of social organization” (Gellner, 1983:48). By presenting 
Putonghua as the ancestral language of the Han Chinese, and binding it with a national identity, 
the Chinese state has engaged in social engineering in deliberate ways to forge a sense of unity 
and loyalty. Thus, the cosmopolitanism of Shanghai with its rich semi-colonial, industrial history 
is at odds with China’s message of a unified national identity, and needs to be quieted and even 
excised, for the “invented” one-ness of nation-state to prevail.  
Over the course of Shanghai’s relatively short history, nationalism took on different 
meanings. Gellner argues, “the age of transition to industrialism was bound to be an age of 
nationalism” (1983:40). The anti-colonial and labor protests in Shanghai during the turbulent years 
of the early 20th century exemplify this. The nationalist sentiment then was anchored on political 
independence from imperialist and capitalist powers. However, in current times, on the issue of 
language, it is the very same kind of nationalist agenda, albeit one of unification through cultural 
homogeneity, that local Shanghairen hesitate to support. The uniformity and cultural homogeneity 
required by the nationalist vision clashes with the diversity inherited from Shanghai’s semi-
colonial history, landscape, urban culture, and population.  
Unlike the majority of Mainland China, the city of Shanghai has grown out of a semi-
colonial treaty port history. Starting with the Treaty of Nanking, signed between the Qing Dynasty 
and Great Britain, which introduced the political anomaly of extraterritoriality, Shanghai became 
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a shared jurisdiction between Britain, France, the United States, and after 1895, Japan. The 
existence of different concessions, each with its own set of extraterritorial laws, meant the daily 
life in Shanghai was a constant negotiation between Chinese and foreign powers, and among the 
foreign powers themselves. 
Out of that historical and political condition grew a “genuine cosmopolitanism”, as Ulf 
Hannerz defines it. He characterizes the city and its population, as having an orientation or 
openness toward divergent cultural experiences, an interest in contrasts rather than uniformity, and 
a cultural competence to readily make one’s way into other cultures (1990:239). Shanghai’s claim 
of a cosmopolitan past in the early 20th century means knowledge of other cultures, especially 
western cultures, and apparent tolerance or a blasé attitude, in Simmel's term, to live in a western-
oriented, culturally-diverse environment.  This is an experience that in large, the rest of China had 
little access or exposure to.   
The city’s experience of diversity was not without tension with the central state in the early 
20th century. Abbas sees the friction largely between Chinese-ness and cosmopolitanism that 
“Shanghai’s strength as a cosmopolitan city was always based on China’s weakness as a nation. 
Therefore, there was always an underlying tension between national culture on the one hand, which 
could only be constructed as anticolonial resistance, and Shanghai cosmopolitanism on the other 
(2002:215)”. Leo Ou-fan Lee interprets the phenomenon as less contentious, that the urban culture 
in Shanghai is a Chinese interpretation of modern cosmopolitan culture, “not as the cultural 
domination by the foreign but as the appropriation by the local of elements of foreign culture to 
enrich a new national culture” (1999:104).  
These “foreign” elements have been written about from the perspective of population 
composition, religious beliefs, and architectural styles in studies on Shanghai. At the core of 
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Shanghai's cosmopolitanism, argues Lu, is that the city has a well-established tradition of accepting 
newcomers, starting with the influx of merchants of the cotton trade in the 18th century from as far 
as Manchuria and Southeast Asia (2002:178). The later treaty port era, after the Opium War (1839-
42), according to Lu, scaled up the openness “norm” in accepting outsiders (2002:179).   
Abbas points out that the treaty port century in Shanghai’s history (1843-1945) was a time 
when the modern world was dominated by economically and politically more advanced Western 
powers, and thus, being cosmopolitan meant by and large being versed in Western ways 
(2002:210). Therefore, illustrations of the Golden Era of Old Shanghai largely focus on ways in 
which the city embraced Western culture, including ideologies, religious beliefs and consumer 
culture (See for example Bergère, 2000; Lee, 1999; Lu, 1999; Pan, 1982; Wasserstrom, 2009; Yeh, 
2008).  
But, it would be misleading to think of Shanghai’s cosmopolitanism as simply an East 
meets West phenomenon, with dominant Western European and American influences. There were 
always non-Western and non-Chinese actors playing key roles in the story of Shanghai’s 
globalization; for example, businessmen from Korea, Jewish Baghdadi real estate moguls, or 
Filipino musicians employed by the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra (Wasserstrom, 2009:129). 
Among the non-Western and non-Chinese participants in Shanghai’s initial rise to global city 
status were also White Russians, Sikh and Vietnamese policemen, Japanese soldiers (Gamble, 
2003:200) and a displaced Indonesian “radical”, who found himself in Shanghai in 1932, and that 
experience “shaped this ‘hero of national independence’ to confront colonialism and the nationalist 
agitations in Jakarta in the 1940s” (Kusno, 2003). 
Shanghai possessed many temples and shrines honoring various gods, individuals, and 
philosophers such as Lao-Tzi (Taoism) and Kong-Tzi (Confucianism). Besides these Chinese 
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homegrown religious beliefs, many others coexisted in Shanghai, which endowed the city with a 
diverse spiritual character that embraced Buddhism, Islam, Christianity and various local religions 
(Denison & Ren, 2006:25). The architecture within these various communities honored those 
traditions and their gods and goddesses, best illustrating the cultural heterogeneity in Shanghai. 
Domestic architecture was widely variable as well, with Qing dynasty courtyard houses, art deco 
apartment buildings, Western classical style public buildings, mock Tudor cottages, standing 
alongside Shikumen housing, which is a hybrid of a Chinese traditional courtyard house and 
Western townhouse (Gamble, 2003:200). 
The cosmopolitan population, jurisdiction, and culture were overhauled upon the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Nationalism trumped the individual character of the 
city. Holston and Appadurai point out that “one of the essential projects of nation building has 
been to dismantle the historic primacy of urban citizenship and to replace it with the national” 
(1996:196), and in the years since 1949, the cosmopolitan and migrant identity of Shanghai has 
been replaced by a national identity through legal, educational, and propaganda systems. With the 
transformation of China into a market economy, the contradictory notions of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism converge again in Shanghai.  
For more than a century, Shanghai was a surrogate of the West, with its Western-looking 
urban built environment and supply of Western commodities and culture. The material difference 
created and continuously reinforced a distinction, suggesting a Shanghairen identity, separate from 
Chinese identity but not fully Western either, however modern and cosmopolitan. The historically 
cosmopolitan Shanghai now faces a dilemma in the ongoing re-globalization. For a large part of 
China, embracing state-led globalization means discarding the local and the traditional, to embrace 
nationalism fashioned in the age of globalization. In Shanghai, cosmopolitanism today means 
 40 
 
accommodating global trends, but not necessarily with tolerance for native Chinese from poor, 
rural regions – especially when they share the urban spaces of Shanghai. It is an engineered 
diversity mixing Shanghai’s historically local characters inherited from the semi-colonial era, 
openness to the world, and intolerance of, or at least uneasiness with rural, inland Chinese-ness.  
In the post-colonial context, in describing the globalizing Singapore, Brenda Yeoh 
interprets cosmopolitanism as "an ideal, a desirable goal and a dream, which speaks of a unifying 
vision for urban democracy and governance in a globalizing world" (2004:2431). In the similar 
vein, Dharwadker explains values of cosmopolitanism as "inclusive egalitarian heterogeneity, of 
the tolerance of difference and otherness, of the equitable (re)distribution of resources and 
privileges, of the recognition of others' freedoms, of (comm)unity in diversity” (2001:7). This 
indiscriminative inclusive-ness, tolerance of differences, and celebration of diversity in a 
democratic city was not likely to be the case for a global city built by an authoritarian state.  
Shanghai’s reconnection with its early 20th century cosmopolitan golden age differs from 
recent changes in post-socialist cities such as Budapest or East Berlin, whose reconnections with 
the West were brought on by the collapse of the Communist Party’s power (Wasserstrom, 
2009:135-38). In Budapest, there has been an increasing degree of social and cultural heterogeneity 
within the city’s borders, a proliferation of difference, as people from varied places, speaking 
varied dialects and languages, plying varied trades, worshipping in varied ways, and cooking in 
diverse styles converge on a locale (Szelenyi, 1996). In Europe, many migrants are now coming 
from other countries and regions, hardly under the control of European governments. But in 
Shanghai, all the redevelopment, reconnection, and reclamation of global city status are cautiously 
initiated, and closely monitored by the state under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.  
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The flow of people coming into the city, though there are some foreign expatriates, are 
largely from other parts of China, who speak the same language and share the same ideology. To 
talk about cosmopolitanism in Shanghai today, does not mean the locals share the openness to 
varied ideologies, diverse languages, or architectural styles earlier generations had, but rather a 
national language forcing out the vernacular, and a state-sponsored “global city look” replacing 
vernacular and historically cosmopolitan architecture;  this juxtaposition  is explored in chapters 
three and four.  
Shanghai presents a site to study the localization of global forces, but more importantly, it 
allows me to examine the articulation and execution of nationalist visions and projects. This study 
of the language conflict in Shanghai illustrates the uniqueness of China’s participation in 
globalization, that selective global forces are allowed in, but only to serve and strengthen the 
Communist Party’s rule. This study will greatly contribute to examinations of confrontations 
between the local and the national in global city studies, especially those that focus on post-colonial 
and post-socialist cities. 
 
Research Methods 
To capture the multiple social processes Shanghairen use to make sense of, and come to 
terms with, the recent urban transformation, I used mixed methods in this study, including archival 
research, surveys, in-depth interviews and qualitative observation. The first phase of my research 
started in the summer of 2013 in New York City. During this phase, I was able to access documents 
online regarding state language policies and statements from the Ministry of Education of the 
People's Republic of China regarding the annual Putonghua Promotion Week from 1998 to 2013. 
Also remotely, through Weibo, the Chinese twitter, and Wechat, a Chinese smartphone social 
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network app, I established contact with Shanghai dialect preservation activists and public 
intellectuals interested in the fate of the vernacular. Many of them became gatekeepers essential 
for my fieldwork in Shanghai. 
My fieldwork took place in Shanghai in the fall and winter of 2013. I conducted 50 in-
depth interviews with members of the following groups: activists in the Shanghai dialect 
preservation movement, public intellectuals, school teachers and principals, vernacular novelists 
and comedians, journalists, college language organization leaders, and entrepreneurs in the 
language training business. The majority of them were born in, and spent most, if not all, of their 
life in Shanghai. Highly educated, of a middle class background, these participants all regard the 
Shanghai dialect as their native language. The only exceptions were a publisher who came from 
the Anhui province and three entrepreneurs in the language training business who came from the 
Zhejiang province, which is adjacent to Shanghai. The publisher attended college and lived in 
Shanghai for more than 20 years. He spoke Shanghai dialect with a Mandarin accent, and was the 
leading figure in publishing Shanghai dialect related works.  The three entrepreneurs spoke another 
variation of the Wu language—very similar to the Shanghai dialect—as their mother tongue, and 
had lived in Shanghai for more than a decade.  
Apart from interviewing experts and those who have a personal stake in the dialect-
speaking issue, I also investigated changes in language choices and practices of ordinary native 
Shanghairen of various backgrounds. Using my personal connections, I was able to recruit a wide 
variety of participants, ranging from college students in their early 20s, middle-class parents in 
their 30s and 40s, to middle-school educated seniors laid off from their work units in the 1990s, 
the majority being of a middle class background. All participants had experienced an outward 
movement from the overcrowded urban residence of childhood or youth to current single-family 
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apartments or condos. The conversation about language practices invariably led to reminiscences 
about their old neighborhoods, feelings of alienation, and descriptions of new urban areas and 
public transportation systems which did not exist ten or five years ago.  Their ready association of 
changes in language practices and changes to the urban demography, and to the urban landscape 
through these interviews confirmed my research questions about the relationship between language 
choices and urban transformations in Shanghai.  
To comply with the requirements of the Institutional Review Board on research involving 
human subjects, I provided and explained consent forms to all my interview participants at the 
beginning of our interviews. At the end of the consent form, I included one additional question 
asking whether they would allow me to use their real names in the dissertation and future 
publications resulting from this study. All of my interview participants checked yes to that question, 
feeling they had nothing to hide about their language choices and opinions on urban transformation. 
Those involved in the dialect preservation movement eager for more publicity or international 
attention, academic or not, were particularly excited about the prospect of being quoted or 
mentioned in my future publications outside of China. That is why throughout the dissertation, 
other than two occasions, I used the interview participants’ real names. The two occasions involved 
opinions on China’s current political system, and conversations with a journalist working for a 
leading state-owned Shanghai newspaper. Both these interview subjects requested me not identify 
them, and I sought to avoid potential exposure.  
Anonymity was less an issue for my survey research. Modeled after Woolard’s study on 
Catalan speakers in Barcelona in the 1980s, my survey questionnaire focused on Shanghai dialect 
proficiency and language choices at home, in school, at work, and in public, with different 
audiences, and covering decades of private and public life. Compared to the interview respondents, 
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the 250 survey participants were of a more diverse educational and class background. The survey 
questionnaire also included demographic information about families’ origins, mother tongues of 
the parents, education levels, and occupations, but the respondent’s name or contact information 
was not collected.  
Using snowball sampling technique, I recruited respondents both offline, in public 
gathering spaces, and online, via the professional survey website, Surveymonkey.com, which is 
the online host of my survey questionnaire. Online recruitment was aided by Weibo and Wechat, 
which allowed my initial respondents to send the web link of the survey questionnaire to their 
family members, coworkers, friends and acquaintances with a simple copy and paste. The offline 
recruitment mostly targeted seniors who were unfamiliar or uncomfortable with using computers 
or smartphones to fill out the online questionnaire. To collect data from that demographic group, 
I developed two strategies. First, I encouraged young and middle-aged survey participants to 
recruit their parents into the study, and help them with filling out the online survey questionnaire.  
Secondly, I obtained permission from a dialect preservation movement activist, Ge Minmin, 
who had recently retired after twenty-five years editing the well-known Shanghai dialect radio 
show he created, to distribute survey questionnaires at the free Shanghai Storytelling Gathering 
(shanghai gushi hui) that he organized. Since April 2012, this biweekly Shanghai vernacular stand-
up comedy and talk show, sponsored and housed at the Shanghai Mass Art Center (shanghaishi 
qunzhong yishuguan), has attracted a loyal following among Shanghairen retirees. To me, they 
were a hard to reach group, often suspicious of strangers, and fearful of trickery. An introduction 
from their beloved host, Mr. Ge, smoothed my way to recruit many longtime Shanghairen into my 
study. For a half hour before the beginning of four consecutive biweekly events, I was able to 
collect survey responses from audience members ranging in age from 60 to nearly 90. For those 
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without their reading glasses handy, I read aloud survey questions and response categories. Slowly, 
I was able to collect highly valuable data, from people no more than one generation removed from 
migrants to Shanghai, who nevertheless spoke the Shanghai dialect and regarded themselves as 
Shanghairen.  
Since I used improbable sampling technique to recruit survey participants, the data 
generated are not representative of the entire study population, which is native Shanghairen living 
in Shanghai. Unable to use these data to predict language death, I rely on these descriptive data 
from the survey to investigate generational differences in terms of dialect competences and 
language practices. These individual level changes taking places over decades, within one’s family 
or in public, provide snapshots of impact of state policies on linguistic space.  
Supplementing my interview and survey data, I employed triangulation, which is the use 
of two or more different measures to collect data on the same social phenomenon (Brewer & 
Hunter, 1989:17). In both in-depth interviews and survey questionnaires, I asked about the 
language choice in public: namely, which language my research participants used to communicate 
with friends, acquaintances, shopkeepers, bank cashiers, or staff at government agencies. The 
ethnography I conducted in Shanghai in the fall and winter of 2013 provided me opportunities to 
cross-validate language proficiency and choice data, as well as to capture how social dynamics 
played out in linguistic practices. Those dynamics mostly involved demonstration of educational 
level, of social status, and, most importantly, of Shanghairen identity, a fascinating category I 
explore throughout this work.   
Participant observations in public spaces, such as public transit, shopping malls, hospital 
lobbies, restaurants, or parks also expanded the scope of my data collection to include non-
Shanghairen, who do not speak the Shanghai dialect. To communicate with them, bilingual 
 46 
 
Shanghairen had no choice but to switch to Putonghua. The subtle but significant tension and 
hesitation, in the split second when a bilingual Shanghairen judged the circumstance and decided 
which language to use to initiate conversation with a stranger in public, was crucial for a better 
understanding of social distance and social integration in urban Shanghai.  
At the end of December in 2013. Using qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti, I coded 
all my interview transcripts in Chinese and organized important quotations into groups 
corresponding to the topics of my three empirical chapters. Out of the roughly forty-seven hours 
of interview recording, I only translated into English those interview excerpts that were actually 
used in the dissertation.  
In terms of survey results, descriptive data generated by Surveymonkey.com, along with 
field notes from my observations were incorporated into my writing about the broader linguistic 
landscape in Shanghai. Data collected through this combination of research methods about 
language practices all come together to depict the social and cultural costs of urban transformation 
in Shanghai. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Aside from the historical chapter following the introduction, three empirical chapters make 
up the core of this dissertation. The first empirical chapter is devoted to language policies and 
practices, while the other two describe social changes more broadly, focusing on the Shanghairen’s 
sense of urban space and local identity.  
I describe the cosmopolitan urban history of Shanghai in chapter two from three 
perspectives. The unique character of Shanghai, first and foremost, lies in its nature as a migrant 
city. I detail the four major waves of internal migration into Shanghai since the mid-19th century. 
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Each of these took place in a particular historical period significant for contemporary Chinese 
history, and stood at a junction of local, national and global forces. The second aspect of 
Shanghai’s urban history is the continuous urbanization and socio-geographical hierarchy of city 
neighborhoods. The issue of boundary has always been important in Shanghai, from the city wall 
between the territory controlled by the Qing Dynasty and the settlement and concession under the 
Western imperialist rule, to a “Upper/Lower Corner” geographical divide based on quality of 
housing and socioeconomic status of residents, to the Huangpu River which separates the urban 
west and formerly rural east bank, and traverses the city before reaching the East China Sea. Lastly, 
I provide a brief explanation of the origin and development of the Shanghai dialect. It is a hybrid 
urban language rooted in the Wu linguistic family, dating back six thousand years. The rising 
economic and cultural significance of Shanghai in the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
brought the regional language to a peak in prestige, influence, and use. But only a century removed 
from that era, we will learn, from my research, about its decline and endangerment.  
In chapter three, I examine the reasons for the dim prospects for the Shanghai dialect, 
emphasizing the Chinese Communist Party’s state language policies, particularly the strengthening 
of such policies in the last two decades. From a four-tiered legal structure of language laws, to 
national campaigns initiated by nine central government agencies since 1998, and administrative 
orders for workplace language practices, I illustrate the full scope of the promotion of Putonghua 
and the marginalization of regional dialects. The effect has been profound, and we see that in the 
context of China’s economic reform, the top-down promotion of Putonghua taps into pragmatic 
locals’ motivation for upward mobility. 
Expanding Bourdieu’s argument on the close relationship between state power and official 
language, I differentiate two markets for the conversion of linguistic capital into social, cultural, 
 48 
 
and economic capitals. The dominant market is created and controlled by the state, rewarding 
Putonghua competence through the education system and the labor market. Though on the fringe, 
the market of converting the linguistic capital of the Shanghai dialect into social and symbolic 
capital is still alive within the Shanghairen community. However, the existence of this market is 
unlikely to save the dialect from endangerment, as I will show that Shanghai dialect competence 
has drastically declined over the course of just one generation. To combat against this trend, a 
small group of highly educated Shanghairen has started a Shanghai dialect preservation movement. 
I document their strategies and internal conflicts at the end of chapter three.   
The focus in chapter four is how geographical displacement also contributes to the 
endangerment of the Shanghai dialect. Urban redevelopment and expansion in the last two decades 
in the state-led global city building process renders a multi-dimensional loss among Shanghairen, 
from the linguistic environment to the right to urban space. In place of traditional and dilapidated 
alleyway housing, glass-façade skyscrapers characterize the current urban built environment in 
Shanghai. The displaced Shanghairen, who are now homeowners rather than renters of state 
property, uniformly express alienation, and wholesale rejection of the new urban landscape. In 
their eyes, the new built landscape has obliterated Shanghai’s unique character. Powerless to 
confront the physical urban transformation resulting from the private-public partnership and 
controlled by national elites and their local delegates, Shanghairen create an alternative urban 
space in their mental mapping of the city. What they recognize as Shanghai is located in the city’s 
historic west bank, with a built environment inherited from semi-colonial times; in this space, 
speaking the local dialect remains a sign of membership.  
In chapter five, I examine the demographic dimension of the urban transformation in 
Shanghai. Fifteen years after the beginning of reforms to the hukou system, and thirty years into 
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the economic reform, the privilege once exclusively associated with a Shanghai hukou has 
diminished. Furthermore, to meet the labor demand of building a global city, the municipal 
government has created new categories that sidestep the national hukou system, and grant internal 
migrants legal status and access to social services in the city. Under this overarching structural 
change, my closer look into the social integration of recent internal migrants reveals that this 
acceptance is based on educational level and socioeconomic status. That is to say, in the social 
space shared at a workplace, in social circles and in the family, Shanghairen are more comfortable 
with highly educated and better-off migrants.   
The institutional and selective social acceptance of migrants, however, backfires in the 
debate of who counts as a Shanghairen. In this study, for the purpose of clarification, I call those 
born to Shanghairen parents and with an urban Shanghai hukou “natives” or “native Shanghairen 
(Shanghai people)”, and those born to non-Shanghairen parents “non-natives”; in the case of those 
who later acquire a Shanghai hukou, “non-native Shanghairen”. This categorization can be 
inaccurate in various ways; for example, first and second generation migrants to Shanghai, arriving 
before the household registration system was put into place in the 1950s, identify themselves as 
Shanghairen. In the second part of chapter five, I discuss the various dimensions of Shanghairen 
identity, including legal, residential, linguistic, and the most important indicator, an individual’s 
self-identification. In the end, a particular combination of mindset and demeanor, that I call 
Shanghairen habitus, emerges, and will remain a significant way of making distinctions in the 
revived migrant city.   
To conclude, in chapter six I summarize the social and cultural costs of Shanghai’s urban 
transformation: the diminished linguistic space of the Shanghai dialect, the loss of character of the 
urban built environment, the challenged right to the city among native Shanghairen, and the 
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continued ambiguity of Shanghairen identity. Though I do not predict the death of the Shanghai 
dialect, I share my interview subjects’ serious concern about its future. Lastly, looking beyond 
Shanghai, I propose a future comparative study with Hong Kong on the fate of local dialect, 
regional identity, and populist democracy in light of the Cantonese-speaking pro-universal-
suffrage “Umbrella Revolution” crushed by the central government.   
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Chapter 2: A Cosmopolitan Past 
 
Though globalization has changed the face of Shanghai, the city has a cosmopolitan past 
that began with the end of the Opium War in 1843. As part of the Treaty of Nanjing, Shanghai was 
forced to open to the West as a treaty port. Cosmopolitanism in Shanghai a century and half ago 
was mostly characterized as a juxtaposition of cultures; in other words, East meets West. In order 
to understand the city’s cosmopolitanism in the mid nineteenth century, especially in contrast with 
the rest of the country, which was still mostly closed from Western or other outside influence, it is 
useful to see “[c]osmopolitanism was first a modernist argument against the tyranny of “tradition” 
as narrow parochialism and ethnocentrism” (Abbas, 2002:210). In this view, Shanghai as a treaty 
port was open to the modern world, which was then dominated by economically and politically 
more advanced Western powers. Thus, rather than indiscriminative inclusive-ness, tolerance of 
differences, and celebration of diversity, being cosmopolitan in Shanghai meant Chinese subjects 
being versed in Western ways. 
From the city’s migration history, urban landscape, and hybrid dialect, I will illustrate in 
this chapter the fabricated cosmopolitan past of Shanghai. To understand Shanghai’s cosmopolitan 
character, we first need to look at the two competing narratives of Shanghai’s origin. The one 
recognized and promoted by the central and municipal government stresses that Shanghai has a 
rich history, reaching back seven hundred years as a coastal town, and though Shanghai rose to 
become a cosmopolitan metropolis in the early twentieth century, it was invaded, occupied, and 
exploited by the West. Western settlers, as the historian Jeffrey Wasserstrom points out, favored a 
counter-narrative. These settlers declared 1843 as the year the city was founded, and thus, their 
presence was natural and beneficial to the land and to the native people (2009:120).  
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There is merit and fault in both narratives. On the one hand, when Shanghai Township first 
appeared in Chinese historical records, it was not located where urban Shanghai is now, which 
disputes the official narrative of seven hundred years’ local history. On the other hand, to argue 
that Shanghai did not exist at all until 1843 disregards all previous history and the significant 
Chinese population that lived on the land currently occupied by metropolitan Shanghai. Therefore, 
for the central and local state in Shanghai to insist on the rich history of Shanghai Township before 
the treaty is to claim the city’s Chinese origin. This narrative downplays the role played by foreign 
forces in building the city’s cosmopolitan past; this version of events is vital to the current state-
led global city building process. This time, Shanghai will become a bigger and stronger, and 
distinctly Chinese global city, under the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership.    
Interestingly, the second narrative has its supporters among the so-called native 
Shanghairen, whose ancestors mostly came to Shanghai in the late 19th or early 20th centuries from 
nearby towns or villages in the Yangtze River Delta. Compared to the recent internal migrants to 
Shanghai, brought in to meet the labor demand of a globalizing city, these Shanghairen are the 
earlier migrants, or descendants of earlier migrants who contributed to Shanghai’s cosmopolitan 
past a century ago. By insisting on 1843 as the beginning of the city of Shanghai, these Shanghairen 
assert their birthright to the city. This migration history of the city is crucial for understanding the 
cosmopolitan identity of Shanghai, and the conflicts between so-called native Shanghairen and 
recent migrants, which I will elaborate in chapter five. 
 
A Migrant City 
The history of Shanghai is a history of migration. The now so-called native Shanghairen 
(Shanghai people) are urbanites descended from migrants only a century ago, that is to say, they 
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themselves are second or third generation migrants. When Huating County—later renamed 
Songjiang County, and which Shanghai Township once belonged to—was established in the 
prosperous Tang Dynasty (AD 751). At that time, the current urban area of Shanghai was still 
under water on the continuously expanding Yangtze River Delta. Therefore, no group can claim 
themselves indigenous to the city (Zhu, Liu & Chen, 2008:7). 
For most of its over seven hundred years’ history, Shanghai was initially a fishing village, 
and later a trading port. The simultaneous remoteness from political power located in the north, 
and function as a river trading post made Shanghai similar to other townships in the Yangtze River 
Delta. The circular wall (See Figure 2.1) reflected the city’s relatively minor political status among 
China’s larger imperial cities, most of which employed sharp rectangular walls and linear street 
patterns. According to official records, 1291 was the year when a place called “Shanghai” first 
appeared in written documents. The predecessor of that town was a fishing village in the tenth 
Figure 2.1: Map of Shanghai county seat in Qing Dynasty Tongzhi Period 
(1861-74). Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
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century called Hu Du, naming after hu (沪, bamboo stakes), which fisherman sank into the mud to 
anchor their nets (Dong, 2000:12). In 1291, Shanghai County was established with Shanghai Town 
as the county seat. At that time, the county seat was merely nine square li, approximately 556 acres 
(Zou, 1980:90-1), located at the tip of the Yangtze River Delta, facing the East Sea of China, and 
sat at the midpoint of China’s coastline. This ideal location made it a major port in China’s coastal 
trade by the seventeenth century, and a big lure for anyone attempting access to China’s interior 
(Dong, 2000:12).  
On 29 August 1842, the defeated Qing Dynasty signed the Treaty of Nanjing to end the 
Opium War. The treaty made Shanghai one of five treaty ports opened to British residence and 
trade. 8  The treaty granted the British a vast amount of land west and north of the walled county 
seat in 1843. This historical event forever changed the fate of Shanghai, and set it on the trajectory 
to become a migrant city, and cosmopolitan metropolis in the early 20th century.  
The population of the Shanghai County grew only gradually since its establishment in the 
late 13th century, but increased rapidly after 1843. The early residents of the predecessor, the 
Songjiang County, were migrants from the neighboring Suzhou region, and refugees from Genghis 
Khan’s invasion of central China, which drove the Song Dynasty and its Han Chinese subjects 
south to establish the South Song Dynasty (AD 1127—1279).  That new dynasty set up its capital 
in Hangzhou roughly 100 miles southwest of Shanghai (Zhu, Liu & Chen, 2008:7). Historically, 
Chinese elite and literati were rooted in rural areas, where they kept their permanent property, 
family tombs and lineage temples. Urban living was mostly for officials to fulfill their duties, or 
for merchants. Little evidence indicates any large rural-urban migration to Shanghai before 1843 
(Zhao, 2004:52).  
                                                          
8 The other four treaty ports were Canton, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Ningbo. In the same treaty, Hong Kong was ceded 
to Britain as a colony. 
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Before the outbreak of the Opium War (AD 1839–1842), the population of Shanghai was 
estimated to be one hundred and twenty thousand (Zhu, Liu & Chen, 2008:7, cited from Shanghai 
County—Custom). In that year of “Opening Treaty Ports” (开埠 , kaibu), the population in 
Shanghai was less than two hundred thousand (Zhu, Liu & Chen, 2008:9). Within merely ten years, 
official records show that by 1852, the population had nearly tripled, to reach 544,413, largely due 
to internal migration (Zou, 1980:113).  
This first population boom in Shanghai was the direct result of a war between China and 
the West. It represented the characteristics of the city’s migration history; that it was engendered 
by forces beyond the city’s wall, and largely beyond the country’s wall, even though the population 
involved were mostly Chinese. Before rigid measures were put into place to restrict migration into 
the city during the Maoist era, this characteristics of large migration into Shanghai repeated four 
times, which I will illustrate in detail below. The economic reform era since 1990s in Shanghai, 
when the central state initiated the building of a global city, we have seen this characteristics 
revived. Similar to nearly a century ago, this time too, the population involved are mostly Chinese 
from other parts of the country, and their geographical mobility are enabled and subjected to forces 
beyond the city and the country’s wall, in the larger context of globalization.  
 
Waves of Early Migration 
Shanghai quickly turned into a migrant city after kaibu. During the treaty port period (1843-
1943), the population of Shanghai grew almost threefold, from around half a million in the mid-
19th century to almost 1.3 million in 1900, and increased to 3.7 million by 1935. The population 
in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party took over and most foreigners left the city, was 
roughly 5.46 million (Zou, 1980:90-1, 113). Among any of these periods of time, the original 
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population of the Shanghai County never counted more than one-fifth of the urban population (Zou, 
1980:112-13). The main reason for such rapid population growth was waves of internal migration, 
driven mostly by war out of the home region and attracted by economic prospects in the metropolis. 
In the last century and a half, Shanghai has experienced four huge waves of internal 
migration. The urban population first started to increase rapidly during the Taiping Rebellion (AD 
1851-1864), a peasant-led revolt against the Qing Dynasty that originated in Guangxi province in 
southern China. Shanghai itself came under threat when the rebel’s army established the Heavenly 
Kingdom and set the capital in Nanking, only two hundred miles to the northwest. Twice the army 
of Taiping appeared outside of the walls of Shanghai, in 1860 and 1862, and twice they were 
defeated by joint French, British, and Qing Dynasty forces (Bergère, 2009: 42-4). During that 
period, hundreds of thousands fled their homes in the Yangtze River Delta to seek refuge in 
Shanghai’s foreign concessions, which quickly changed these areas from “quarters reserved for 
Westerns into Sino-foreign towns” (Bergère, 2009:44).  
It is from the influx of war refugees during the Taiping Rebellion that a social hierarchy 
based on regional origin began to develop among Chinese residents of the city, in both the walled 
Chinese City and the foreign concessions. Many of the wealthy gentry and merchant families that 
had sought refuge in the treaty port during the Taiping Rebellion remained in Shanghai, often in 
partnership with foreigners, and began investing in trade and commerce, shifting native capital 
from the countryside into the city (Dong, 2000:64). Merchants, gentry, and literati came 
predominantly from the adjacent Suzhou-Wuxi area of southern Jiangsu province, the Ningbo-
Shaoxing region of northern Zhejiang province, and Canton; while laborers mostly came from 
northern Jiangsu province (Dong, 2000:75-6; Honig, 1992:12).  
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The second wave of migration was caused by the Boxer Rebellion (or Yi He Tuan 
Movement, 1898-1900), when war refugees again poured into the settlement and concessions to 
escape the unrest and revolts in the nearby countryside. Among this influx, class differentiation 
based on origin echoed that of the first wave. The gentry and merchants from southern Jiangsu and 
northern Zhejiang joined their earlier counterparts to form the Chinese elite group in Shanghai. 
Those from northern Jiangsu of poor rural origin, with limited education, primarily occupied the 
unskilled service sector as coolies and sanitation workers, if they did not become beggars.  
After these first two waves, the population in Shanghai was 3.7 million in 1935, among 
which there were also tens of thousands of foreign residents, making the city truly cosmopolitan. 
Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Chinese Republic all had some jurisdiction over 
certain parts of the city, a hybrid government overseeing a transnational population.  Just as 
Chinese migrants from various parts of the country found their way to the city, by 1932, some 
48,000 foreigners representing fifty different nationalities lived in Shanghai. In addition, there 
were anywhere from 25,000 to 50,000 White Russians, who had fled the Bolshevik Revolution 
(Dong, 2000:224).  
It was not until the third wave during the Anti-Japanese War (1937-45), which the West 
knows as the Second World War, that the urban population swelled again. On August 12th 1937, 
the Japanese advance fleet of twenty-six warships moved down the Huangpu River, which is the 
major waterway in Shanghai, connecting the Yangtze River to the East China Sea. On August 14th, 
remembered ominously in the annals of Shanghai as “Bloody Saturday”, hundreds of thousands of 
residents from urban areas controlled by the Republic of China and Shanghai’s outlying 
countryside poured into the foreign concessions. Over the next two months, bitter fighting took 
place in and around Shanghai, which drove hundreds of thousands more refugees into the foreign 
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settlements (Dong, 2000:254). This resulted in a combined population increase for the 
International Settlement and the French Concession of 780,000 (Zhu, Liu & Chen, 2008:9). Shortly 
after, during the Liberation War (the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang Party and the 
Chinese Communist Party, 1946-49), the fourth wave came to Shanghai. This enormous migration 
brought more than two million people. Starting from kaibu in 1843, the four big waves of 
migrations into Shanghai by and large resulted from wars. Thus, it was haven becoming home for 
current Shanghairen’s parents and grandparents. 
In less than a century, the migrant city of Shanghai grew from a node in the network of 
towns in the Yangtze River Delta, to a treaty port and home for those seeking fortune or refuge 
from home and abroad. Geographically, politically, economically, and culturally significant in 
China’s contemporary history, Shanghai under the Chinese Communist Party’s population control 
policies experienced severe decline of migration influx. Those policies enacted shortly after the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 institutionally created an urban population 
with Shanghai hukou.  
 
During the Maoist Era 
The restrictions on internal migration were measures to facilitate the planned economy 
mode that dominated Mainland China until the emergence of the “Open Policy” in 1978 that aimed 
to establish a market economy under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. In the early 1950s, 
regulations were adopted to control population flows, in order to re-establish urban public order 
after years of warfare, to facilitate agricultural production, and to regulate resource allocation (Lu, 
2002:124). Using an indicator called mechanical population growth, 9  which is calculated by 
                                                          
9 It is also an indicator used by National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China and its regional 
division to track internal migration.  
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subtracting those moving out of an urban area from those moving in, we can see the trend of 
immigration decline in Shanghai since 1952 (See Figure 2.2). The volatile pattern in the 1950s 
resulted from food shortages in urban areas, which triggered later population control measures 
(Chen, 2011:101).The spike in the number of immigrants in mid-1970s is due to the return of 
Shanghai youth who were sent down to the countryside against their will during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76). I will explain it in more detail later.  
The passing of the Household Registration (Hukou) Regulation in 1958 led to a decline in 
both the numbers entering and leaving Shanghai, until both decreases came to a halt in 1967. The 
1958 Hukou Registration later became the legal basis of restriction and control of geographical 
movement, and for monitoring and limiting any individual’s claim to social resources. This 
regulation was intended to stabilize population movement, with the effect of strictly limiting the 
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ability of rural workers to find non-agricultural work in cities (Lu, 2002:125). This essentially 
created a de facto internal passport system (Chan, 1994:91).  
The spike on the chart in 1979 represents the return of native Shanghairen forced to leave 
the city during the first three years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Though essentially a 
struggle within the party for the next generation of leadership after Mao, this period resulted in a 
nationwide movement to forcefully relocate high school students and urban youth to collective 
farms in rural and periphery areas to learn from peasants, instead of advancing academically. 
Nationwide, 40 million youth participated, most involuntarily, in this “go up to the mountains, go 
down to the countryside” (shangshan xiaxiang) political movement. Towards the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, measures were issued by the central state to allow many of displaced urban 
youth to return to their hukou location. They either took over their parents’ jobs, found other sorts 
of entry-level urban occupations, or were admitted into colleges. The higher education system, 
halted during the Cultural Revolution period, reopened for the first post-revolution cohort in 1977. 
Therefore, the mechanical population change from the late 1960s to the end of 1970s is a story of 
zero-sum gain, which depicts a generation of native Shanghairen driven out of, and after many 
years, allowed back into their hometown. 
The population data I compiled for this chart from yearbooks published by the Shanghai 
Statistical Bureau represent Shanghai hukou population. As explained in the introduction, hukou 
status introduced in 1958 was essential for a Chinese citizen’s everyday life, determining food 
rations, healthcare, employment, and even criminal records during the Maoist era; thus, when the 
hukou system was strictly implemented nationwide, the hukou population could serve as the proxy 
for the city’s population. During this thirty year period Shanghai was not a migrant city, and should 
not be understood as such, due to hukou status prohibiting voluntary geographical mobility.  
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New Migrants 
The migration situation in Shanghai started to change after the 1992 Tour of the South 
(nanxun) of then Party Secretary, Deng Xiaoping. Despite the “Opening Policy” that was issued 
in 1978, economic reforms did not reach Shanghai in large measure until after that tour. Lu notes 
that the central government saw social stability, built through household registration system, as a 
prerequisite for economic development in the early years of economic reform (2002:127). To 
control the population growth in cities and towns, the State Council issued a regulation about 
hukou status on November 1st, 1977; it stated that non-local hukou holders and the unemployed 
should return to their hukou locations, in particular to rural regions; these migrants being the result 
of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.  It was not until the Shanghai Blue-stamp Hukou 
Temporary Management Regulations (Shanghaishi Lanyin Hukou Guangli Zhanxing Guiding), 
which went into effect on February 1st, 1994, that Shanghai systematically allowed migrants 
without Shanghai hukou to settle in Shanghai. 
Economic development in Shanghai and further local amendment of the hukou system are 
inextricably linked from this point forward. Local migration regulations were allowed by the 
central state, and devised by the Municipal Government of Shanghai to circumvent national hukou 
restrictions to meet the labor force demand, and to build Shanghai into China’s global city. 
The first clause of the 1994 regulation explains that its purpose is to fulfill the needs of 
establishing a socialist market economy, and to manage temporary residents from outside Shanghai. 
Instead of the red stamp used on native Shanghairen’s hukou booklet, between 1994 and 2002, 
internal migrants received a blue stamp, which listed their birthplace. The reasons for the lack of 
a significant increase in the migrant population in Shanghai after this new regulation are the 
difficulty migrants experienced acquiring it and the high costs involved (See Figure 2.2). For each 
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blue-stamp hukou, applicants originated from elsewhere in China were required to invest at least 
one million yuan. In addition, those private investors would need to have already established 
lawful long-term residence in Shanghai before submitting the application. Each additional blue 
stamp hukou, for example for spouse or children, cost the same as the original. 
Other ways to apply for a blue stamp hukou included application through employers or 
through the purchase of market-rate housing of more than 100 square meters. Termed “flexible 
circulation” of talents, the blue stamp hukou is comparable to current international practices of 
“technical immigration” and “investment immigration”. By the end of 2000, Shanghai had 
approved nearly 30,000 individuals for blue stamp hukou. Among these, 20,000 were granted the 
permit by purchasing market-rate housing (Kang, 2002:62). Simply put, those able to acquire blue 
stamp hukou in Shanghai belonged to the newly rising elite group, comprised of domestic 
entrepreneurs, the highly educated, and the highly skilled. However, they represent only a small 
portion of internal migrants in Shanghai.  
The majority of internal migrants were less-educated and low-skilled temporary laborers, 
whose status as wage labor echoed that of migrants arriving in the first half of the twentieth century. 
With neither a red stamp, nor a blue stamp on their household registration booklet, this migrant 
population is not included in the Shanghai hukou population chart (Figure 2.2). To a certain extent, 
they are invisible on paper, even though they supply the majority of the low-end labor force.  
To manage them, the Shanghai Municipal Government enacted the Shanghai Floating 
Population Management Regulation (Shanghaishi Wailai Liudong Renyuan Guangli Tiaoli), on 
January 1st, 1997. The tone of this regulation is rather different from the one issued to welcome 
the wealthy and the highly educated in 1994; that it sees the floating population as potential threat 
to the urban social order. The class difference addressed in this regulation compared to the one 
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issued in 1994 is also apparent, which is best illustrated in clauses about housing and work.  The 
1997 regulation contains no clause about housing purchases; rather, it contains detailed procedures 
for finding apartments and rental properties. On top of the temporary residency card, these floating 
non-natives needed to apply for a work permit to legally obtain employment in Shanghai. In terms 
of the work permit, one detail in the 1997 regulation exemplifies the type of jobs some migrants 
would find: a clause explaining how to obtain the work permit if one’s job was as a domestic 
worker. This is in sharp contrast to those non-natives eligible for a blue stamp hukou, who were 
supposed to be capable of investing at least one million yuan. More details on the job status of 
non-native migrants over the last two decades will be discussed in chapter five. 
Both the 1994 and 1997 regulations were updated with new regulations issued in early 
2000s; these constant changes reflect not only the extraordinary labor demands of redeveloping 
Shanghai as a global city (Chen, 2009), but also how closely the municipal government monitored 
and adjusted its population policy to facilitate the city’s economic development, and to address its 
social consequences.  The rhetoric used to describe the purposes of the two regulations changed in 
the new versions, from the hesitant openness that characterized the 1994 and 1997 regulations to 
a full embrace of a migrant influx, though that welcoming tone remains contingent upon class. 
That is to say, for highly educated, skilled, and wealthy migrants, the purpose of the regulation 
focuses on their potential contribution to the city; and to those less-educated, of low skill level and 
rural background, the purpose of the regulation indicates more social service.  
The Temporary Regulation on the Shanghai Residency Permit for Imported Talent (yinjin 
rencai shixing shanghaishi juzhuzheng zhidu zhanxing guiding), which went into effect on April 
30th, 2002, explicitly aims to facilitate the flow of talent, to encourage employment, investment, 
and to enhance the city’s overall competitiveness. This 2002 regulation made a bachelor degree or 
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higher an eligibility requirement for a Shanghai Residency Permit. It also explicitly states that the 
residency permit allows the holder to participate in the municipal’s social security system, hence 
enjoy its benefits.   
Two years later, on August 30th, 2004, the Shanghai Residency Permit Temporary 
Regulation (shanghaishi juzhuzheng zhanxing guiding) went into effect. This regulation expanded 
on the 2002 temporary regulation, applying to less educated migrants. The stated purpose of this 
regulation differs from its antecedent; rather than bolstering the city’s competitiveness or 
enhancing Shanghai’s status as a global city, as declared in Clause 1, this regulation was designed 
to “protect the legal rights of those coming to Shanghai, to standardize and digitalize population 
management, and to improve governmental services”. This regulation extends legal residency and 
employment to the less educated and less skilled population, predominantly of rural origin (79.4% 
of the newcomers according to the 2010 census). Two surveys conducted by the Shanghai 
Statistical Bureau in 2000 and 2003 showed that more than half of the non-hukou population in 
Shanghai had a middle school education or lower, and only 10% had completed high school (Zhu, 
Liu & Chen, 2008:18). Thus, the early 2000s regulations institutionally provided a more 
welcoming environment for the majority of the migrant labor. 
The blue stamp hukou and later residency permit system created by the Shanghai Municipal 
Government have bypassed the national hukou system, and brought an influx of internal migrants 
to Shanghai who are vital for the city’s participation in economic globalization. A close reading of 
the four regulations reveals that non-natives entering Shanghai are allotted very different levels of 
governmental support and service based on socioeconomic status. Those who are less educated are 
called job seekers (jiuye) or business owners; those who are highly educated, skilled, and wealthy 
belong to a category called imported talent (yinjin rencai), who either obtain blue stamp hukou or 
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fall under the “talent” category in their official dossier. Other than domestic entrepreneurs, these 
two groups are similar to the polarized labor force that Sassen characterizes in global cities: the 
highly educated and wealthy work predominantly in Fortune 500 companies and in tertiary 
industries, while laborers with limited education work in the service sector (1991). Recent 
migration policies brought in both of these groups, and included measures for them to stay for the 
long term in a globalizing Shanghai.  
With millions of residency permit holders legally living and working in the city, the number 
of hukou holders is not sufficient to capture the population size of Shanghai. In a report published 
by the Shanghai Statistical Bureau in 2006, the hukou population in Shanghai was 13.6 million; 
however, the actual number of residents in Shanghai, including the hukou population, those having 
residency permits, and the temporary floating population, was more than 19.2 million. 10 This 
demonstrates the weakening of hukou status in terms of urban legal residency and entitlement to 
social services, that the non-hukou population was already accounted for one third of the urban 
population in 2005. More importantly, this discrepancy indicates the globalizing Shanghai is no 
longer a place under rigid population control as in the Maoist era, but entering a phase of 
cosmopolitanism.  
The juxtaposition of the fifth and sixth censuses, conducted in 2000 and 2010, further 
demonstrates the migrant city identity of Shanghai. In 2010, the hukou population and long-term 
non-hukou residents were a little more than 23 million, increased from 16.7 million in 2000. 11 In 
2010, of 23 million people in Shanghai, almost 9 million were recent migrants. According to the 
                                                          
10 “Overview of Shanghai Population in 2005”. Shanghai Statistical Bureau. April 5th, 2006. http://www.stats-
sh.gov.cn/fxbg/201103/94427.html 
11 “Data Manual of the Sixth Census of Shanghai”. Shanghai Statistic Bureau. http://www.stats-
sh.gov.cn/sjfb/201203/239823.html 
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2000 census, of Shanghai’s 16.7 million residents, 3.5 million were migrants. 12  This figures 
indicate that 87% of the population growth over the first decade of the 21st century in Shanghai 
was due to internal migration. 
Such enormous population increase, over such a short period of time, is the result of 
measures taken by Shanghai’s municipal government to overcome labor shortages in constructing 
Shanghai into a world-class financial center and global city. According to the 2010 census, almost 
half of the non-hukou population was between ages of 20 and 34, exceeding their Shanghai-hukou 
counterparts by 7.7%, making the former group the majority of the labor force.13 The city grants 
the permit holders social services once provided only to native Shanghairen such as housing, 
schooling for children, pension plans, health insurance, and loans for housing and vehicle 
purchases. Through these measures, the privilege once associated exclusively with Shanghai hukou 
was extended to those recent migrants, the social impact of which will be elaborated in chapter 
five. 
After twenty years of using regulations to circumvent national hukou restrictions to build 
Shanghai into China’s global city, the municipal government of Shanghai eventually replaced the 
2002 and 2004 temporary residency permit regulations with Regulations on Shanghai Residency 
Permit, which came into effect on July 1st, 2013. This law continues the measures to protect 
internal migrants’ legal rights, to standardize population management, and to enhance 
governmental services in facilitation of economic, social, and environmental development. In 
addition, the criteria for application is streamlined to require only legal employment, lawful 
residence and more than six months of contribution to social security.  
                                                          
12  “Report of Fifth Census – Shanghai.” National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/200203/t20020331_30355.html 
13 “The Current State and Characteristics of Shanghai’s Migrant Population”. Shanghai Statistic Bureau. Sept.23rd, 
2011. http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/fxbg/201109/232741.html 
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Compared to the rigid requirements for a blue stamp hukou in 1994, the requirements for 
a residency permit in 2013 were significantly less. Moreover, the Experimental Measure for 
Residency Permit Holders to Apply for Shanghai Hukou, issued on February 12th, 2009, offered a 
new opportunity. This new regulation offered to those holding a residency permit for seven years, 
during which time they continuously contributed to social security and paid income tax, the ability 
to obtain a Shanghai hukou. On the one hand, this rewards migrants who have contributed to 
building a globalizing Shanghai a permanent legal status; but on the other hand, it muddles the 
definition of Shanghairen since hukou has long been a definitive and exclusive indicator of 
Shanghairen identity based on birthplace.  
Those who lived through the Maoist era in Shanghai, when the hukou system rigidly 
controlled geographical mobility and resource allocation, nowadays firmly assert and defend their 
Shanghairen identity and its associated social privilege and status. However, they are themselves 
children of earlier migrants, many of whom arrived in Shanghai only a generation before. A police 
officer in his late 40s, a university professor in his late 50s, and a retired entrepreneur in his early 
60s, all told me that they were not really by origin Shanghairen. Though each was born and grew 
up in Shanghai, their parents originated in Shandong, Hebei, and Jiangsu provinces respectively. 
It was such a cosmopolitan metropolis tolerating differences and promising upward mobility that 
drew the parents of the police officer, professor, and entrepreneur to Shanghai in the early 20th 
century.  Now that Shanghai again participates in the global economy, its economic development 
demands and accommodates millions of migrants, who will contribute to a new kaleidoscope of 
cosmopolitan Shanghai. 
In the past, flows of migrants brought fortune, opportunity, and tension to the city, 
beginning with the first day of the “Opening Treaty Port”. Just as important, the birth of the “Paris 
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of the Orient” was also the result of foreign settlers’ greed and Chinese sovereigns’ vulnerability 
in Shanghai. Imprinted in the contour of the city and the built environment is the sociospatial 
hierarchy of urban neighborhoods. Resulting from the colonial era’s segregated jurisdictions, the 
mental mapping of the cosmopolitan Shanghai has always been divided along socioeconomic and 
cultural boundaries.  
 
A Divided Landscape 
The divided urban landscape of Shanghai was a story of East meets West; but more 
importantly, a story of rezoning and urban expansion, starting from the previously rural land 
outside of the walled county seat after kaibu. Similar to the migration history in Shanghai, the 
forces shaping and dividing the cosmopolitan landscape have been mostly foreign, but the 
population involved have largely been Chinese. During Shanghai’s semi-colonial era, the 
International Settlement, which occupied the area surrounding the walled county seat, in the 
northeastern part of the city on the waterfront, was under British and United States rule, with street 
names such as Avenue Edward VII, after the son of Queen Victoria. Located southwest of the city 
center was the French Concession, with street names such as Avenue Joffre, named after a French 
general of the First World War. The divided jurisdiction transformed Shanghai into a cosmopolitan 
metropolis with a diverse built environment and urban culture.  
The settlement boundaries functioned as means of social segregation from the time of their 
establishment, and the divide later translated into what was called an upper/lower corner 
distinction. Those with modern, upscale, Western-looking housing in central and southwestern 
areas of the city were called upper-corner (shangzhijiao), while those shantytowns and low-end 
alleyway housing in the working class north and northeastern part of the city were deemed lower-
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corner (xiazhijiao). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, despite the 
Communist Party’s condemnation of capitalist consumption and lifestyle, the lack of new housing 
and neglect to urban infrastructure in the Maoist era reinforced the distinction between upper/lower 
corners in the minds of millions of Shanghairen.  
This dichotomy inherited from the colonial era has influenced Shanghairens’ housing 
choices, geosocial mobility and place-bound identity throughout the 20th century, until a competing 
new divide emerged in the economic reform era. Pudong, rural land located east of the Huangpu 
River, was rezoned to be part of urban Shanghai in 1993. The new Shanghai since then is divided 
by the Huangpu River; on the west bank was the city imbued with the vicissitudes of a century and 
a half of colonial occupation, civil war, cosmopolitan culture, waves of internal migration and 
class struggles under the Communist Party rule, on the east bank, land that was rural two decades 
ago is now crowded with skyscrapers ready to become a global city in the 21st century. The divided 
landscape in Shanghai tells a story of power and capital, on a global scale.  
 
Semi-Colonial Era 
Shanghai stands 15 miles south of the mouth of the Yangtze River, facing the East China 
Sea. The two wealthy neighbouring provinces, Jiangsu to the north and Zhejiang to the south, have 
been famous for a millennia for producing and trading silk and tea. The county seat, later to become 
the so-called “Chinese City” during the treaty port period, and Nanshi district after 1949, sat close 
to the intersection of two important waterways, the Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek, which 
provided access to the sea and the hinterland respectively. Though well positioned for trade, 
Shanghai remained merely a dot on the fringe of the empire, geographically as well as politically 
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(Zhao, 2004:51), not in a position to compete with much famous old cities such as Suzhou, or 
Hangzhou in the region.  
Under the Treaty of Nanjing (1843), Britain, France and the United States—each 
employing a different strategy and of varying appetite—carved up thousands of acres of farmland 
outside the county seat’s wall. On November 29th 1845, the British Consul George Balfour and 
the Shanghai Daotai (circuit intendant) Gong Mujiu ratified the first ‘Land Regulations’ abiding 
by the Treaty. In effect, this ratification expedited the creation of a British settlement officially 
recognized by the Qing Dynasty of China in 1846 (Zhao, 2004:53). The original British Settlement 
was established on a rectangular plot of land at the intersection of the Huangpu River, Suzhou 
Creek, and Yang Jin Bang Creek. Yang Jin Bang Creek would later become a shared border with 
the French Concession.  
The three-part divided landscape of Shanghai of the colonial era came into being when a 
lengthy negotiation between the French Consul Louis Montigny and the Shanghai Daotai Lin Gui 
in 1849 led to the French acquisition of land for the exclusive use of French nationals (Zhao, 
2004:53). The 164 acre French Concession was bound to the south by the moat of the Chinese 
City, to the north by the Yang Jin Bang creek also bordering the British Settlement, and to the east 
by the Huangpu River. Over the years, the French Concession expanded, and in 1900 reached 358 
acres. On April 8th, 1914 the French authorities obtained a 2,470 acres expansion, marking their 
most significant expansion yet (Denison & Ren, 2006:82, 85).  
The United States joined the scene shortly after the French and quickened the expansion of 
settlements. In contrast to the British and French negotiations, the American Settlement grew from 
the American consul John N. Alsop Griswold’s protest against the creation of the French 
Concession and the existence of the French’s exclusive privileges and rights (Bergère, 2009:31-2). 
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Without any formal designation of land, an American Settlement started to grow near the small 
port where Suzhou Creek joined the Huangpu River. In 1863, that area was combined with the 
British Settlement to become the International Settlement (Denison & Ren, 2006:56). With ever-
increasing business opportunities and rising number of both foreign and Chinese residents, the 
foreign community required the extension of settlements from the Chinese authority. In May 1899 
the International Settlement was extended from 1,779 acres to 5,583 acres (Denison & Ren, 
2006:75). When the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, the total area of Shanghai’s foreign 
settlements reached more than 8,043 acres, an area almost fifty-eight times larger than the first 
British Settlement established in 1846, and twelve times larger than the original walled Chinese 
City (Zhao, 2004:53). That is to say, urban Shanghai was largely under the foreign rule, and it was 
 
Figure 2.3: Establishment and expansion of foreign settlements in Shanghai (source: 
Lu Hanchao, 1999). 
 72 
 
indeed the imperialist powers gave birth to the cosmopolitan city. Figure 2.3 shows the size and 
expansion of the foreign settlements in Shanghai.  
Upon the establishment of foreign settlements, the landscape of Shanghai was not only 
divided but also segregated. The first Land Regulation of 1845 signed by the Qing Dynasty and 
British officials stated that the special international territories were reserved for foreigners only. 
The pool of foreigners was comprised mainly of diplomats, traders, and missionaries and their 
servants and families (Zhao, 2004:54). Chinese citizens were forbidden to live on this land, and 
both foreigners and Chinese were prohibited from building houses to rent to Chinese people 
(Denison & Ren, 2006:34). However, economic incentives quickly eroded this segregation when 
migration waves hit. The force of urban political economy to reshape the urban landscape was 
omnipresent from the beginning of the history of Shanghai.  
From the early days of settlements, urban residence in Shanghai had already been 
manipulated by profit-driven local elites. British merchants, led by Edwin Smith, convinced the 
three consuls to admit into the foreign settlements those Chinese seeking refuge from the Taiping 
Rebellion by appealing to the values of profit and efficiency that united the foreign settlers (Lu, 
1999:32-5). Soon the segregation policy was officially abandoned. Shanghai’s foreign settlements 
were transformed from reserves for foreign residents, to Western-run municipalities predominately 
populated by Chinese.  
In place of settlement borders, a new divide of urban landscape emerged; the upper-
corner/lower-corner distinction has become the new set of internal boundaries within the city. 
These boundaries overlap the settlement borders in some places, with the northeastern part of the 
International Settlement and lands under the Chinese rule outside of the settlements being the 
lower corner, and southwestern and central of both settlements being the upper-corner. 
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 This divide was not necessarily based on land value. Rather, housing quality, social 
environment, and the socioeconomic status of inhabitants all contributed to the socially constructed 
upper/lower corner distinction. Figure 2.4 is a map of Shanghai land values in 1926, which 
demonstrates that land values within settlements, in particular those near the waterfront were the 
highest and, regardless of jurisdiction, land value declines the further one gets from the city center. 
From the perspective of land value, this map refutes the conventional perception that upper corner 
means the southwestern part of the city, and lower means the northeastern. The persistence of this 
perception among Shanghairen expresses more a mental mapping of urban neighborhood hierarchy 
than actual land values. It also indicates that there are elements other than land value itself that 
explain symbolic value embedded in the geosocial hierarchy of neighborhoods in Shanghai.  
First of these elements was housing quality, which differentiated life quality and lifestyle 
in the two corners. Beginning in the 1870s, two kinds of alleyway (lilong) housing were built to 
  
Figure 2.4: Map of land value zones in greater Shanghai, 1926. Source: Brooke, J.T.W., and 
R.W. Davis. (1927). The China Architects and Builders Compendium. 
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accommodate groups of different socioeconomic status. The lower quality alleyway housing was 
shikumen. Its defining feature was a courtyard behind a heavy wooden gate (kumen) wrapped in 
stone (shi). The other was the new style lilong housing with relatively modern amenities. From the 
1910s to the 1930s, a period of westward expansion of both the International Settlement and the 
French Concession, the new-style lilong housing, with electricity and other modern amenities such 
as steel-framed windows and waxed floors, experienced rapid growth. Compared to its antecedent 
shikumen housing, which lacked even indoor plumbing, lilong housing added an attic, an 
additional floor above the kitchen, and service rooms. Both kinds of alleyway housing reached 
their greatest numbers between the 1920s and 1940s, in the development of modern Shanghai 
(Zhao, 2004:50). Their dominance of Shanghai’s urban landscape continued until the massive 
demolition and redevelopment brought about by the economic reforms starting in the late 1990s. 
For those unable to afford shikumen housing, straw and bamboo shacks were erected on 
land beyond the northern border of the International Settlement in Zhabei and Baoshan County 
under Chinese control (See Figure 2.3, and “Chapei” and “Paoshan” in Figure 2.4). In 1929, 
Shanghai had an estimated 21,000 such makeshift hovels housing the most desperate classes 
(Denison & Ren, 2006:165). In the eastern part of the International Settlement were also factories 
and mills, which drew a constant flow of rural migrants, who lived in shantytowns and shikumen 
housing nearby. This concentration of low-end housing and its working class inhabitants gave the 
area the name lower corner.  
In contrast, better quality housing such as new style lilong and villas were more commonly 
seen in upper corner, comprised of the central parts of the International Settlement and the French 
Concession. For the middle class population and clerks of higher ranks, garden lilongs and 
apartment lilongs were built (Lu, 1999:110-12; Zhao, 2004:65).  Living standards in those new 
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style lilong housing were improved in a number of ways, including the incorporation of bathrooms, 
toilets, utility rooms, and the introduction of electricity, hot water, and gas. Instead of a courtyard 
behind a heavy wooden gate, most new style lilong housing enjoyed an open or semi-open green 
space in the front. Garden lilong introduced in the 1930s already bore the appearance of a terraced 
town house (Denison & Ren, 2006:163-64), vastly better than shantytowns, though still short of 
quality and status when comparing to Western-style villas. 
The upper corner was also the home of the local and national elite. Wealthy foreign 
residents and Chinese businessmen acquired land and built magnificent villas and mansions with 
exquisite gardens in the expanded western part of the International Settlement and the French 
Concession. The western section was famous for its prestigious inhabitants, for example, from 
1918 to 1924, the founder of Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party that now rules Taiwan) 
and the first president of the Republic of China (1912-1949) Sun Yatsen and his wife Song 
Qingling maintained a residence on 29 Rue Molière in the French Concession. The western district 
of the International Settlement, similar to the western part of the French Concession, was known 
for its sumptuous Western style garden houses (xishi yangfang) (Denison & Ren, 2006:165,167). 
The largest and most luxurious of these, Aili Garden, belonged to Silas Hardoon, a Sephardic Jew 
from Iraq who moved to Shanghai to seek fortune, and was once believed to be the richest man in 
Asia. 
In general, housing types and the socioeconomic status of their inhabitants explain the 
upper/lower corner divide in Shanghai over the first half of 20th century. The best housing 
(Western-style villas, modern apartments, and new style lilong houses) was located in the western 
and southwestern part of the city, while the poorest housing (single-story houses and straw 
huts/shacks) gathered in the north and north-east. Housing in between these two extremes (the 
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shikumen) was scattered all over Shanghai proper (Lu, 1999:115).  Furthermore, the divide also 
indicates the differentiation between the designated function and social environment of each of the 
two corners of the city. Those areas representing industrial production and its impoverished labor 
force were grouped together as the lower corner which was hidden behind the glistering surface of 
Shanghai; while the upper corner flaunted its conspicuous consumption, luxury, and leisure.  
After examining the elements that constructed the upper/lower corner distinction, it is 
apparent that this divide would remain in place, even when official divisions between foreign 
settlements and Chinese areas ceased to exist in 1943 during the Second World War, or upon the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Even when Mao determined the country to 
be a People's Democratic Dictatorship (renmin mingzhu zhuanzheng) under the leadership of the 
proletariat, the predominantly working class neighborhoods were still referred to as the “lower 
corner”.  
This upper/lower corner distinction continued to follow Shanghairen like a shadow, well 
into the latter half of the 20th century. It defines the desired path of their geo-economic mobility, 
and explains the grievance of displacement from the prestigious upper-corner. Up until the 1990s, 
even if they occupied only one room in a shikumen housing unit, if that low end dwelling was 
located in the upper corner, a Shanghairen family would have enough pride and confidence to look 
down on people of the lower corner even if the latter enjoyed a more spacious dwelling. 
 
Transition of the Upper/Lower Corner Divide 
The nationalization and redistribution of urban housing soon after the liberation in May 
1949 inherited the upper/lower corner divide, and over time, has strengthened its symbolic power. 
During the Maoist era, rather than urban political economy, changes to the urban landscape 
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followed a political agenda. Nationalization of housing ownership was carried out through 
confiscation, coercion and forced revocation of property rights, to prove the owners’ allegiance to 
the new Communist government (Denison & Ren, 2006:205). Afterwards, most houses built 
before 1949 were taken over by local housing authorities, in effect rendering all residents in the 
city tenants of the state.  
In the process of housing redistribution, working class families were relocated into pre-
liberation era middle-/upper-class neighborhoods.  These initiatives were intended to better the 
living conditions of the working class. Consequentially, they created more socioeconomically 
heterogeneous neighborhoods in Shanghai, though these measures ultimately failed to alter the 
upper/lower corner distinction.  The strength of this divide was especially notable when we 
consider the fact that the finest residences previously occupied by the upper or upper-middle class 
of both foreign and Chinese origins in the upper corner were taken over by high-ranking 
government officials and party bureaucrats. 
The urban landscape in Shanghai saw little development or maintenance, and the 
distinction prevailed in the three decades after 1949 even though overcrowding plagued the two 
corners indiscriminately.  At the time of the liberation in May 1949, Shanghai’s housing stock was 
comprised of 52.7% old lilong houses (shikumen housing), 19.8% new lilong houses, 13.7% 
temporary shacks, 9.5% garden villas and 4.3% apartments (Denison & Ren, 2006:202; Xu, 
2004:128-9). As we can see, nearly three questers of the urban residential housing stock was lilong 
housing, of either new or old type. Using the usual arrangement of lilong housing as example, I 
will illustrate the high density and overcrowded-ness in urban Shanghai at that time.   
Initially, a lilong housing complex was built on one acre of land, and 120 units would house 
600 residents, but in reality the density was much higher. Only in rare cases could one family 
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afford to occupy one entire two-story lilong unit.  Instead, the tenant family, almost without 
exception, would sublet the extra space to poorer families, artists and students, to supplement 
household income (Lu, 1999:20; Zhao, 2004:59). Families of lower financial means had little 
choice but to cram into one room, with a shared kitchen and bathroom (if any) under the secondary 
rental system, sometimes for decades. According to the 1937 Shanghai Municipal Council Report, 
in the International Settlement, where most lilong housing neighborhoods were located, more than 
86% of families lived in this way in one house, with family numbers ranging from two to nine. A 
concentration of four families, or twenty-four persons, per house was the norm in these 
neighborhoods. When calculated at the individual level, each person was allotted an average 2.8 
square meters or 9.5 cubic meters (Zhao, 2004:67).  Those numbers further prove that residency 
in the upper corner did not necessarily mean spacious dwelling in upscale housing. The appeal of 
the upper corner lies predominantly in the proximity to the urban center, cultural amenities, and 
consumption space.  
When economic reforms and large-scale urban redevelopments reached Shanghai in the 
1990s; the upper/lower corner distinction was further strengthened it. Most of the lilong and villa 
housing units in the previous upper corner were demolished, in their place, modern office towers 
and luxurious condominiums dominate the skyline. The desirability of those urban central land 
was incorporated in the urban growth machine in raising land value, and in fabricating a 
cosmopolitan image of central Shanghai. This upper/lower corner divide on the one hand helped 
real estate developers to reap more profit, on the other hand, intensified the sense of loss among 
displaced and dispossessed Shanghairen in the urban redevelopment process, which I will 
elaborate on in chapter four.  
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Shanghairen’s departure since the 1990s from the urban center, especially with the 
demolition of old lilong housing, was a story of exodus under the force of urban governance 
involving foreign and domestic capital, the central, municipal and district governments. And again, 
transformation of this cosmopolitan space affected mostly Chinese, who became property owners 
after decades of leasing from the government.   
Redevelopment in the economic reform era treated sitting tenants quite differently from 
the earlier period. Sitting tenants affected by redevelopment projects between the 1950s and 1980s 
were offered new rental housing units in the old neighborhood after a temporary relocation, or new 
rental housing in another area if they preferred not to wait. The terms of their relocation were 
mediated and arranged through their work units and local housing administration bureau, which 
owned the housing since property nationalization in the 1950s.  To quicken the redevelopment of 
the city in the 1990s, four alternative funding mechanisms arose, all inviting the participation of 
private developers.  
Of the four alternatives, three allowed displaced tenants to move into new property in their 
old neighborhoods. The funding pool for these three approaches were a combination of funds from 
private developers, district governments, displaced tenants, and the work units the majority of the 
tenants in a particular neighborhood belonged to.  While these approaches abided by the intentions 
of the initial contracts that allowed moving back, the fourth, which did not, was more popular.  
This fourth approach, fittingly called “Commercial Housing Operation” (shangpingfang jingying), 
was a process by which developers leased land from the municipal government upon which stood 
straw and mud shacks or lilong housing. In those cases, all sitting tenants were relocated with no 
prospect of moving back and the whole neighborhood were demolished (Xu, 2004:167-71). 
While the 1991 housing policy required developers to provide ready permanent housing to 
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those displaced, 14 the 1997 relocation and compensation policy suggested two options to handle 
those who lost their homes. Besides providing permanent housing, the new option was to provide 
monetary compensation, to allow the displaced to purchase housing on the market.15 The tiers of 
monetary compensation were defined by the Shanghai Municipal Housing Security and 
Administration Bureau, and paid to the displaced by developers. The sum was usually not enough 
for units in secondary market apartment buildings in the same neighborhood, and counted only a 
fraction of the market price for the new ones soon to rise from where their old dwelling once stood. 
As a result, former tenants were mostly relocated to the cheaper and less desirable lower 
corner or the Pudong New District across the Huangpu River. For example, the Songbai Alley 
neighborhood in the central Huangpu District (See Figure 2.5) was categorized as “dangerous” 
(wei fang) and “ripe” for redevelopment. Eighty percent of former residents were relocated to 
Pudong New District (Shanghai Construction 1986-1990, cited in Xu, 2004:162-64). The 
depopulation of the central city was intensified in a new round of old lilong neighborhood 
redevelopment projects from 2001 to 2004. The overall rate of return among previous residents in 
that round of redevelopment remained around 10 percent, at the city average level (Xu, 2004:202-
04).  
Redevelopment of shantytowns and shikumen lilong housing neighborhoods in central 
Shanghai was only part of the story of massive urban renewal and displacement rippling through 
the city. The revenue generated by leasing land occupied with lilong housing or shacks in central 
districts such as Luwan or Huangpu to real estate developers was later used to modernize the 
                                                          
14 Article 43, in Shanghai Urban Housing Demolition Management Plan issued on July 19th, 1991. 
http://www.govyi.com/zhengcefagui/difangfagui/shanghaishifagui/200707/7581.shtml 
15 Article 4, in Shanghai Dangerous Housing and Shacks Demolition Compensation and Resettlement Trial 
Measures issued on Dec.8th, 1997. 
http://www.shucm.sh.cn/gb/jsjt2009/node1290/node1470/node1472/userobject7ai694.html 
 81 
 
decaying urban infrastructure of the city. The building frenzy of the 1990s changed the city at a 
rate rarely seen in urban history; the authorities had to print a new version of the city map every 
three months on average (shijie ribao, Nov.28th, 1999, cited in Lu, 2002:169).  Within ten years, 
elevated freeways including the inner ring, the north-south, and the east-west Yan’an Road were 
erected, freeways that cut through the heart of central Shanghai and destroyed lilong 
neighborhoods of tens of thousands of households. For example, in an effort to make space for the 
north-south elevated freeway in 1995, nearly 20,000 households and 916 business had to leave 
their former locations (Kang, 2002: 207-08). 
In the process of dramatic urban landscape change, millions were displaced, from Huangpu, 
Jing’an and Luwan districts, which are located within the boundaries of previous settlements and 
comprised of the upper corner to lower corner districts such as Putuo, Yangpu, and Xuhui (See 
Figure 2.5 for the district map). Others were displaced to rezoned rural areas such as Minhang, 
Jiading, and Songjiang. Figure 2.6 shows a district level population change, using census data from 
 
Figure 2.5: 2010 Shanghai District Map 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Government, modified by author. 
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2000 and 2010.  
Three central districts of the eighteen total districts in Shanghai had the most significant 
decreases in population.  The Huangpu district, at 35% (or 232,100 persons) has the highest 
decrease, followed by the Jing’an District at 31% (111,300 persons), and the Luwan District at 30% 
(107,200 persons). From these three core districts in the inner city, residents moved to the furthest 
periphery districts which were previously rural, before the city rezoned them as urban. The “new” 
urban districts of Songjiang, Minhang, Jiading, Qingpu, Fengxian, and Pudong New District saw 
sharp population increases during the same time span. The most significant population increase 
was in Pudong, which over ten years’ span, saw a population increase of over 3.4 million. Since 
District 
2000 
Census 
2010 
Census 
Population Change 
2000 – 2010 
Unit: 10k 
Population Change in 
Percentage 
Huangpu 66.18 42.97 -23.21 -35.07% 
Jing'an 35.8 24.67 -11.13 -31.09% 
Luwan 35.59 24.87 -10.72 -30.12% 
Xuhui 86.77 108.52 21.75 25.07% 
Changning 60.49 69.06 8.57 14.17% 
Putuo 84.27 128.88 44.61 52.94% 
Zhabei 70.83 83.04 12.21 17.24% 
Hongkou 80.36 85.23 4.87 6.06% 
Yangpu 107.95 131.3 23.35 21.63% 
Minghang 65.4 243.12 177.72 271.74% 
Baoshan 80.95 190.56 109.61 135.40% 
Jiading 48.64 147.2 98.56 202.63% 
Jinshan 53.01 73.25 20.24 38.18% 
Songjiang 49.55 158.34 108.79 219.56% 
Qingpu 45.89 108.19 62.3 135.76% 
Fengxian 50.42 108.41 57.99 115.01% 
Pudong New District 165.14* 504.73 339.59 205.64% 
Nanhui 69.03    
Chongming Island 65.36 70.34 4.98 7.62% 
City Total 1136.82 2302.66 1165.84 102.55% 
Figure 2.6: Long term resident population change by district. Unit: 10k. On Aug.9, 2009, the 
previous Nanhui County was merged into Pudong New District, adding its 690,300 
population to Pudong New District’s in 2010 data. Source: Shanghai Statistical Bureau. 
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the massive urban redevelopment and relocation in the 1990s, the divide between upper and lower 
corner gradually became secondary in Shanghairen’s mental mapping of the city.   
The long held upper/lower corner divide was disintegrated when upscale condominiums 
were built in previous shikumen housing neighborhoods in the lower corner, and office towers 
came to dominate the skyline of the upper corner. This reconfiguration of the urban landscape 
resulted in many Shanghairen no longer living in either corner of the city. A further divide of the 
urban landscape emerged when Pudong New District was established across the Huangpu River 
in 1993. Prior to the urbanization and redevelopment of the 1990s, it was simply farmland. In the 
2010 census, Pudong New District, once empty farm land, housed more than 5 million long term 
residents, roughly a quarter of the urban population.   
The Huangpu River once defined the border of urban Shanghai. But since 1990s the river 
has served as a different kind of border within the city. Unlike the earlier borders between foreign 
settlements and the Chinese City, and the distinction between the so-called upper and lower corner, 
this new divide separates the Shanghai of the 20th century and the 21st century. What remain the 
same are the transfers of power and transactions of capital that define, transform, and strengthen 
the divided landscape of cosmopolitan Shanghai. Also transforming is the dialect of the city, which 
represents Shanghai’s cosmopolitan past in the same way as the migration story and the urban built 
environment. 
 
A Hybrid Language 
The dialect spoken in urban Shanghai bears the similar cosmopolitan character as the city’s 
population and the landscape. The Shanghai dialect came into its current shape roughly a century 
ago. Rooted in the Wu language, it has absorbed vocabularies from other regional dialects, as well 
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as foreign languages. Despite this hybrid nature, it has been spoken predominantly by internal 
migrants coming to the city, and regard themselves Shanghairen.  
In the same time period that Shanghai grew from an insignificant river trading post in the 
Yangtze River Delta to a cosmopolitan metropolis, the Shanghai dialect, once a small branch of 
the Wu language family grew to be the mother tongue for millions of Shanghairen. From kaibu in 
1843 until the mid-20th century, its expansion in vocabulary and cultural influence coincided with 
the city’s rise to a cosmopolitan metropolis embracing a diverse migrant population. Before 
delving into the recent changes and endangerment of the Shanghai dialect in later chapters, I will 
first trace the origin and development of the dialect over the last century and half, because to a 
certain extent, the story of the Shanghai dialect is at the core of the history of the city and its people.  
The Shanghai dialect has been a particular point of tension in the recent transformations of 
the city.  When native Shanghairen stress their place-bound identity through their fluency of the 
Shanghai dialect, they unavoidably confront and struggle with the fact that the dialect itself is not 
indigenous, but urban and hybrid. The dialect in its current form has always been in the making, 
constantly reshaped through the contemporary history of Shanghai, by multiple waves of migrants 
and power struggles between different migrant groups in the early 20th century.   
The origin of the Shanghai dialect was as modest as the beginning of the town itself; 
accompanying the rise of the city, its significance in the region did not emerge until late 19th 
century. The dialect dates back to a language spoken in Huating County during the Song and Yuan 
Dynast (960—1368 AD); Huating County was renamed Songjiang County during the Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644 AD) (Chen, 1992:106; You, 2006:75). In the Songjiang County record, 
published in 1512, Jiaxing dialect was the most respected and authoritative tongue within the 
county. At that time, the native tongue of Huating County was very similar in pronunciation to the 
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Jiaxing dialect (Xu & You, 1988:188).  One hundred and fifty years later, in 1663, the early period 
of the Qing dynasty, the county record suggests that the Suzhou dialect occupied the leading 
position within the county.  Its dominance continued for another one hundred and fifty years; in 
1817 the county record affirms the Suzhou dialect as the dominant spoken language over the 
Shanghai dialect.  
It was not until late 19th century that the prestige of the Shanghai dialect started to rise (Xu 
& You, 1988:189; Qian, 1998:32-3). The ancient dialect spoken in Songjiang County, to which 
the Shanghai Township historically belonged, is part of the northern Wu linguistic cluster. The 
Wu linguistic cluster dominates most of the Yangtze River Delta region and is one of the ten dialect 
clusters primarily used by Han Chinese.  The linguistic characteristics of the contemporary 
Shanghai dialect, on the other hand, suggests its membership in the Su(Suzhou)-Hu(Shanghai)-
Jia(Jiaxing) division of the Tai Lake sub-cluster of the northern Wu language (Chen, 1992:101; 
Qian, 1998:29). The ancient tongue, based on the Songjiang dialect and spoken by the population 
living in the county for hundreds of years before Shanghai began to ascend to its current status and 
size, is not the same Shanghai dialect that has been spoken in the city in the last hundred years. 
The contemporary Shanghai dialect spoken in urban areas is a younger dialect formed less than 
100 years ago around the 1920s (Qian, 2006:72). 
Though the historical origin is agreed upon, the composition of the current Shanghai dialect 
differs according to what linguistic facet linguists study: vocabulary (lexicon) or accent 
(phonology). Linguists parse the minute variations to determine the Shanghai dialect’s similarities 
to and diversions from its cousins in the Wu language family. The linguistic perspective on 
Shanghai’s growth and expansion provides clear examples of the cosmopolitan social environment 
in urban Shanghai in the early 20th century.   
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One thread of argument suggests that the dialect is primarily a conglomeration of dialects 
spoken by internal migrants pouring into the city after kaibu in 1843.  Among Chinese linguists, 
the current Shanghai dialect is defined as a mixed urban dialect, with the Songjiang dialect as a 
basic tongue supplemented by words and phrases from the Wu language spoken in southern 
Jiangsu province and northern Zhejiang province (You, 2006:72, 75).  This identification was 
already present in writings about the Shanghai dialect in the early 20th century. In a study first 
published in 1917, Yao categorized the origins of the Shanghai dialect under five headings: 
Cantonese, Ningpo dialect, Su cluster dialect (which he identified as spoken by gentry and 
landowners from Suzhou and southern Jiangsu region), northern tongue (which he identified as 
spoken in northeastern China), and Shanghai native tongue.  The Shanghai native tongue was 
spoken by only a few genuine natives living in the southern and western rural areas of the county 
seat. According to Yao, the Shanghai dialect spoken commonly in the early 20th century was a 
mixture of Ningpo and Suzhou dialects, both of which were very different from the native tongue 
spoken before the 1843 treaty port opening (Yao, 1989[1917]:19). A Japanese scholar who 
quantified the influence of other dialects on the early 20th century urban Shanghai dialect offers a 
more precise account: at 75% the Suzhou pronunciation dominated; Ningpo was a distant second 
at 10%; Cantonese was merely 0.5%, and other tongues, including those from the impoverished 
northern Jiangsu province and other more inland and northern areas of China, offered a combined 
influence of 14.5% (Yingshan, 1928:702-3).  
Tellingly, this breakdown of linguistic influences on the current Shanghai dialect 
corresponds to the socioeconomic status of the various migrants flowing into the city.  Waves of 
wealthy war refugees of gentry and merchant origin, from the southern Jiangsu and northern 
Zhejiang provinces, represented the cities of Suzhou and Ningbo respectively. These groups 
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shaped the lingua franca of early 20th century Shanghai. The Suzhou dialect’s dominance in the 
region grew from that city’s literati’s cultural influences, while the Ningbo tongue’s influence was 
a product of its speakers’ economic advantages. Conversely, the tongue of the peasant refugees 
fleeing northern Jiangsu due to drought and war, who lacked both the cultural and the economic 
backing of wealthier Suzhou and Ningbo refugees, was unable to exert much influence at all in the 
formation of the Shanghai dialect (You, 2006:75).  Furthermore, people in the southern Jiangsu 
province and the northern Zhejiang province spoke variations of the Wu language, while those 
peasant refugees spoke northern Jiangsu dialects, which belong to an entirely different linguistic 
family, which made them mutually incomprehensible (Honig, 1992:24). 
In summary, scholars who study and describe the hybrid character of the Shanghai dialect 
recognize internal migration’s determining role in the composition of the current urban tongue. 
These scholars emphasize the geo-linguistic position of Shanghai, and find that the dialect received 
the most influence from the surrounding Suzhou and Ningbo areas also within the Wu linguistic 
region. For the most part, the current Shanghai dialect incorporates the pronunciations of Suzhou 
and Ningbo dialects; the northern Jiangsu dialect, despite a sizable migrant population in the city, 
has marginal influence (Honig, 1992:55). Following this line of arguments, the Shanghai dialect 
is a contemporary urban variation of the Wu language, with contributions from waves of internal 
migrants. 
A counter argument in terms of Shanghai dialect’s origin stresses the unshakable root of 
the Songjiang dialect in the Shanghai dialect, arguing that other dialects, which accompanied 
hundreds of thousands of migrants into the city after 1843, canceled out each other’s influence on 
the Shanghai native tongue (Qian, 2003, 2006). Qian acknowledges the influences of Suzhou, 
Ningbo, and northern Jiangsu dialects represented by a substantial vocabulary, but rejects the 
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notion that any of them could challenge the dominance of the native Shanghai tongue in the early 
20th century (2006:275). As a renowned Shanghai dialect scholar, and an outspoken Shanghai 
dialect preservation activist, Qian further suggests that earlier migrants were eager to learn the 
Shanghai dialect, and their offspring regarded the Shanghai dialect as their mother tongue, and 
themselves as Shanghairen (Qian, 2006).  
Despite this disagreement, consensus is reached when Qian admits that current suburban 
tongues that are closely related to the Songjiang dialect are incomprehensible to contemporary 
Shanghai dialect speakers. This suggests that the Shanghai dialect is an urban language, and its 
development was closely associated with changes to the urban population in the early 20th century 
Shanghai. Furthermore, these debates regarding the origins and components of the Shanghai 
dialect among scholars are themselves presentations of language ideologies. I will discuss their 
implications in chapter three when focusing on the dialect preservation movement.   
Shanghai’s turbulent political, social, and cultural history during the early 20th century had 
a profound effect on the Shanghai dialect. Many new words emerged during that period to 
accommodate social change, and to describe phenomena and goods new to urban Shanghai (Qian, 
1998:33). The Shanghai dialect was not itself sufficient for a cosmopolitan population to maneuver 
through a city with separated jurisdictions and colonial dominance. Changes to the dialect were 
needed to facilitate communication, and to connect different populations in Shanghai. A hybrid 
language known as Pidgin English (or yangjingbang), originating in Canton in the early days of 
the China trade and composed of English, Chinese, Indian, and Portuguese words extended its 
influences on the fast-forming Shanghai dialect in the early 20th century (Dong, 2000:33).  
New hybrid vocabularies ranging from the business world to the underworld flourished. 
For example, steamer got its Chinese name in Shanghai dialect as “si-ding-ba”, on sale turned into 
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“ang-san”, porter was “pao-tuo”, sofa “su-fa”, and the dialect word for prostitute was taken from 
lassie, “lah-sey” (Qian, 2007:101-02).  More relevant to this study is the example of the word for 
the Western architectural feature, loft window. It was a feature adopted in shikumen housing, and 
its Chinese name was first given in the Shanghai dialect, “laofu-cang”. It borrows the half 
phonological and half semantic way in composing Mandarin characters by combining the 
pronunciation of “laofu”, mimicking the English pronunciation of “loft”, with “cang”, meaning 
window in the Shanghai dialect.  
In general, Chinese linguists argue that the absorption of words or lexical items from 
Western languages, and the continuous creation of new words to accommodate the dynamic treaty-
port business, signified the city’s open-mindedness and indiscriminate cosmopolitanism (Qian, 
2000:66; Chen, 2012: i; Qian, 2012:8). However, we should never situate changes to a language 
in a political vacuum. Since the political environment is central to my study of the fate of the 
Shanghai dialect in the city’s transformation over the last two decades, I need to highlight that the 
hybridity of the dialect represents the city’s cosmopolitan past which was driven mostly by foreign 
forces, aided by the local’s business-minded pragmatism, and a migration population from other 
parts of China.  
Changes to the Shanghai dialect after the founding of the People’s Republic took a slightly 
different form. Instead of words or accents from other regions or foreign countries, political 
turmoil and the planned economy contributed new words to the dialect such as “jia-ji-dou-zeng” 
(class struggle), or “che-da-gu-fan” (eating rice from the big wok), which connotes the collective 
mode of production and socialist redistribution. The close association between the internal 
migration and changes in the Shanghai dialect in early 20th century explains the period of stability 
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and stagnation of the dialect in the Maoist era (Qian, 1998:31-2), when the household registration 
system halted migration flows.  
While the flow of internal migration resumed in the 2000s, and the city starts to regain its 
cosmopolitan character, the Shanghai dialect has yet to experience a revitalization, or it may never 
be. In the next chapter, I will delve into language policies since the 1950s to illustrate the national 
and local linguistic environment, the dominance of Putonghua, which is the official language of 
the People’s Republic of China, and the rapid decline of the Shanghai dialect in the last two 
decades.   
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Chapter Three:  
“China Dream” versus Shanghai Dialect: The Impact of State Language Policies  
 
On the evening of June 16th, 2009, I went to Pudong, the new face of Shanghai’s 
globalization located on the east bank of the Huangpu River, for a classical music concert. Though 
the subway ride from People’s Square, the center of downtown Shanghai in Puxi (west bank of the 
Huangpu River) took only 15 minutes, I was immediately lost after getting off at the Shanghai 
Science and Technology Museum station of Line 2. The recently urbanized and developed Pudong 
was a totally unfamiliar place to me, a native Shanghairen who had lived in Puxi for twenty-five 
years before moving to Canada. It bears little resembles to the Shanghai I once knew so well. My 
surprise and disorientation did not end when I arrived at the Shanghai Oriental Art Center. Upon 
purchasing the playbill for the concert performed by the United States’ National Symphony 
Orchestra, I said “thank you” in Shanghai dialect to the staff, but was ridiculed and jeered in return, 
“Seriously, Shanghai dialect? This is high culture, not standup comedy!” Native Shanghairen like 
me were raised to speak and treat the dialect as the native language of the city. But now I was 
shunned for speaking the Shanghai dialect in Shanghai. What happened? That shocking experience 
pointed to language as a new dimension for studying the urban transformation of globalizing 
Shanghai.  
The Shanghai dialect has been the lingua franca of Shanghai since the early 20th century. 
The shift from the feudal Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), to the Republic era (1911-1949), and then to 
the People’s Republic founded by the Chinese Communist Party, did little to affect the Shanghai 
dialect’s primacy over the past century. It was not until the late 1990s, when economic reforms, 
and China’s deeper participation in globalization, set Shanghai on a trajectory to become a global 
city, that the Shanghai dialect’s standing was threatened by the official language, Putonghua, or 
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Standard Mandarin Chinese. To demonstrate the top-down cause of the dialect’s endangerment, I 
will first set the background of changes in the central state’s language policies since the founding 
of the People’s Republic of China, to demonstrate how the state has shifted emphasis from dialect 
co-existence to linguistic exclusiveness to build up the hegemony of the official language. The 
official language promotion project is a nationalist project, one that associates speaking Putonghua 
with patriotism, loyalty to the party and the state, and allegiance to a national identity. More 
recently, since 2012, speaking Putonghua has been connected with the realization of the “China 
Dream”, which was defined as a “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by Xi Jinping, the current 
president of China. In this sociohistorical context, state language policies to establish Putonghua’s 
dominance over regional dialects, such as the Shanghai dialect, reflect the Chinese leadership’s 
interests in both globalization and nationalism. 
Through the political and legal system, the state-engineered language hierarchy became a 
“language ideology” taught through the public school system, and reinforced in the cultural and 
social sphere. By language ideology, I apply Irvine’s definition to mean “the cultural system of 
ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political 
interests” (1989:255). Gal and Woolard elaborate on the implication of language ideology as the 
cultural conceptions about the nature, form and purpose of language, and its usage in social 
interactions as an enactment of a collective order (1995:130). Under this analytical framework, I 
apply linguistic anthropologist Jillian Cavanaugh’s conceptualization of social aesthetics of 
language to examine three inter-related and mutually reinforcing ways, in which the Chinese 
state’s language ideology plays out in everyday social interactions.   
According to Cavanaugh, “a social aesthetics of language is the interweaving of culturally 
shaped and emotionally felt dimensions of language use and the extra-linguistic factors that rank 
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people and their groups into hierarchies” (2009:11). This differentiation first identifies Putonghua 
as modern, sophisticated and formal, and the Shanghai dialect as backward, inadequate, and 
informal. Shanghairen’s shared belief in the importance of proper language choice—either 
Putonghua or Shanghai dialect, considering topic, occasion, and audience of the speech – is the 
first aspect of this social aesthetics of language. Second is the way in which the language hierarchy 
is reproduced, and individual’s linguistic capital, is accumulated in the school system. Since 
Putonghua is the sole language of instruction, Putonghua proficiency is both an indicator of 
educational achievement and a tool to achieve it. Third is the class-based association between the 
language spoken and the speaker’s socioeconomic status. In general, speaking Putonghua indicates 
higher educational level and social status.  
To analyze the workings of language ideology in these three ways, I employ Bourdieu’s 
notion of cultural capital, which means knowledge acquired through the school system and 
“inherited” from class-based upbringing (1986). Under the broad concept of cultural capital, 
Bourdieu defines “linguistic capital”, a form of embodied cultural capital that implies a mastery 
of language and interactional practices concerning language use (1990:114). In this study, I treat 
proficiency in Putonghua and the Shanghai dialect, as well as beliefs about their differentiated 
aesthetics and functions, as linguistic capital. According to Bourdieu, language proficiency and its 
proper use is converted to social status and upward mobility; in other words, language is converted 
from embodied cultural capital to social and economic capital. The conversion for the two 
languages do not necessarily take place on the same market, a market defined by the state, as 
Bourdieu stresses (1991). Rather, similar to what Woolard discovered in her study about Catalan 
speaking in Barcelona (1985), an alternative market co-exists in the parallel, for the effective 
conversion of the Shanghai dialect into symbolic, social and economic capital. 
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The full picture of the changing linguistic scene of Shanghai requires an understanding of 
the Shanghai dialect preservation movement. It is a social movement that mobilizes narratives of 
cultural heritage, particularly the Shanghai dialect’s roots in the ancient Wu language family, to 
fight against the state’s language law and language ideology. Grassroots dialect preservationists 
struggle to keep their language alive on Shanghai’s streets and in native Shanghairen households, 
using an ancient Chinese idiom as an expression of their powerlessness “a mantis raises its foreleg, 
trying to stop a coming wagon (tangbi dangche)”. They see a language crisis in Shanghai, as what 
was once the lingua franca in a cosmopolitan city is downgraded to the status of a provincial 
dialect. The potential loss of the Shanghai dialect is a cultural price the state is willing to pay to 
build Shanghai into China’s global city.  
In the following, I will first examine state language policies and national language 
campaigns over the last sixty years, which have firmly established the dominance and prevalence 
of Putonghua, and successfully instilled a language hierarchy in the minds of native Shanghairen. 
Then applying and expanding Bourdieu’s notion of linguistic capital, I will detail how the cultural 
aesthetics of Putonghua and the Shanghai dialect are perceived differently, and how the linguistic 
capital associated with Putonghua is acquired and accumulated through the school system. Under 
these mechanisms, the Shanghai dialect has experienced rapid decline. Lastly, I will explain the 
strategies the dialect preservation activists deployed to try to reverse the endangerment. 
 
A State Project 
Upon founding the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party deployed a 
wide range of political measures to establish an official national language, seeing linguistic 
uniformity as an essential part of unification and nation building. Borrowing Bourdieu’s insight 
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on the aim of the state, the definition and imposition of a national language in opposition to dialects 
is part of political struggles to claim political legitimacy (1992:47). Through language policies, 
the party intended to produce and reproduce “New Chinese Citizens” loyal to communist ideology 
and the leadership of the party. Under this logic, language policies over the last fifty years were 
designed to serve nationalism and the Communist party’s rule in the authoritarian state.  
The communist regime is not the first political entity to define a national language with 
standardized pronunciation in China, but is the most successful in suppressing and endangering 
regional dialects to establish the hegemony of the official language. 16  In 1728, Emperor Yong 
Zheng of the Qing Dynasty—who reigned from 1722 to 1735—declared Mandarin Chinese with 
Beijing pronunciation (Beijing guanhua) as the official language of his empire.  This was the first 
time in Chinese history that the government enforced a standardized pronunciation. 17  This set a 
precedent for regimes that followed.  After the collapse of the feudal system in the early 20th 
century, seen as an integral component to the development of a modern nation-state, both the 
Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) who ruled the country during the first half of the 20th 
century, and the Communist Party that has ruled since 1949, pursued the establishment of a 
national language soon after establishing their regimes.  
The establishment of a modern national language was essential for the founding of a unified 
and modern Chinese nation, an idea that prompted the Kuomintang to define and promote a 
national language in the early years of the Republic. Party leaders believed that though a written 
classical language existed in China for over two thousand years, only a unified modern vernacular 
                                                          
16 In the context of this study, I look at dialects of Han Chinese, the written systems of which are shared with 
Mandarin Chinese. Minority languages used by ethnic minorities such as Uighurs or Tibetans are beyond the scope 
of this study.  
17 Interestingly, a Manchurian emperor implemented the official language for Han Chinese, based on Beijing 
pronunciation. His native language was a vastly different language, Manchurian, which belongs to the entirely 
different Tungusic linguistic family.   
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could serve as the linguistic foundation of a modern state (Ramsey, 1989:4). Representatives from 
northern Mandarin-speaking provinces and those from southern non-Mandarin-speaking provinces 
competed for national language status for their native dialect. From a Bourdieusian perspective, 
the imposition of a national language throughout the entire state, used at all official occasions 
reinforces the authority and prestige of the language (1992:45). Thus, the representatives’ heated 
debate about the definition of a national language in the period of state formation was a competition 
for the status and dominance of their own dialects.  
 The promotion of a national language with standardized pronunciation in the Republic era 
served the Kuomintang’s agenda for modernization and nationalism, but did not sacrifice regional 
dialects in exchange.  When each province had only one vote, the geographically dominant 
Mandarin dialect, based on Beijing pronunciation, was selected over the three competing southern 
dialects (Cantonese, Fuzhounese, and Wu, which the Shanghai dialect is a variation of) as the 
national pronunciation (guoyin) (Ramsey, 1989:5). Guoyin was then promoted nation-wide 
through the school system starting in 1920, and adopted by radio broadcasting in 1932.18 Despite 
these official efforts, in Shanghai in the 1930s migrants from all over the country brought with 
them different regional pronunciations and vocabularies, creating a polyglot linguistic scene, 
instead of a population unified by singular national pronunciation. This linguistic scene affected 
the Shanghai dialect itself, which was enriched by adopting grammatical structure and 
vocabularies from various regional dialects such as Suzhou, Ningbo, and Hangzhou (Qian, 
2007:19-24), which are the ancestral lands of most current native Shanghairen.  
The Chinese Communist Party, which defeated Kuomintang in 1949, shared the 
modernization and nationalism agenda represented by national language policies.  One of the 
                                                          
18 Guoyin is still in use in Taiwan, where Kuomintang has ruled after the Communist Party took over the mainland 
since 1949.  
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practices the new ruling party decided to keep was the Republic era’s language policy that called 
for a unified national tongue.  The Communist party inherited Guoyin as the pronunciation of the 
country’s new official language, Putonghua (which literally means “common language”). This is 
a particularly interesting policy choice for the new political rulers, since they were the same people 
who fought so bitterly for the equal status of Cantonese, Fuzhounese, and the Shanghai dialect 
during the Republic Era (Chen, 1999:121).  While Ramsey sees those former pursuits and concerns 
of communist party members as either ignored or forgotten when they came into power (1989:14-
5), I argue that it was actually consistent with the logic of nationalism. Political ideology, right or 
left, is irrelevant; it is a modern Chinese state speaking a unified language that matters to a leading 
party.   
This vision for a linguistically unified China gave rise to both Guoyin in the Republic era 
and Putonghua in the communist regime. From her study of Catalan speaking in Spain, where 
Castilian is the national language, Woodlard argues that the equation of language and nation is not 
a natural fact but rather a historical, ideological construct (1998:16). This construct is usually 
articulated as a need for clear communication across a country; for example, the vernaculars in 
southern China such as the Shanghai dialect or Cantonese belong to different linguistic families 
than Guoyin or Putonghua, so for a monolingual Guoyin or Putonghua speaker, those southern 
tongues are unintelligible.  
However, as Bourdieu points out, the purpose of the imposition of a national language is 
the political need to constantly remind and reinforce state authority and the ruling party’s 
dominance (1992:47). In contemporary China the advocacy of a single, standardized language 
reflects the cultural and political elites’ agenda of building up national unity on the one hand and 
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political controllability on the other (Zhou & Ross, 2004). Beyond political control, Putonghua 
also serves as a tool for the construction of a homogenous identity of Chinese-ness (Guo, 2004). 
To achieve the unification and imposition of Putonghua, which according to Ramsey is an 
abstract, standardized language that not a single person in the country spoke as his native idiom 
(1989:9), the state carried out the nationalist agenda aggressively through legal, administrative, 
and propaganda mechanisms to establish the dominance of Putonghua across China.    
 
Legal Structure  
The nationwide dominance of Putonghua was a top-down state project established first and 
foremost through the legal system. Putonghua’s official language status is recognized and 
reinforced at four levels in the legal structure. At the top are national laws such as the fourth and 
current Constitution, and the Law of People’s Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and 
Written Chinese Language passed by the People’s Congress. These are followed by administrative 
regulations and policies at the second tier issued by the State Council.  On the third level are 
provisions and documents issued by bureaus under the state council, such as the “Provisions on 
the Administration of Putonghua Proficiency Test” issued by the Ministry of Education. The 
lowest level consists of regional regulations.  Together this legal infrastructure has ensured the 
dominance of Putonghua as the official language of China, guaranteed and reinforced at various 
levels and through various state agencies. 
Shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, meetings of top-level officials 
were organized to determine an official language. The first state policy concerning the national 
language was called the “Directive of the State Council on Promoting Putonghua” (tuiguang 
Putonghua zhishi), passed at the State Council’s 23rd National Emblem on January 28th, 1956. This 
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directive granted Putonghua the status of an official language, to be used as the common language 
for all Han Chinese. In terms of Putonghua’s relation with dialects, the most explicit formulation 
of the official position was published a few months before in People’s Daily, which is the state-
owned newspaper representing opinions of the party, that “[p]romoting Putonghua does not mean 
intentionally annihilating local dialects, but to gradually limit their scope of use, which is in 
conformity with the objective rules of societal progress” (1955; quoted in Chen, 1999:58). The 
1956 directive also instructed all schools, from first grade through university, to teach students in 
Putonghua. Through the nationwide public school system, the language and its underlying 
legitimacy and dominance were thus instilled in the minds of future generations.  
The status of Putonghua was further strengthened in the fourth Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, passed on December 4th, 1982.  Passed after the ten-year turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution, and the adoption of an “Open Policy” in 1978, the fourth and current Constitution was 
the legal framework for China’s economic reform era. The constitutional provision related to 
Putonghua, Article 19, states, “The state promotes the nationwide use of Putonghua.”19 More than 
thirty years ago, Putonghua’s dominance was established at the highest level of China’s legal 
system, and ever since the state has been proactive in its promotion, as the cornerstone of political 
measures to ensure social stability and citizen’s loyalty to the state and the party.  
Under the framework of the Constitution, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress passed the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written 
Chinese Language at the end of 2000. 20  It was a measure to aid both political control and 
                                                          
19 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Adopted on December 4, 1982. 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html; in Chinese:  
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm 
20 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language. (Adopted at the 
18th Meeting of Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on October 31, 2000 and promulgated 
by Order No. 37 of the President of the People's Republic of China on October 31, 2000). 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6233&CGid= 
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economic development. Shortly after the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, this law coincided with the 
beginning of a new phase of China’s economic reform and participation in globalization. This 
decree effectively gave Putonghua the same significance as state sovereignty, national dignity, and 
unification. The law describes Putonghua as an essential means to enhance the social construction 
of the material and ideological infrastructure of the state (wuzhi jingshen wenming jiangshe).  
It also makes explicit the breadth and width of the usage of Putonghua across the country. 
It mandates speaking Putonghua within all state organs, schools of all levels, mass media, and 
encourages its use in the service sector. 21 Exceptions are made, though either in vague terms, such 
as in Article 16.1, “local dialects may be used when state functionaries really need to use them in 
the performance of official duties,” and in Article 16.4 “where local dialects’ use is really required 
in publishing, teaching and research”; or subject dialect use to further bureaucratic process, as in 
Article 16.2: “local dialects may be used in broadcasting with the approval of the broadcasting and 
television administration under the State Council or of the broadcasting and television department 
at the provincial level”. From the top level of the legal structure, the linguistic space of regional 
dialects is sharply reduced and restricted; and the linguistic space of Putonghua is clearly defined 
and guaranteed. 
 
National Campaigns and Workplace Regulations 
More effective than merely passing laws is the continual reinforcement of the law. 
Otherwise, an artificial, standardized language shared automatically across a vast land could only 
exist on paper, or in the imagination. Bourdieu notes that a single “linguistic community” of an 
invented national language, is “endlessly reproduced by state institutions capable of imposing 
                                                          
21 Read the full text of the law in Appendix I. 
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universal recognition of the dominant language” (1992:46). The Chinese state has two main 
strategies to reinforce Putonghua’s prominence through the national administrative system. One 
strategy is the annual nationwide Putonghua Promotion Week. The other, perhaps more important, 
is the required Putonghua Proficiency Tests for a plethora of occupations.   
The Ministry of Education passed the motion creating “Putonghua Promotion Week” as a 
national annual event in 1998. Starting the following year, the third week of every September is 
designated as the promotion week, characterized by various promotional and propaganda activities 
held across the country. Notices guiding the annual promotion are jointly issued from nine central 
government bureaus including the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Propaganda, the Ministry 
of Culture, the Ministry of Personnel, Labor and Social Security, the State Administration of Radio, 
Film, and Television, and the General Political Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army. Every year, the theme for the annual event changes, showing the new political message 
encoded in the dominance of the official language. 22 Competitions are held, centered on the 
chosen theme, including poetry recitations, spelling bees, choruses, posters or calligraphy. These 
competitions are organized by the public school system, cultural institutions, and various state 
institutions.  
Over the 2013 promotion week, speaking Putonghua was integrated with the realization of 
the “China Dream”, which is an idea introduced by Xi Jinping, the current President of China, in 
November 2012. In his speech, he used the phrase to mean “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, 
but the exact implication of this political ideal remained vague, without clear parameters. Thus, 
the theme of the 2013 promotion week was described as “Using Putonghua to describe the ‘China 
Dream’, using standardized simplified Chinese to write the ‘China Dream’”. Other than these 
                                                          
22 See a full list of the propaganda slogans since 1998 in the Appendix II. 
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official definitions, a practical explanation of exactly what the “China Dream” means for an 
ordinary citizen’s life remains elusive. It has nevertheless been cited in political statements, official 
party speeches, and governmental directives, to indicate accordance with the party’s leadership.  
By invoking the “China Dream” in the promotion week theme, the nine top-level ministries 
and bureaus that jointly issued the notice made it clear that Putonghua was the only linguistic 
means recognized and encouraged by the state to participate in the dream. This exclusiveness again 
reinforces the dominance of Putonghua. Also, this theme excludes those who use traditional 
Chinese characters, as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or diaspora Chinese communities that were 
established before 1949, to write the “China Dream”. The theme is the embodiment of the binding 
of a nationalist vision with the official language, which simultaneously excludes other tongues and 
subjects not directly under the communist party’s rule. To linguists in the West, this association 
shows how, according to the state,  multiple languages indicate multiple loyalties, and thus “a 
temperamental flaw, a lack of trustworthiness,… and shifting language as evidence of equally 
shiftable, hence dubious and shallow allegiances” (Irvine & Gal, 2000:65). In this regard, the 
central government made plain that language choice is not a personal linguistic or cultural choice, 
but an announcement of political affiliation and loyalty.  
The theme for the 2014 Putonghua Promotion Week again centered on Xi’s political ideal, 
“China Dream”. The theme reads “Speak Putonghua well, he, you and I will realize our dream 
(shuo hao Putonghua, yuan meng ni wo ta).”  I understand this theme to mean that not only does 
one need to speak Putonghua, but to speak it well, to make possible the realization of the ‘China 
Dream’. This theme combines wishful thinking of an imagined community, superficial solidarity, 
and a nationalist ideal, and translates that into a linguistic practice of self-governmentality.  It asks 
each individual whether he wants to have a slice of the pie of China’s rising prosperity, and states 
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the political allegiance as expressed by the use of Putonghua as a prerequisite for participation. 
Though not the focus of this study, the gendered language in this theme deserves our attention here. 
In the theme, a male third person pronoun他 (ta, meaning he) is used to represent everyone other 
than you and me. It is one more example of the resurgence of gender inequality in Mainland China 
in the last two decades (See for example works by Yinhe Li, 1997, 1998, and Leta Fincher, 2014).  
During the other 358 days of the year when it is not officially Putonghua Promotion Week, 
reinforcement of the dominance of Putonghua is carried out as obligations assigned to various 
levels of the government and state functionaries under the party’s control.  As Dengfeng Wang, an 
official from the Ministry of Education, stated in a work report in 2008, “Party and administrative 
offices serve as the “dragon-head” to lead, schools function as the foundation, news media act as 
models, and public service agencies perform as windows.” In this way, abstract language policy 
becomes operational guidelines for linguistic practices of public employees, from public service 
agents to schoolteachers, and reporters. The proper, professional conduct of speaking Putonghua 
is expected and required, as an essential part of Putonghua promotion. 
In an interview, the Deputy General Manager of the Shanghai Grand Theatre explained to 
me how they, being a “Window Organization” (chuangkou danwei, meaning representing the 
image of the city and facing the general public), would be constantly covertly inspected by the 
city’s Office of the Construction of Ideological Infrastructure Committee (jingshen wenming 
jianshe weiyuanhui bangongshi): 
They would come to our box office, pretending to be clients and asking about 
performances, to see whether our staff speaks perfect Putonghua. Or sometimes 
they would just act like tourists asking our security guards for directions. Very 
sneaky, we always only find out about their visits in the later notice or report they 
send us. If spotting dialect speaking or untidiness of the venue, they would deduct 
points from our annual ranking to be a Model Organization (wenming danwei), 
threatening to take away the plaque.  
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Though during the economic reform era, previously state-owned and state-funded theatres and art 
troupes were restructured to take full responsibility for their financial standing, administratively 
they still belong to the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Bureau. Taking away the Model 
Organization plaque would be a serious punishment and public humiliation for any organization, 
and affect the career trajectory of the organization’s leadership. This intricate relation between 
government and non-profit organizations indicates that the implementation of the language law is 
the responsibility of more than just the law enforcement sector, but stretches to various inter-
connected state and party agencies that painstakingly engage in daily surveillance. 
For a state project to ultimately reach the individual level, to affect an ordinary 
Shanghairen’s everyday life, municipal and local agencies not only reinforce Putonghua speaking 
through organizational control, but also through individual surveillance of personal conduct. The 
guiding principle is to treat any effort to promote local dialects as a challenge to the dominance of 
Putonghua. In early 2013, a team of producers and editors at the Shanghai People’s Radio Station 
submitted a proposal for a citywide Shanghai dialect competition to the Shanghai Spoken and 
Written Language Committee under the Municipal Education Bureau. It was a grassroots effort 
intended to encourage Shanghai dialect speaking among school children.  According to Ren Zhong, 
a member of that radio station team, the committee was interested in the proposal and showed 
verbal support, but required the committee’s name not to be mentioned in any promotion of the 
dialect competition.  As a municipal governmental agency, it was important that they were not 
seen by other agencies or featured in media as a backer of a Shanghai dialect related activity. 
However, without written governmental approval, no promotional or recruitment material could 
be distributed in schools.  
Ren Zhong attributed the failed attempt to organize the Shanghai dialect competition to the 
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dilemma faced by school principals and teachers: 
Without a clear order from above, they dared not to do a thing. Plus, they are all 
required to carry out the administrative order to promote Putonghua. How could 
they participate in the promotion of the Shanghai dialect, when everywhere on 
campus there are small plaques and posters saying ‘Please Speak Putonghua’?  
According to Dengfeng Wang’s statement, any governmental agency, such as the Municipal 
Language Committee, is supposed to lead the promotion of Putonghua, and schools are the primary 
organ for the creation of Putonghua speakers. Thus, the message on those small plaques or painted 
on walls and windows, “please speak Putonghua” (see Figure 3.1 for an example of the Putonghua 
promotion slogan painted on window panel in schools), not only reminds school principals and 
teachers of their duty, but also explicitly excludes Shanghai dialect speaking in any form on 
campus.  
The other systematic strategy to ensure the promotion of Putonghua is through the 
Putonghua Proficiency Test. For occupations such as news reporter, police officer, performer, or 
schoolteacher, the state sets minimum scores as part of the required qualification. Xia, a native 
Shanghairen policeman in his mid-40s proudly informed me that he scored 92 out of 100 in the 
test, while the national standard for policeman was 87. Passing the test is only the beginning; daily 
 
Figure 3.1. A window panel with “Please Speak Putonghua, Please Write Standardized 
Characters” painted on a classroom door on the campus of Fudan University. Photo Credit: 
Jinjin. 
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linguistic practice is required. 
During fieldwork in Shanghai I came across interactions among various professions, for 
example bank clerks, hospital receptionists, or restaurant staff that centered on the issue of public 
use of language. Figure 3.2 is a photo of a “Please Speak Putonghua” plaque commonly seen at 
hospital lobbies, banks, and at public transit customer service counters. It faces outward to remind 
clients of the linguistic norm in public places, and its presence also ensures that the staff self-
monitor their speech.  
From my observations, it was only when a client responded in broken Putonghua with a 
strong Shanghai dialect accent, or completely in Shanghai dialect, that a bank clerk or receptionist 
would switch to Shanghai dialect to accommodate. Usually, those who do not speak Putonghua 
well are elderly native Shanghairen, who finished schooling before the Communist Party’s 
 
Figure 3.2 A plastic plaque showing “Please Speak Putonghua, Please Write Standardized 
Characters” nailed to the pole at a hospital lobby. Photo Credit: Jinjin. 
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Putonghua project started in the 1950s. In other cases, as my bilingual native Shanghairen 
interviewees told me, for everyday conversation, they were likely to follow the language choice of 
the person who initiated the conversation. Complementing each other, the language component in 
those professions’ job descriptions and bilingual native Shanghairen’s linguistic tendency explain 
the prevalence of Putonghua speaking in public settings such as banks, hospitals, retail stores, or 
public transit stations. 
The promotion of Putonghua is not an isolated project; instead, it is integrated into the legal 
and administrative system under the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership. It represents a 
nationalist vision of a unified, modern, prosperous, and “open” China, and took on momentum in 
the economic reform era. To influence the behavior of ordinary citizens, the nationalist project of 
linguistic unification brings together state institutions and associated organizations. Ultimately, 
through themes of the annual promotion week and language qualification for employment, the 
state makes explicit the political and socioeconomic significance of Putonghua proficiency. This 
translates Putonghua proficiency into a type of linguistic capital, or embodied cultural capital, 
which is convertible into economic gain and social status. By applying the Bourdieusian analysis 
of capital conversion, I will show next how Putonghua’s dominance creates a language hierarchy 
that devalues the Shanghai dialect, and facilitates a new social stratification in the economic reform 
era Shanghai.     
 
Linguistic Capital Conversion 
The state’s Putonghua promotion project encodes the official language as clear, modern 
and advanced, in contrast to vernacular tongues such as Shanghai dialect, which is deemed 
backward, inadequate and incompatible with the country’s progress. This association of languages 
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with different properties or values constructs a language ideology regarding Putonghua as formal 
and of a higher status, and condemning regional dialects such as the Shanghai dialect as informal 
and of a lower status. Ordinary Chinese citizens recognize in this state engineered language 
ideology a hierarchy, with Putonghua comfortably on top.  Individuals making language choices 
complying with this ideology internalize this hierarchy, to which I apply Bourdieu’s notion of 
linguistic capital (1991), a type of embodied cultural capital convertible to social and economic 
capital (1986).  
By linguistic capital I mean not only language proficiency, but also a firm belief among 
bilingual speakers in Shanghai of the aesthetic value of both Putonghua and Shanghai dialect. 
Similarly, Bourdieu argues that the tongue which is spoken in public is never a personal choice, 
rather it involves both the linguistic competence to speak correctly to achieve a communicative 
purpose, and the social competency to speak properly given the circumstances (1991). The 
properness is defined by the state’s language laws and Putonghua promotion project, and 
internalized and reproduced by individuals through their daily linguistic practice and interaction.  
Language ideology works through language choices when different aesthetic values are 
assigned to languages. More than any other factor, the association of a language with either high 
or low culture and the formality of the setting determine the individual’s language choice, in 
adherence to the state’s language ideology. Linguistically, it is close to a diglossic situation, in 
which two languages are hierarchically ranked into a high language of state, power and high culture, 
and a low language of intimacy, solidarity, and vulgarity (Jaffe, 1999; Cavanaugh, 2009). This 
language hierarchy is seen in mass media on the large scale, and on a smaller scale, in bilingual 
Shanghairen’s linguistic practice of switching between Putonghua and the Shanghai dialect.  
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The school system, understood from a Bourdieusian perspective, as institutionalized 
cultural capital, plays a determining role in how the language hierarchy is reproduced. This plays 
out through both the teaching of Putonghua and teachers’ own language choices. Thus it is a venue 
where linguistic capital is acquired and accumulated. Lastly, I will show examples of conversions 
between linguistic capital into other kinds of capital on both the dominant, and the parallel 
alternative markets, the success of which contributes to the reproduction and reinforcement of the 
dominant language ideology. 
 
Aesthetic Values of Languages 
The association between Putonghua and high culture explains the scenario described at the 
beginning of this chapter. The art center staff’s rude response to my speaking Shanghai dialect at 
a high culture venue exemplified the dominant language ideology, their assigned role to police and 
promote proper linguistic practice, and their linguistic capital in terms of the understanding of the 
language hierarchy. The concert for that night was performed by the United States National 
Symphony Orchestra, one of a series of events to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the 
establishment of official diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic 
of China. Messages from both the Chinese President at that time, Hu Jintao, and the US President 
Barack Obama were printed, wishing for a successful performance, and their pictures were 
featured in the playbill.  
That high-profile Western classical music concert was not a rare demonstration of the 
dominant language ideology, and its power and influence on individual’s linguistic practices in 
Shanghai. Under the state’s language ideology, classy, beautiful, and formal are among the 
aesthetic values associated with Putonghua, while regional dialects such as the Shanghai dialect is 
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deemed vulgar, backward, and informal. Two clips from Shanghai TV Station’s Morning News 
broadcast in early November 2013 illustrated native Shanghairen’s linguistic capital, in terms of 
the “proper” linguistic conduct.  
The first clip was about a seasonal Shanghai local delicacy, hairy crab (da zha xie). On the 
street outside of a wet market, a reporter interviewed two elderly men about seafood venders’ 
newly invented sales trick, by which the crabs were labeled and sold according to their package 
instead of unit price. For example if one wanted to buy hairy crab Type 1580, it meant a 
combination of eight crabs, four males weighing 200g each and four female weighing 150g each 
for a total price RMB 1,580 (approx. US $260 dollars). One of the elderly men replied to the 
Putonghua-speaking reporter in Shanghai dialect, “Our ordinary people have no idea about those 
dealer’s tricks. Nong Song Ning!” (Shanghai dialect slang meaning play tricks).  
The reporter was required by language law to speak Putonghua, but the bilingual 
interviewees burst out in Shanghai dialect to complain about seafood price on the street. Regardless 
of the price of hairy crabs, the location and topic of the interview communicated the occasion to 
be informal to the interviewees. Therefore, they did not hesitate to respond in the dialect. 
The other clip was an interview with an operagoer at the reopening of the Shanghai Grand 
Theater after its eight-month renovation. In front of the posters and costume display of Verdi’s 
Attila, which was the season-opening performance, a middle-aged Shanghairen man responded to 
the reporter in Putonghua, though with heavy Shanghai dialect accent. Opera tickets ranged from 
RMB 80 to 1,280 (approx. US $13 to $210 dollars), making it much cheaper than the gourmet crab. 
However, the venue and topic of the interview indicated the formality of the occasion. Thus, the 
proper language choice for the setting, as perceived by the audience member, was Putonghua, 
despite the fact that he was not able to speak it well.  
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Encountering a Putonghua-speaking TV reporter, both interviewees made a language 
choice according to the language hierarchy. Their responses exemplify the association of the 
official language with high culture and formal setting, and Shanghai dialect with everyday 
mundane activities, such as shopping seafood at a neighborhood wet market. This distinction is 
the result of decades of language policies granting Putonghua a superior status, while 
simultaneously relegating dialects as inferior. The decision of which language to speak in public 
is never just a personal choice, as explained above; rather it involves linguistic capital of both 
language proficiency and judgment of the occasion. The definition of properness is in the hand of 
the state, rather than the individual (Bourdieu, 1991:47). An individual’s enactment of linguistic 
capital reinforces the cultural aesthetics of languages, reproduces the language hierarchy, and 
strengthens the dominance of Putonghua.  
The dissemination of aesthetic values of languages can be particularly effective and 
influential when native Shanghairen producers in the cultural industry believe in the hierarchy and 
integrate it in their work. Jin, a famous novelist whose recent bestseller, Fan Hua (Flowers), won 
various national awards, was blunt about the vulgarity of the Shanghai dialect over our interview: 
It has nothing to do with social class, but essentially [with] the language itself. It is 
not the issue of topics either, such as domestic conflict, or trivial things, the 
indecency of the dialect is embedded in each and every sentence. You can find lots 
of vulgarity and coarseness in ordinary Shanghairen’s dialect-speaking.  
A bilingual native Shanghairen, Jin had worked as an editor for the literary journal Shanghai 
Literature for decades before he wrote Flowers, which incorporates Shanghai dialect in depicting 
urban living over the last half century. To him, Shanghai dialect, the former lingua franca of the 
city, and a member of the ancient Wu linguistic family, is essentially an urban vernacular for daily 
life, with curse words and vulgar sayings, and incompatible with high culture.  It echoes Dorian’s 
analysis of the contrast between official language and dialects, that official language is usually 
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regarded as “a rich, rationally organized and rationally organizing instrument; and dialects by 
contrast, are considered impoverished, crude and most likely inadequate” (1999:8). By using 
Shanghai dialect to vividly depict urban life among middle and working class Shanghairen, Jin 
provides an authentic voice of Shanghai, one that regards the dialect as crude and less valuable. 
The language ideology he holds, which is expressed in his novel and over our interview, does not 
take into consideration the socioeconomic status of dialect speakers, but justifies the state’s 
language ideology.  
Rather than personal opinion, the next example is an observation of linguistic practice at a 
private setting contributed by an interviewee. It involves a native Shanghairen who was born in 
1983, speaks Putonghua fluently, and works as a director at Shanghai Television. I interviewed his 
cousin, Ouyang, who told the story:  
It was at the family gathering to celebrate his 30th birthday at a fancy restaurant. 
His parents, and senior members of the extended family were all present. But he 
said later that he couldn’t give the thank-you speech in Shanghai dialect. According 
to him, it’s like physiologically [psychologically as well] compulsive, that he could 
not make himself. To him, it is a formal speech, so he could not switch to the local 
tongue. He apologized to us for that language choice at the end of the speech.  
Through the language choice, Ouyang’s cousin demonstrates the embodiment of his linguistic 
capital, which disciplines his linguistic interaction with family members. His choice of Putonghua 
for the perceived formal setting exemplifies the differentiated aesthetics and status assigned to the 
official language, in contrast to the Shanghai dialect. Usually, dialect speaking at a private, 
intimate setting, such as among family members or in a close-knit community, signifies trust and 
solidarity (Cavanaugh, 2009:6; Jaffe, 1999:28; Gal, 1987:637; Woolard, 1985), but Ouyang’s 
cousin was unable to use the dialect despite his acknowledgement of the kind of audience he was 
facing. The apology notwithstanding, the differentiated aesthetic values of the two languages in 
the core of his embodied linguistic capital explain his language choice.  
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We have seen how the aesthetic values of language shape the expected, proper language 
for public settings, and in return, individuals’ embodied linguistic capital reproduces aesthetic 
values of languages through their daily practices and interactions. Next, I will turn to the venue 
where children acquire linguistic capital, highlighting the role of the public school system, which 
instills the association between Putonghua proficiency and upward social mobility. 
  
Acquisition and Accumulation in School 
Putonghua has been the instructive language from kindergarten to college since it was 
mandated in the 1956 directive. In a comparatively less rigid linguistic environment before the 
passing of the language law in 2001, Chen observed that in mainland China, competence in 
Putonghua in addition to one’s local dialect was generally taken as an indicator, albeit not always 
a reliable one, of one’s educational level (1999:30). Against this backdrop, the state’s language 
project since the early 2000s has emphasized a connection between Putonghua proficiency and 
upward social mobility, which can be understood as a conversion between linguistic, social and 
economic capital. The broader sociohistorical context facilitating such conversions involves 
changes in job allocation during the economic reform era. Instead of criteria essential in the Maoist 
era such as hukou status or political affiliation, the job market has turned to a more merit-based 
system that rewards educational achievement. Details of this shift will be discussed in chapter five.  
The connection between Putonghua proficiency and educational achievement created 
under the state’s language ideology is reproduced in the school system. The formation and 
accumulation of linguistic capital starts as early as kindergarten. Many Shanghairen parents of 
young children told me stories of how after just weeks or months of sending their children to school, 
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they had stopped, and even refused to speak Shanghai dialect at home, even though most of them 
were raised in the dialect by grandparents.  
The school system in Shanghai produces linguistic capital through teaching Putonghua, 
which in those who also learned Shanghai dialect at home fosters a bilingual capacity. The 
knowledge of two languages is the prerequisite for recognition of the hierarchy and, consequently, 
their differentiated cultural aesthetics. Bourdieu rightfully acknowledges the role of school in the 
elaborating, legitimating, and imposing an official language (1991:32). Wu, a computer 
programmer in his early 30s who developed a free cellphone App to type in Shanghai dialect, 
explained to me how public schools legitimate and establish Putonghua’s higher status by 
degrading the dialect: 
The idea that speaking Shanghai dialect is philistine and low-class is deeply rooted. 
We were taught since elementary school that Shanghai tongue is a dialect, is rustic, 
as well as the idea that Shanghai dialect is of a lower status, not proper for formal 
settings.  
This language hierarchy taught at school influences children’s perception of the two languages and 
their future linguistic practices.  Putonghua’s exclusive properness for formal settings is instilled 
as part of the linguistic capital children acquire in school.  
The aspiration to do better in school, and in turn for upward social mobility feeds the self-
motivation to speak Putonghua, to increase one’s linguistic capital for later capital conversion. 
Yujie, a native Shanghairen MBA holder and marketing strategy manager for Siemens’ 
headquarters in Shanghai, told me that upon entering college she realized her tendency to speak 
Shanghai dialect negatively impacted her presentation skills in the eyes of her professors, which 
motivated her to practice Putonghua as much as she could both on campus and at home with her 
parents.  
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Besides imposing judgments on students’ linguistic practice, and adhering to the language 
requirement in the job description, teachers’ language choices in non-pedagogical settings further 
reproduce the language hierarchy. Those linguistic practices demonstrate the thoroughness of the 
embodiment of language ideology, often in unintended ways. Lu Yan, a private elementary school 
teacher provided me with a telling example: 
Usually we teachers consciously use Putonghua at work, because school is a formal 
setting. But interestingly at meetings with the principal, he would use Putonghua to 
explain pedagogic materials in a very formal tone. Then, he would switch to 
Shanghai dialect when scolding us based on some review or report. He 
differentiates, switches back and forth. We as well, if criticizing students’ work, we 
would switch to the dialect.    
In Yan’s depiction, in a relatively formal setting, the principal did not consistently use Putonghua. 
Rather, he switched to Shanghai dialect to swear, a function believed to be improper for Putonghua. 
The official language connotes power and authority, and is viewed as unsuitable for certain ways 
of speaking, regardless of social context.   
Earlier linguistic studies, in a European context, interpret code switching as an inherited 
component of a value-laden bilingual system. Woolard discovered that in Franco era Barcelona 
the switch between Catalan and the official language Castilian communicated the expectation and 
the rules for the differentiated uses of the two languages (1987:117). From her study on French 
and Corsican bilingual speakers, Jaffe argues that the symbolic meaning embedded in code-
switching relies on two mutually exclusive or opposing systems of values associated with the two 
said languages, from which co-present meanings are recognized by the speaker (1999:28). The 
principal’s language switch does not indicate that there are more coarse words in Shanghai dialect, 
but instead, that a social function and cultural aesthetic has been assigned to its use. Given that 
Yan has noticed the occasion of the principal’s code switch, it is apparent that the differentiated 
functions of the two languages are effectively communicated and universally understood.  
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When Yan continued to describe a similar linguistic practice among teachers when 
criticizing students’ work, it was clear that the differentiated social functions of Putonghua and 
Shanghai dialect are part of the linguistic capital reproduced at school. Through teachers’ 
demonstration of their linguistic capital, students learn about how, where, and when to use each 
language; besides learning Putonghua pronunciation, vocabulary, and grammar in Chinese class. 
This linguistic capital will accumulate over years, and ultimately be converted to social and 
economic capital. Successful conversion will then in return reproduce Putonghua’s higher status 
and dominance.  
 
Conversion on Two Markets 
Linguistic capital is an effective indicator of socioeconomic status, and also one of the tools 
to achieve it in contemporary Shanghai. Anthropologists studying the social dimension of 
linguistic practices have noted that the hierarchy of languages corresponds to the social status of 
their speakers. Bourdieu notes that besides considering the correctness in pronunciations and 
grammar, the expressive style of the language spoken, such as when, where, and how to speak 
correspond to the social hierarchy of the speakers (1991:54).  Conversely, Dorian argues that the 
correlation goes both ways, by which she means that “[l]anguages have the standing of what their 
speakers have. If the people who speak a language have power and prestige, the language they 
speak will enjoy high prestige as well” (1999:3-4).  
This two-way association is built into the state’s language ideology. In elaborating how the 
language ideology taught at school influences native Shanghairen’s language choice, Wu Wei, a 
software developer who single-handedly wrote a Shanghai dialect typing APP for smartphones, 
concluded to me from his observation that the imposed lower status of the Shanghai dialect resulted 
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in “those self-perceived to be modern and classy people’s refusal to speak it.”  Cavanaugh’s 
conceptualization of the social aesthetics of language sheds light on this; she means the cultural 
and emotional dimensions of language use and extra-linguistic factors that rank people into 
hierarchies (2009:11). To put it simply, people are ranked by the language they speak. Such 
ranking explains the self-distancing from the Shanghai dialect in Wei’s observation.  
Because Putonghua has been the language instructed in the school system since the 1950s, 
its proficiency is associated with a long period of formal schooling, and hence higher educational 
achievement. In Shanghai in the 1980s, Ramsey observed that some educated, sophisticated 
Shanghai families had begun to use Putonghua in their homes (1989:30). From my personal 
recollection of growing up in Shanghai in the 1980s, Putonghua proficiency was by then already 
a component of habitus, which indicated a child’s family background. Not surprisingly, children 
from those better-educated families came to speak Putonghua better than their working-class 
counterparts and thus were usually favored by teachers in schools. Considering how high 
achievement in education will later translate into higher socioeconomic status, it exemplifies the 
working of habitus that through linguistic capital, the embodied cultural capital, class structure is 
reproduced.   
From our interview, I learned that in Dabei’s family, the linguistic component of her son’s 
habitus was actively monitored and created under her husband’s order. Dabei is a native female 
Shanghairen who married a non-native. Her husband migrated from Shannxi in northwestern 
China; he objects to speaking Shanghai dialect at home. According to Dabei: 
He thinks Shanghai dialect is backwards, not compatible with the global city image 
of Shanghai. Besides, he picks on my mother, who is not highly educated and 
speaks only the dialect, saying her world is very limited, evidenced by her limited 
language skill. He doesn’t like her speaking Shanghai dialect to our son. So when 
he is around, my mother though with heavy accent and difficulty, would speak 
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Putonghua to the boy. It is her way to show to my husband that she understands his 
expectation and requirement for the child.   
The linguistic capital Dabei’s husband possesses is comprised not only of knowledge of his native 
Shannxi dialect, but also Putonghua and English, but also the knowledge of the rankings of them. 
To him, his mother-in-law’s lower educational level (and thus, social status) is the proof of the 
lower status and limited application of the Shanghai dialect.  In turn, the Shanghai dialect is judged 
in relation to the dominant language ideology and confirms speakers’ low status in society. As 
Woolard points out through her study on the social condition of Catalan and Castilian speakers, 
the dialect’s speakers of lower socioeconomic status “furnish convenient evidence that they are 
not equipped for more authoritative functions” (1985:744). Immersed in the dominant language 
ideology through her own school years, Dabei found it difficult to counter her husband’s view. 
After a while, like her mother, she stopped communicating with her son in Shanghai dialect when 
her husband was present. Through her husband, the state-imposed language ideology constructed 
a monolingual Putonghua environment in the private sphere. Though deprived of the opportunity 
to learn the Shanghai dialect, Dabei’s son grew up with the proper, and thus desirable linguistic 
capital, which would later be rewarded in the school system and on the job market.   
As these examples suggest, I observed in Shanghai that in general, Putonghua competence 
was recognized as a tool for climbing the socioeconomic ladder. Instead of the Shanghai dialect, 
it is a bilingual or trilingual capacity—many professionals in Shanghai work for transnational 
corporations and use English on a daily basis—that distinguishes the middle-class Shanghairen 
from the lower class monolingual Shanghai dialect speakers. The latter are predominantly senior 
citizens of a lower educational level and working-class background. Despite the fact that their lack 
of Putonghua proficiency is due to the historical context of the implementation of Putonghua in 
school systems, which started after their graduation from middle or high schools, their lower social 
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status is due mostly to the economic restructuring of the reform era. Many native Shanghairen 
nevertheless see this correlation as proof of the Shanghai dialect’s worthlessness when converting 
linguistic to social and economic capital. 
Qi, a native Shanghairen dialect preservationist told me about his aunt’s firm belief in this 
correspondence, and her resulting linguistic practice:  
Not only when talking to her high-school age daughter, [does she use Putonghua]; 
even when describing her daughter’s classmates and school life, my youngest aunt 
would switch to Putonghua automatically even though she was talking to my dad 
and other siblings of hers, regardless of her daughter’s presence.  
From the way Qi described his aunt, I could sense that she had high aspirations for her daughter 
and regarded her daughter’s status as higher than her own. Through a conscious language choice, 
she wanted to make a distinction between her Putonghua speaking daughter and her Shanghai 
dialect-speaking siblings of a lower socioeconomic status. Qi’s aunt’s language ideology, which 
associated higher socioeconomic status with Putonghua speaking, was supported by the fact, that 
her daughter, at the time of our interview, was a manager for a foreign company located in 
Pudong’s CBD area, and earned the highest salary of her generation among the relatives.  
From Qi’s aunt and cousin’s story, we see how linguistic capital, in particular Putonghua 
proficiency, becomes a convenient signifier of social status.  To a certain extent, we can understand 
it as an example of achieving the “China Dream”, which, according to themes of recent years’ 
Putonghua Promotion Week, requires Putonghua proficiency to realize. The “China Dream” turns 
out to be less an individual aspiration than a promise by the state, that political and cultural 
conformity will be rewarded with economic prosperity and social recognition.  
From Qi’s aunt’s story, we have seen how the dominant language ideology has influenced 
native Shanghairen of lower socioeconomic status, who now inhabit and promote that ideology. 
Bourdieu sees petite bourgeoisie, or the lower middle-class, as the main contributors to linguistic 
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change, because of the disparity between their socioeconomic aspiration and their limited means 
to achieve it (1991:62). Many Shanghairen of Qi’s aunt’s generation experienced the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) during their school years, and thus acquired only a middle-school level 
education before being sent to the countryside to engage in farming. Only a decade or two after 
returning to Shanghai to take up manufacturing jobs in the late 1970s, they were laid off in the 
economic reforms in the 1990s. Since then economic restructuring has closed down their work 
units and focused instead on the tertiary economy, that required education and skills that they did 
not possess. They now belong to a lower middle-class or working-class stratum. It is an 
intermediate position between the bilingual, if not trilingual, highly educated professionals, and 
rural-origin migrant workers who speak Putonghua with various heavy inland accents, or other 
dialects. To climb the socioeconomic ladder, native Shanghairen choose not only to speak the 
standardized official language themselves, but also, as in Qi’s aunt’s case, they create a linguistic 
environment at home that encourages Putonghua speaking and eschews Shanghai dialect speaking.  
However, this is not the full picture of linguistic capital conversion. Shanghai dialect, 
though excluded, and even despised, on the formal market of capital conversion that is created and 
regulated by the state, has its appeal and value in a Shanghai local market. This market includes 
those outside mainstream career trajectories. They are retired native Shanghairen who do not speak 
Putonghua well, and who treat Shanghai dialect proficiency as the mark of an insider in the local 
community. Among these Shanghairen, this linguistic capital converts into social and symbolic 
capital.  
Another group participating in this alternative market for the conversion of linguistic 
capital are migrant workers in the retail and service sector whose patrons include a large group of 
native Shanghairen seniors. Working as barbers, street food venders, seamstresses, or locksmiths, 
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these migrants are outside the state’s employment system. These workers’ linguistic fluidity and 
use of Shanghai dialect converts directly to better customer service, more business, hence, 
economic capital.  
Jin, the award-winning novelist who believes in the lower cultural aesthetic of Shanghai 
dialect, pointed out to me where to find Shanghai dialect speakers:  
If you go to public space in lower class neighborhoods, those playing chess in parks, 
or mahjong at community centers, all speak the Shanghai dialect. Each person there 
is a Shanghai dialect loudspeaker, 24/7. They are at the base in the socioeconomic 
pyramid, its [size] is much bigger than upper levels.  
He compared the hierarchy of languages and the number of their speakers to a pyramid, with the 
lower status language, the Shanghai dialect, having more speakers than Putonghua. It could be true 
among the older generation of native Shanghairen, especially those of lower educational level, as 
well as migrant workers, as he observed:  
And also at the bottom are migrants, who came to Shanghai to open small 
businesses in neighborhoods selling produce, cutting hair or mending shoes and 
umbrellas. They are barely educated, coming to seek luck in Shanghai, like a 
century ago. First thing they did was to learn the Shanghai dialect, so as to 
communicate with patrons, most likely elderly Shanghairen. Those migrants who 
refused to learn Shanghai dialect were the wealthy ones, occupying the upper level 
of the socioeconomic pyramid.  
Jin’s keen observation of the language practices among the lower class contributed to his depiction 
of symbolic power embedded in interactions between Shanghai dialect speakers and Putonghua 
speakers, in his bestselling novel, Fan Hua (2013).  
I have observed similar language practices in a migrant seamstress over my fieldwork. 
During that encounter, the seamstress demonstrated her Shanghai dialect proficiency in serving 
her elderly native Shanghairen patrons, and deployed the symbolic and social capital, into which 
her linguistic capital had been converted, avoiding discrimination she might experience as a non-
Shanghai dialect speaker. She had a sewing machine set up outside of an apartment building under 
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a shabby tent in a lower middle class neighborhood in the Hongkou district in northeastern 
Shanghai. I approached her in Putonghua for a seam repair, because in my understanding, most 
service sector workers were non-natives, and thus Putonghua speakers. She treated me with bad 
manners, which at first I assumed was because the seam work cost only RMB 5, a very small job. 
However, despite equally small work, the senior female customer after me received kind words 
from her. Instead of age, the reason for this differentiated treatment was language. This customer 
did not make the effort to switch from Shanghai dialect to Putonghua when talking to the 
seamstress. The seamstress conversed in Shanghai dialect with the later customer, though with a 
strong accent. Her attitude toward me changed immediately after I switched to Shanghai dialect. 
It supported my hypothesis of the alternative language hierarchy that places the Shanghai dialect 
above Putonghua, as a mark of certain social status.  
This field encounter resonates with Jin’s description, that among migrant workers such as 
the seamstress, the Shanghai dialect is an important component of their linguistic capital, which 
can be converted not only to economic capital through business opportunities, but also social and 
symbolic capital to discriminate against more recent migrants, who have yet to acquire the dialect 
competence to make a living and start climbing the socioeconomic ladder.  
In summary, the conversion from linguistic capital to other capitals in Shanghai takes place 
in two markets. The dominant one is similar to what Bourdieu identifies in the French context, that 
proficiency in the official language is rewarded in the school system and on the labor market 
connected with it, and thus devalues regional dialects and accents, and reinforces the language 
hierarchy (1991:49).  The alternative market for converting dialect proficiency to immediate social 
and economic capital, from my observation, is still alive in Shanghai, despite the state’s language 
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ideology. The reason is the presence of the older generation native Shanghairen who do not speak 
Putonghua well, and the small businesses catering to them.  
In the next section, I will explore the dire linguistic landscape of the Shanghai dialect, 
especially the risk of language loss among the younger generation born in the 2000s onward. 
Against this background, I will examine the efforts of a group of Shanghai dialect preservationists, 
who resist state language policies and create an alternative language ideology. Dorian summarizes 
the fate of languages by the principal that “languages are seldom admired to death but are 
frequently despised to death (1999:3).” Changing the cultural aesthetics of the Shanghai dialect 
could be a way to save it from such a fate.  
 
Rapid Endangerment 
Narratives about language loss often seem to suggest that speakers across different 
generations suddenly abandon their mother tongue and completely adopt the imposed or aspired 
language in every aspect of their lives, but the reality is rarely if ever this simple (Grenoble & 
Whaley, 1998: xv). Rather than a sudden switch, the endangerment of Shanghai dialect is closely 
associated with the state-sponsored ascendancy of Putonghua and the rise in intermediary 
bilingualism among native Shanghairen.  
The 2001 language law, which coincided with the economic reforms that reached Shanghai 
in the 1990s, is largely to blame for the recent endangerment of the Shanghai dialect. Before the 
1990s Shanghai was primarily monolingual, with the primacy of the Shanghai dialect due to both 
the lack of enforcement of earlier language policies, and the planned economy allowing limited 
social and geographical mobility. Summarizing from earlier studies in various sociohistorical 
contexts, Grenoble and Whaley argue, “the relinquishing of a native tongue is tied in part to the 
belief that success in a non-native language is crucial to economic advantage” (1998:37). The shift 
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from a planned to a market economy opened up venues for individuals’ upward mobility. To 
achieve that increase in status in a changing Shanghai, native Shanghairen made the pragmatic 
decision to emphasize Putonghua speaking. A primary means was through the school system, 
which is imbued with the state’s language ideology.  
The language situation quickly changed over the last two decades, with the result that 
currently the majority of Shanghai dialect speakers are middle-aged or older. Younger adults and 
children only have a limited or passive knowledge of the dialect. While elderly native Shanghairen 
who do not speak Putonghua well rely on the Shanghai dialect for their daily activities, the younger 
generations in Shanghai are predominantly bilingual, and Shanghai dialect proficiency positively 
correlates with age. That is to say, the younger a person is, the lower their Shanghai dialect 
proficiency is likely to be.  
Previous studies on earlier cohorts’ language patterns complement my findings on native 
Shanghairen schoolchildren’s lack of knowledge of the Shanghai dialect. A study conducted in the 
late 1980s examined language patterns across three generations of native Shanghairen who were 
born and lived their entire lives in the city. Language patterns of cohort members born in the 1920s, 
1950s, and 1980s demonstrate the shift from monolingual to bilingual, and from using the 
Shanghai dialect as the mother tongue to using Putonghua even when talking with oneself (Qian, 
1988:46-7).   Similarly, Jiang concludes that most native Shanghairen students are qualified as 
bilingual, in a 2005 survey study of more than eighty-six hundred native Shanghairen students 
ranging from kindergarten to their first year of college, all with native Shanghairen parents 
(2006:64-5). A more in-depth view of the younger generation’s bilingual capacity is provided by 
Jiao’s study of two hundred and forty-three native Shanghairen students conducted in 2007. 23 Jiao 
                                                          
23 The ‘native-ness’ in that study was defined as: the students themselves and at least two generations above needed 
to be Shanghairen, presumably with Shanghai household registration status. 
 125 
 
found that more than 70 percent of native Shanghairen students consider Putonghua the language 
they speak most fluently, in comparison to 28 percent for Shanghai dialect. Furthermore, Shanghai 
dialect competence is positively associated with students’ age: the younger the student, the less 
likely he or she is to consider Shanghai dialect the language they speak most fluently. In Jiao’s 
study, only 17 percent of junior high school first-years considered Shanghai dialect the language 
they speak most fluently, while the percentage was higher among high school first-years and 
college freshman at 32 percent and 34 percent respectively (2009:30-1).  
Jiao did not explain the reason for the difference by which Shanghai dialect competence 
among junior high school first-years’ is roughly half that of high school first-years who are only 
three years older. The answer becomes clear when we consider the year the two groups of students 
entered elementary schools; 2001 and 1998 respectively. The first-year junior high school students 
in Jiao’s study certainly demonstrated the “achievement” of the 2001 language law, which 
mandates Putonghua be used as the sole instructive language in schools since that year. As I can 
recall from my own high school years in the late 1990s in Shanghai, other than Chinese language 
courses, most courses were taught in Shanghai dialect, including physics, chemistry, and 
mathematics, among others. Furthermore, the language environment became even less tolerant in 
the late 2000s, as reported by some of my interviewees. In interviews, I learned that elementary 
and middle-school students were picked on by peers and punished by teachers for speaking the 
dialect at school.   
Observations from my fieldwork in the fall and winter of 2013 further prove the consistent 
decline of Shanghai dialect proficiency among younger generations. Almost uniformly, the 
conversations I overheard between grandparents and grandchildren on the streets of Shanghai were 
characterized by grandparents speaking Putonghua to their school-age grandchildren with a heavy 
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accent, and apparent difficulty. Instead of teaching grandchildren the Shanghai dialect, 
grandparents chose to accommodate the younger generation’s language preference. Weiyun, a 
native Shanghairen professional in her mid-30s, recounted an encounter between her father and 
her kindergarten-age daughter: 
To both my daughters, all cartoon characters speak Putonghua, so Shanghai dialect 
is a very, very remote and unfamiliar language. One day my father was trying to 
read a story to them in Shanghai dialect, “Today, grandpa is going to read a story…” 
but my younger daughter interrupted him and protested in a fairly bad manner, 
“Speak to me in CHINESE!”  
This anecdote speaks directly to Shanghai dialect endangerment, especially among younger 
generations: a native Shanghairen child regards the Shanghai dialect as a foreign language. In 
particular, if we consider the fact that the little girl is the third generation of a native Shanghairen 
family, and lives with grandparents whose Putonghua is fairly poor. According to Weiyun, her two 
elementary school age daughters have only a limited knowledge of the dialect; if she insists the 
usually chatty girls to converse in Shanghai dialect, their answers to her questions would mostly 
be “yes”, “no”, or “okay”.  
Using the language assessment chart produced by UNESCO, the stage of Shanghai dialect 
can be categorized as “definitely endangered” (See highlighted section in Figure 3.3). My 
ethnographic data shows that the dialect is spoken mostly among today’s parental generation, or 
 
Figure 3.3: UNESCO Assessment of Language Vitality and Endangerment (2003) 
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those born in the 70s and early 80s. If we examine the language patterns across generations, 
between those born in the 2010s, to parents born in the late 1980s, and to grandparents born in the 
1950s-60s, it seems accurate to say that Shanghai dialect is in a “severely endangered” stage 
(Grade 2 in Figure 3.3), meaning the language is used mostly by the grandparent generation and 
older. 
The best illustration of the generational difference in Shanghai dialect proficiency is Yujie’s 
story comparing herself with her son: 
All my school years until college, I expressed my opinions in Shanghai dialect, 
which to me was the most natural, convenient and efficient way. Then to adjust to 
the [linguistic] environment…and now the language in the work place [is 
Putonghua as well]. As for my son (four years old at that time), the linguistic 
environment he grew up in was Putonghua. So when he learned to speak, he spoke 
Putonghua. Now even when I want him to speak Shanghai dialect…there was once 
I asked him in Shanghai dialect to bring me a little bucket. He stood still, translated 
the request into Putonghua and said it aloud to himself before getting it done. He 
can totally understand the Shanghai dialect, but he doesn’t speak it. Probably to 
him, the most natural and convenient way to express himself is Putonghua.  
If we remember from above, Yujie, because of pressures to improve her presentation skills and 
other academic performances in college, had strong motivation to speak Putonghua well. Between 
her son and herself, over the course of merely one generation, the most “natural” and adequate 
way to express oneself shifts from the Shanghai dialect to Putonghua. 
Her son’s adoption of Putonghua as mother tongue is not a rare case. A private elementary 
school music teacher told me that at her school, native Shanghairen children born in the 2000s are 
barely able to speak the dialect.  Her opinion echoes that of the principal of Haibei Kindergarten, 
which is located in an upper-middle class neighborhood in southwestern Shanghai. The principal 
told me that, over the last several years, fewer and fewer Shanghairen children have been able to 
speak Shanghai dialect, and one rarely heard it in classrooms or on the playground, in particular 
from the cohorts born in the 2010s.  
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The generational difference indicates the power of societal influences and the impact of the 
education system. In her study on the decline of native languages among American Indians, 
Mithun argues that the replacement of the mother tongue with the dominant language of the larger 
society takes place when “the strength of their own cultures and the intellectual value of 
bilingualism were little understood or appreciated” (1999:182). Yingli, a native Shanghairen in 
her early 40s, described to me her eleven-year-old daughter’s practical decision to speak 
Putonghua, which shows how bilingual ability is un-appreciated.  
In Yingli’s daughter’s classroom, there are five non-native students out of a total of forty, 
but many of the native Shanghairen children do not speak Shanghai dialect, regardless of their 
origin. In Yingli’s daughter’s mind, it was a waste of time to initiate a conversation in Shanghai 
dialect. Often, she needed to repeat everything in Putonghua after realizing the other person did 
not understand the dialect. Her bilingualism served as an inconvenience more than a benefit: in 
her experience, it is apparent that the adoption of the Shanghai dialect in everyday life requires 
more effort than using Putonghua exclusively. It explains why school children like her refuse to 
speak the dialect despite having grown up in a domestic environment where Shanghai dialect was 
spoken. The linguistic space in Shanghai schools reproduces native Shanghairen children’s 
preference for Putonghua.  
Furthermore, whenever talking to school age children, native Shanghairen would almost 
instinctively switch to Putonghua. Consider the following experience of a retired college professor, 
Wang Jian, as one example:  
The linguistic environment is that even at home, parents speak Putonghua to 
children. For example, in the elevator of my building, a parent would say hello to 
me in the Shanghai dialect. The next second, he would switch to Putonghua to scold 
the kid: “Stand still!” Automatically, just like that!    
This audience-specific language choice of Prof. Wang’s neighbor demonstrates the acceptance of 
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generational linguistic differences, and how bilingual speakers act accordingly to accommodate. 
Thus parents and the school system work in accordance with each other to create an exclusive 
Putonghua speaking environment for native Shanghairen children, which makes it apparent that 
dialect speaking is never supposed to direct at them, and is the practice of older generations. In 
this sense, the linguistic space of the Shanghai dialect does not belong to or welcome native 
Shanghairen children. This exclusiveness accelerates the dialect’s endangerment. 
In summary, the decline of Shanghai dialect competency moves linearly across generations. 
It is most telling that when we examine the cohorts entering the school system after the language 
law of 2001, those born in the 1990s are still able to speak some Shanghai dialect, but need to 
switch to Putonghua from time to time due to the lack of Shanghai dialect vocabulary. Those born 
in the 2000s in general have a passive understanding of Shanghai dialect and prefer not to speak 
it. The most profound decline can be seen in the group born in the 2010s, who have little to no 
knowledge of the Shanghai dialect, and are highly unlikely to acquire any in the school system.  
Through state policies and continuous governmental efforts to promote Putonghua, the 
dominance of the official language has, over the years, limited and even eliminated Shanghai 
dialect speaking in certain social spheres. This has led to the endangerment of the Shanghai dialect.  
Putonghua’s ascendancy over Shanghai dialect comes not only from administrative regulations 
and censorship, but also from the dominant language ideology communicated through the school 
system and labor market. As I have shown, native Shanghairen came to believe that speaking 
Putonghua well would contribute to their and their children’s future. Against this background of 
almost complete dominance of Putonghua in ‘proper’ social circles, and the continued 
marginalization of the Shanghai dialect in the city, a kind of resistance has emerged, in the form 
of a grassroots preservation movement.  
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The Dialect Preservation Movement 
In an authoritarian state, especially in a city representing the country’s economic 
achievement and social stability, public protests or dissemination of dialect promotion materials 
through state-controlled mass media are highly unlikely. A 2012 study examining the language 
conflict between Cantonese and Putonghua in Guangzhou in southern China makes it plain the 
uneven power relations between the state-backed Putonghua hegemony and a vernacular society 
advocating for place-specific cultural identity (Qian et. al, 2012:908). Taking a lesson from the 
failed protests in Guangzhou, which, through social media and other limited channels attempted 
to reach policy makers, the Shanghai dialect preservationists have devised strategies to avoid direct 
confrontation with the state. They have developed tactics to criticize language policies and tried to 
create an alternative language ideology by altering the cultural aesthetic of the Shanghai dialect.  
 
Role of the State  
According to the state’s language ideology, Putonghua is the single language that 
represents “Chinese-ness”, loyalty to the state, and loyalty to the Communist Party. The long-term 
goal of Putonghua promotion is to unite the population around a homogeneous national identity, 
in place of diverse local ones. Among the younger generation of native Shanghairen, there has 
been a sharp decline in Shanghai dialect proficiency to the degree that younger children treat it as 
a non-Chinese language, i.e. Weiyun’s daughter. In this situation, performing artists represented 
by the Vice Chief Officer of a vernacular theatre group initiated proposals to the municipal 
government for dialect preservation. Behind their rhetoric of the dialect’s cultural heritage is a 
response to the market economy, under which the government has sharply reduced financial 
support for performing arts institutions. For the troupe to survive with little funding from the state, 
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an audience with Shanghai dialect proficiency is needed. With the dialect incomprehensible among 
native Shanghairen children, not only the troupe’s future, but also the fate of the art form itself is 
in jeopardy.  
Instead of measures unlikely to work in a Chinese context, such as publicly denouncing 
the Putonghua hegemony, or advocating for a renewal of the dialect’s status as the city’s mother 
tongue as a human rights issue, Qian Chen, the Vice Chief Officer of the Huaijixi (Shanghai 
vernacular theater) Troupe, evoked Maoist ethics in his proposals sent to municipal policy makers. 
Being a famous Huajixi performer, Qian is also a member of the Shanghai Municipal Political 
Consultative Committee—a committee consisting of non-party members to consult on Chinese 
Communist Party's policies. In the past ten years, he has put forward many proposals for providing 
bilingual services at government agencies and hospitals, and allowing children to speak the dialect 
at schools.  
During our interview, I asked whether his proposals were in conflict with the Constitution 
recognizing Putonghua as the only official language, as well as with the Spoken and Written 
Language Law passed in 2001, which mandates Putonghua speaking for government employees 
and teachers. In response, he mobilized the Maoist ethical doctrine "Serving the People" to make 
his point, that those professions should not hold themselves above the people by insisting on the 
official language; instead, they should speak the language that the people speak, Shanghai dialect 
in this case, in order to better serve the people. Tactically, Qian’s rhetoric picks up the weapon of 
the weak, using the Communist Party’s own doctrine to challenge state laws. In his proposals, he 
reminded the Communist Party member officers of their promises to serve the people, rather than 
dictate to the people.  At least on paper, they are supposed to be of the people, and for the people. 
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Targeting the accountability of governmental officials has proven to be of some use. In 
January 2014, a few months after my interview with Qian, his proposal for Shanghai dialect use 
in kindergartens was approved. According to one of the Communist Party’s online platforms, 
people.com.cn, the Shanghai Dialect Experience Education (Shanghaihua tiyan jiaoyu) planned a 
pilot study with twenty kindergartens across Shanghai later that year. Instead of forbidding the 
dialect altogether, the study was set up to encourage children to speak the dialect with each other 
out of class.24 It was the first step toward carving out a small space in the school system for the 
Shanghai dialect; though it is still far from a bilingual system.  Nor is the study in any way capable 
of challenging Putonghua’s role as the only language of instruction.  
 
Censored Voices  
Without a formal channel to reach policy makers, other preservationists voiced their 
critiques of the 2001 language law on social media. Their posts on Weibo, the Chinese twitter, 
were often censored and taken down within hours of their posting. On the surface, their critiques 
were about language hegemony, but they had gone beyond the “safe” zone of cultural heritage, to 
challenge the legal system and point out the lack of democracy embedded in the passing and 
execution of the law. These preservationists’ frustration about the language law and the dialect’s 
risk of loss was expressed via a wide spectrum of critiques, ranging from an analysis of the state’s 
legal system, to China’s adoption of market economy. 
To ensure their anonymity, I will not reveal the identity of the preservationists quoted 
below. Over the course of our interview, one middle-aged male native Shanghairen stressed the 
shaky ground of the legal enforcement of Putonghua: 
                                                          
24 Guangzhou Daily. January 24, 2014. “Twenty kindergartens in Shanghai will experiment dialect speaking off 
class.” Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/html/2014-01/24/content_2524286.htm.  
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I question whether there had been sufficient public debate before the [2001 
language] law was passed. I question whether the legislative procedure is legitimate. 
First and foremost, whether writing the clause about Putonghua into the 
Constitution had gone through sufficient discussion? In the West, amending the 
Constitution requires more than a pass at the Congress. Many issues require 
referendum. There is nothing like referendum in China! 
Both the Constitution and the 2001 language law were passed through the proper Chinese legal 
and political process. What he complained about was essentially the authoritarian state, in which 
public opinion was not sought in the legislative branch of the government.  In his opinion, policies 
and laws cementing Putonghua’s hegemony were indicators of an oppressive and undemocratic 
state. 
Another line of critiques of the language law targets the administrative level, and similar 
to Qian Chen, uses the party’s own rhetoric for the critique. This male preservationist argued that 
the strict regulations on language were incompatible with the logic of the economic reform era: 
When the government deploys administrative measures to promote Putonghua, how 
do they evaluate the effectiveness? Whether they get the money’s worth in results? 
Also, how do they know whether and how much the promotion of Putonghua 
affects other languages? The government knows nothing! No way to measure 
effects is a typical socialist way of doing things. The state is so used to planning 
everything, everything from the economy to the population size, to everything 
concerning an individual’s life, including language. It used to be like, ‘ordinary 
people don’t need to worry about anything – because the state will take care of 
everything.’ But, if the market economy has replaced the planned economy, then 
why has it not loosened the language [planning]?    
He highlighted the lack of accountability in government measures in promoting Putonghua, in 
terms of the side effect of dialect endangerment. To him, the effectiveness of Putonghua promotion 
was not evaluated, along with those of other top-down measures to control individuals’ lives. 
Given the current endangerment of the Shanghai dialect, the success of Putonghua promotion is 
apparent. His juxtaposition of the two phases of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule since 1949 
points out the reforms brought about better quality of life largely in the economic sphere for the 
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majority of the Chinese population. The censorship and control in the political and cultural sphere 
have not experienced a similar improvement.  
Other preservationists share a kind of paranoid and powerlessness, as a Chinese language 
Ph.D. student active on social media explained to me:  
The purpose of the language law is to destroy dialects! Everything is there to 
prepare for the annihilation of dialects. The essence of the Communist Party’s 
leadership is to control. In the central government’s mind, it would be much easier 
to control the people after the obliteration of all dialects. Otherwise, people with 
their own tongues will riot against the government. 
This student’s understanding of the language law hinges on government control, rather than on 
population unification.  To him, a unified language spoken across the country is a tool for effective 
population control. In his view an authoritarian state endorses an official language to unite the 
people under the state’s authority first, and any talk of a shared culture is secondary. His horror 
about language loss might appear exaggerated, but earlier studies conducted in the Soviet Union 
show such fears are not unfounded. The rapid loss of non-official languages such as Evenki, the 
largest of the Tungstic languages, was the direct result of policies implemented by Soviet language 
planners that created macro-level factors favoring acquisition of Russian at the expense of native 
tongues (Grenoble & Whaley, 1998:48-9). 
Emphasizing the cultural value of the Shanghai dialect became the primary weapon of the 
preservation movement, to counter the state’s language ideology, which painted the dialect as 
backward and vulgar. As Dorian argues about language retention, for a small group to fight against 
the dominant language, a great deal of social and psychological self-confidence in the worth of the 
language is needed (1999:20). The repertoire of literature and theatre of the ancient Wu linguistic 
family, which the Shanghai dialect belongs to, provides rich sources for the re-establishment and 
recognition of the cultural worth of the dialect.  
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Cultural Worth 
To alter the association of Shanghai dialect with lower educational level and lifestyle of 
the urban poor, preservationists point to the use of Wu languages in China’s traditional high culture, 
for example, poetry of the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), or Peking Opera. Qian Chen, of the 
Shanghai Huajixi Troupe, explained to me the ancient pronunciations well preserved in the 
Shanghai dialect, but lost in Putonghua: 
I have done my research about long vowel sound words (zhisheng zi) in Tang poetry, 
for example, Wang Zhihuan’s ‘Ascending Guanque Tower (deng guanque lou)’. 
The ‘bai’, ‘ri’ in the first line, ‘bai ri yi shan jin (sun sets by the mountain ridge),’ 
and ‘ru’ in the second line, ‘huang he ru hai liu (the Yellow River flows into the 
ocean),’ are supposed to be prolonged. Try to read it in the dialect…the up and 
down rhythms are superior! Shanghai dialect has prolonged sounding words, but 
Putonghua does not. Or our national treasure, the Peking opera, in the script of 
‘Four Scholars’ there is a line ‘bai shang le Xinyang zhou (going up to the Xinyang 
county)’. In it, ‘xin’ has a sharp sound (jianyin). Where could you find jianyin in 
Putonghua? None! The differentiation between sharp sound (jianyin) and its 
opposite, rounding sound (tuanyin) in Peking operas is identical to those in the 
Shanghai dialect.   
Qian recited the poetry and sang the opera line in both Putonghua and the Shanghai dialect for me 
to contrast the rhyme and flow, presenting the Shanghai dialect versions as more aesthetically 
pleasing as well as more authentic. His performance communicated a sense of pride in the cultural 
value of the Shanghai dialect. The worth of the language in this case is not articulated by its 
association with upward mobility, but symbolic capital and cultural aesthetic rooted in what he 
calls the “national treasure” of China.  
Similar to Qian Chen’s arguments, in our interview, Miao, a Ph.D. student in Chinese 
Language, recited to me a few lines from Shi Jing (The Book of Odes) in Cantonese. The Book of 
Odes is another classical text; a collection of three hundred and five works dating from the 11th 
and 7th century BC. To him, the state’s language ideology that associates classical literature 
exclusively with Putonghua is historically and linguistically incorrect. Classical literary works are 
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not only recited in dialects, but were also most likely composed in dialects of the ancient Wu or 
Canton linguistic family. Therefore, dialects are historically and linguistically closer to the great 
works of Chinese literature than the newly invented official language.  
This argument has a solid linguistic backing. Some phonetic features of Medieval Chinese 
(AD 25-907) are preserved in southern dialects such as variations of Wu or Cantonese, but are no 
longer present in the Beijing dialect of the twentieth century, on which Putonghua bases its 
pronunciation (Chen, 1999:18). In the arguments of preservationists, dialects provide a more 
authentic means to recite the classical literature of China, and further, that these endangered 
dialects possess their own aesthetic value, on par with China’s great works of literature. Grenoble 
and Whaley argue that a subtle but pervasive predictor of the continued use of a language is the 
prestige attached to it, for example, through the association with a rich literary tradition (1998: ix). 
Through building this association between the Shanghai dialect and classical Chinese literature, 
preservationists are building up the aesthetic status and symbolic capital of the dialect, to refute its 
lower status in the language hierarchy imposed by the state.  
 
Conclusion 
The generational differences in linguistic capital are the result of the factors discussed in 
this chapter: coercive state language policies, administrative measures to promote and reinforce 
the dominant language ideology, and the overwhelming influence of Putonghua’s status as the 
language of socioeconomic success in China. The market for converting linguistic capital into 
social and economic capital created and controlled by the state instills and reproduces the 
dominance of Putonghua. Devalued on the formal market, the Shanghai dialect faces a 
deteriorating future, with increasing threat of loss. The elderly Shanghairen who retain the dialect, 
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and the businesses catering to them, appear to be the last holdout. This might sustain the Shanghai 
dialect for just another few decades, at most, if the trend of younger generations’ lack of education 
in the dialect continues. To prevent this language loss from happening, a group of Shanghai dialect 
preservationists are devoted to producing an alternative language ideology, which stresses the 
cultural value of the dialect. We have yet to see how much it might influence authorities and native 
Shanghairen parents.  
The unique case of the endangerment of the Shanghai dialect is established also on its urban 
nature. What would happen if speakers of an endangered language were to move away from each 
other? Urban redevelopment and expansion over the last twenty years has displaced millions of 
native Shanghairen from the city center to the periphery, where new residential communities were 
located in formerly rural areas. In the next chapter, I will examine how displacement and relocation 
reshaped the linguistic environment in Shanghai. 
 
  
 138 
 
Chapter 4:  Geographical Displacement and Language Loss  
 
Two factors contributed to the endangerment of the Shanghai dialect: the language 
ideology of the Chinese state, discriminatory against regional dialects, and the tangible rewards of 
upward mobility associated with speaking Putonghua Mandarin. However, they were not sufficient 
to entirely dismantle the Shanghai dialect speech community. The language loss was accelerated 
by geographical displacement at the urban center.  
Even before the 2001 language law, urban redevelopment displaced millions of native 
Shanghairen from their overcrowded inner-city neighborhoods. Traditional shikumen alleyway 
houses, once constituting 85 percent of the residential housing in the urban center, have been 
replaced by glass-façade office towers, high-rise condo buildings and elevated expressways since 
the early 1990s. With the traditional physical landscape disappearing, the close-knit community 
and vibrant linguistic environment once maintained in shikumen neighborhoods also disappeared.  
The displacement and relocation of more than one million native Shanghairen households 
in the economic reform era shifted the sociospatial stratification of the city by sorting out residents 
according to their socioeconomic status. Over the last two decades, the state-controlled housing 
allocation system, that formerly redistributed heavily-subsidized rental housing according to 
criteria such as household registration status, career seniority or party affiliation, has been replaced 
by a real estate market economy. As a result, linguistically homogeneous but socioeconomically 
diverse neighborhoods have turned into linguistically mixed but socioeconomically homogeneous 
ones. 
The involuntary relocation amidst massive urban redevelopment and expansion in the late 
1990s and throughout the 2000s has utterly changed the linguistic landscape of the city. Gumperz’s 
(2001:43) relational conceptualization of speech community — “any human aggregate 
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characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of verbal signs and 
set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language use” — helps us define the 
two speech communities distinguishable in current Shanghai: non-natives who predominantly 
communicate in Putonghua Mandarin; and Shanghai dialect and Putonghua bilingual natives who 
communicate mainly in Shanghai dialect. The geographical displacement and relocation of native 
Shanghairen in the last two decades disrupted the “regular and frequent interaction[s]” of a speech 
community and threatened its survival. 
Furthermore, the sweeping physical changes of the city wiped out the unique character of 
Shanghai, as it had been embodied in the urban built environment. From a Bourdieusian 
perspective, this unique character is a type of symbolic capital recognized by native Shanghairen 
as ambiance and authenticity rooted in the city’s semi-colonial history. Zukin (2010: xi) states that 
a city’s distinctive character would nurture a constant dialogue and negotiation between the old 
and the new, and in the process, produce and reproduce its authenticity. Shanghai, in the state-led 
construction of a global city, has diverted from this path, when dialogue was replaced by large-
scale demolition. The removal of distinctive residential neighborhoods in the urban center made 
way for a distanced and cold global modernity, raising Shanghai’s status in comparison with the 
global cities of the West, but losing its former symbolic capital.  
Urban studies shed light on the meaning of the distinctive character of places. Firey 
(1945:144) looks at the symbolic quality and sentiments articulated in Beacon Hill in Boston. In 
her study of New York City, Zukin (1995:264) emphasizes the “divergent and multilayered 
cultures of cities,” which include dimensions of ethnicity, lifestyle and image. Molotch et al. 
(2000:807), in their comparative study of two California cities, stress the distinctive local ambiance, 
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and David Harvey (2001:405) highlights the fact that claims to uniqueness and authenticity rest 
upon historical narratives, collective memories and cultural practices.  
The distinctive character (or aggregated symbolic capital) of Shanghai draws heavily from 
the historical image of an East-meets-West metropolis, as documented in newspaper articles, 
novels, photos, and movies showing people from all over the world and every walk of life 
consuming, mingling, and struggling for a better life in Shanghai. Dialogue and negotiation with 
outside influences were vibrant in early 20th century Shanghai, as evidenced in architectural 
features, fashion, cuisine, ideological trends and the development of the Shanghai dialect.  During 
this period, Shanghai’s unique character took shape. Before the Chinese Communist Party founded 
the People’s Republic in 1949, Shanghai was a cosmopolitan space like no other. Under Mao, 
dialogues and interactions with the outside world were shut down, so the rich and vibrant character 
was frozen in time, preserved and rearticulated as tradition in the collective memories of native 
Shanghairen.   
In the economic reform era, policymakers aimed to re-image Shanghai as a global city. The 
first step was to “adopt a ‘global city look’ by constructing state-of-art infrastructure and flagship 
architectural projects” such as bridges, airports and skyscrapers (Ren, 2011:13). Instead of the 
revival of the city’s cosmopolitan tradition, native Shanghairen saw “Manhattanization,” the new 
urban form of capitalist globalization, signifying an inauthentic and undistinctive urban space, 
where the traits of the locale and the vernacular are replaced with uniform glass-façade high-rises 
(Zukin, 2010:2). After twenty years of massive urban redevelopments of industrial, commercial 
and residential spaces, many native Shanghairen complain that the living experience of an urban 
space with distinctive character is dying — if not already dead — in Shanghai.  
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In the eyes of native Shanghairen, the Oriental TV Tower, the Shanghai World Financial 
Center (dubbed “the World’s Largest Bottle Opener” on TripAdvisor website25), and the China 
Pavilion at Shanghai Expo 2010 are symbolic of a “world-class city,” which has little to do with 
their sense of home and belonging. In Zukin’s words, they are images for the nation, and the world 
to consume (1995:8). The more those urban spectacles are staged for the world, the less they are 
relevant to the native Shanghairen’s sense of belonging. The disappearance of shikumen and lilong 
housing neighborhoods also removed the material basis for the Shanghai dialect speech 
community. Spatially and culturally, native Shanghairen feel alienated and lost facing the 
“Globalizing Shanghai (Chen, 2009).” 
 
Involuntary Mobility 
Starting in the 1990s, urban redevelopments in Shanghai hollowed out the urban center and 
led to the fraying of the social fabric. Redevelopment projects ranged from rebuilding or renewing 
dilapidated and overcrowded residential areas to upgrading urban infrastructure such as elevated 
expressways, bridges and subways. In this process of dramatic urban landscape change, more than 
1.1 million households were displaced between 1995 and 2013 (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 
2011, 2014). Urban core residents with a meager budget were displaced to the periphery of the 
city; this displacement was accomplished by the rezoning of previously rural areas outside of 
Shanghai proper.  
Urban redevelopments were accompanied by changes to the leading industry in Shanghai, 
mainly from manufacture to tertiary. Factories, which had once served as the main source of 
                                                          
25 The World's Largest Bottle Opener: Beautiful - Review of Shanghai World Financial Center, Shanghai, China. 
Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g308272-d1196260-
r138551688-Shanghai_World_Financial_Center-Shanghai.html.  
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district and municipal revenue, were moved to the outer suburbs. Without the factories, land 
leasing fees became the primary sources of financing for local services in many urban districts 
(Zhou & Logan, 2008:150). As David Harvey (2001:405) points out, certain urban locales, 
leveraging their uniqueness and particularity from historically constituted cultural artifacts and 
environmental characteristics, can generate monopoly rent. Not surprisingly, the private-public 
partnership between real estate developers, districts and municipal government favored 
neighborhoods in the upper-corner of central Shanghai, such as Huangpu, Luwan and Jing’an 
Districts. These upper-corner neighborhoods represent the quintessential cosmopolitan Old 
Shanghai in its Golden Age in the 1930s. Here, colonial powers and Chinese national political, 
economic and cultural elites took residence and engaged in conspicuous consumption. Thus, land 
values of those neighborhoods became the highest in the city. 
To understand the land-leasing and profit-generating process in contemporary urban China, 
Ren borrows Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, in particular the notion of misrecognized 
value, to stress that the financial value of the buildings is inflated by the design roles played by 
famous foreign architects, not by bidding for the land. She suggests that when price is inflated by 
the competition between multiple bidders, “the land takes on a symbolic value that is 
disproportionate to its technical and economic qualities, and therefore the symbolic capital of the 
land is a kind of misrecognition, and arbitrary and inflated assessment of value” (2011:170).  
Contrary to her view, I see the bidding practice as a value-generating process, in which the 
bidders are betting on the perceived return value of the piece of land. When arguing for the 
misrecognition of the symbolic capital of the land, Ren does not take into consideration the scarcity 
of the land resource and the location of specific plots of land in the city’s historic geography. Based 
on the recognition of the scarcity of inner-city land, I argue that an ideal location for redevelopment 
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takes its symbolic capital from the appropriated urban history, especially whether it is in the 
“authentic” Puxi (west bank of the Huangpu River) part of Shanghai, and whether it is within the 
borders of former Western settlements. Bourdieu’s theorization of symbolic capital stresses the 
societal boundary of its effectiveness or recognition (1998:103-4). That is to say, the prestige, fame 
and privilege associated with residence in the upper-corner is mostly recognized by native 
Shanghairen, who are socialized to recognize, believe in and reproduce the century-old upper-
corner/lower-corner sociospatial distinction.  
In urban redevelopment, the upper-corner/lower-corner distinction is reproduced in a spiral 
fashion when economic capital in the form of property value and symbolic capital in the form of 
prestige and privilege feed into each other’s rise.  Land in upper-corner Puxi such as Jing’an, 
Luwan and Huangpu districts (with their symbolic capital inherited from the colonial era) can 
garner higher bids from real estate developers and be charged higher leasing fees by the 
government.  As a result, social services provided in those districts, including hospitals, public 
schools and sanitation, are of higher quality than those of previously lower-corner districts such as 
Hongkou and Yangpu. As noted by Orum et al. (2009:384), in the Xin Hua neighborhood of the 
upper-corner, the community center provides local residents “a well-stocked library, as well as a 
building with individual rooms set aside for regular activities such as language lessons, singing 
and even the use of high-end computers.”   Those neighborhood-based provisions re-activate and 
reinforce the privilege of living in the urban core.  
Adding insult to the injury, much of the urban central land in Puxi once occupied by 
overcrowded residential housing was redeveloped into office towers and shopping centers, further 
limiting the housing stock in the upper-corner. As a result, the prices for apartments in those 
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neighborhoods are pushed ever higher, and the sociospatial stratification represented by an 
individual’s housing location is ever more rigid.  
With redevelopment projects taking place in the urban core, previous residents were 
usually offered two options, either receiving monetary compensation or ready-for-move-in 
apartment units. However, neither of these options spared them the loss of departing the urban 
core, and their new housing condition in large part depended on their own socioeconomic status. 
Based on sub-district level 1990 and 2000 census data, He and Wu (2007:187) conclude that the 
urban core has experienced “decreasing population density and an increasing concentration of 
population with higher socioeconomic status and education level.” The monetary compensation 
provided by developers fell short of the actual market prices for apartments in the same 
neighborhoods. Moreover, those ready-for-move-in apartments were sure to be on the periphery 
of the city, depriving the former residents of their right to the city. The sociospatial stratification 
and involuntary downward mobility brought about and intensified by the urban redevelopments of 
the last two decades have left those affected urban core residents dispossessed and bitter.  
Guorong’s family was displaced in 1997, when real estate developers were required to 
provide ready housing for the displaced according to the Shanghai Urban Housing Demolition 
Management Plan issued in 1991. As a result, his parents and he were relocated from a spacious 
garden villa shared by more than ten households in the upper-corner along Nanjing Rd in the 
Jing’an District — an area within two miles of the People’s Square, which has high land values 
and well-developed social service provision (Wu, 2002) — at the center of the inner-ring, to an 
apartment outside of the middle-ring in the Meilong area, in the previously rural Minhang District. 
After more than fifteen years, he was still full of anger and frustration when retelling the account 
of his relocation: 
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On that piece of land, the Four Seasons condo building was built and in 2004 or 
2005 when it entered the housing market, the per square meter price was more than 
RMB 60,000 yuan [approx. US $900/ft2], now [2013] probably is more than 
doubled. At the time of our displacement, the government didn’t mention a word 
of moving back, and the compensation? They gave us an apartment in Meilong and 
RMB 7,500 yuan in cash. The market price for the apartment we live now, the one 
the government gave us, is about RMB 2.7 million yuan, but the worth of our old 
room in our old neighborhood? More than 6 million! 
By comparing the market value of the new apartment with the current value of an apartment in his 
old neighborhood, Guorong strongly expressed the injustice he felt about the relocation. The 
potential loss he and his family did not foresee at the time of their relocation was the root of his 
feelings of deprivation and bitterness. To Guorong and his family, the government teamed up with 
the developer and tricked them in the displacement and relocation process. Complaint 
notwithstanding, the apartment shared by Guorong and his parents is more spacious than their 
previous two rooms. But beyond the monetary disparity he described between the two apartments, 
there is a disparity in relation to the symbolic capital of urban core living. The loss or gain is not 
calculated in the apartment’s concrete square meters, but in the volume of the intangible symbolic 
capital embodied in the built, social and cultural environment of the two housing locations.   
This initial redevelopment and the concomitant relocation of the upper-corner residents in 
the late 1990s had a ripple effect: housing prices close to the edge of the inner-ring spiked, as 
displaced persons opting for monetary compensation from developers tried to buy housing. In turn, 
when a new round of redevelopment projects took place in the 2000s, the displaced were forced to 
move to the middle-ring or to Pudong where housing units were still affordable. The combined 
effects of the shrinkage of urban core housing stock and the ever-rising housing prices found those 
displaced in the 2010s relocating to the outer-ring.  
Nearly all of my interviewees could recount stories of either themselves or close family 
members experiencing displacement from the inner- to middle- to outer-ring over the last ten to 
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twenty years. For example, the marketing manager working for the headquarters of Siemens 
(China), Yujie, who grew up in Huangpu District, a neighborhood within walking distance of the 
Bund, now lives with her husband and two young sons in an apartment beyond the north edge of 
the inner-ring in Zhabei District. Similarly, a social science professor at a top Shanghai university 
in his 60s, who grew up in old shikumen housing in the upper-corner Luwan district of the previous 
French Concession, now lives in the area of Jiangwan located outside of the middle-ring. On the 
land where the professor’s old family house once stood, Xintiandi, the upscale shopping and 
residential neighborhood, can now be found.  
A more recent example is Du’s grandma who lives with his uncle and aunt. Their relocation 
contract was signed in the first weeks of 2015, at the time of my writing this chapter. The family’s 
shikumen house was located in Peide Alley (Piede Li) in the corner of Shanhaiguan Road and 
Datian Road in the Jing’an District. It was once shared by Du’s family, his aunt and uncle’s family, 
and his grandma. Peide Alley was one of the few remaining shikumen housing neighborhoods in 
the urban center. The four relocation apartments, for which they successfully negotiated with the 
developer and the government, are located in Zhoupu Township in the center of the Greater Pudong 
Area, beyond the outer-ring. The apartments are located close to subway line No.16 and No.18 
and will be ready for occupation in September 2016. Involuntarily, native Shanghairen households 
were relocated away from the urban core, in exchange for bigger modern living quarters.  
Their shared experience reinforces a collective social attachment to Shanghai’s urban 
center, which is the only authentic space recognized by native Shanghairen as Shanghai. Setha 
Low and Irwin Altman (1992:4) point out that this attachment to place includes emotional 
embeddedness, feelings of esteem and belonging, and is especially important to the cultural self-
identification and integrity of individuals and social groups. Furthermore, this bonding is most 
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salient during times of relocation and societal upheaval (Low & Altman, 1992:6). The 
dispossession of urban central living and its associated symbolic capital is most acutely felt by 
displaced native Shanghairen, to the degree of threating their self-identification as Shanghairen.  
This relative deprivation of native Shanghairen and their involuntary sociospatial mobility 
is reflected in a comment about the new linguistic landscape in Shanghai: “English is spoken in 
the inner-ring, Putonghua middle-ring, and the Shanghai dialect is spoken in the outer-ring.” 
However, my data about native Shanghairens’ relocation destinations modify this depiction. 
During an interview with Qi in the winter of 2013, he suggested that this saying was no longer 
accurate and was in fact outdated: 
This saying has been around for almost ten years. The reality now is actually more 
nuanced, if not the opposite. The closer to the urban center, the higher the living 
cost. It is true that in Jing’an or Luwan district, there are many foreigners, but it is 
not even close to the degree that the common language in the inner-ring is English, 
even though you can hear more English spoken there than ten years ago. 
Despite the more visible and audible presence of affluent foreign expats, the commercial and 
residential spaces within the inner-ring seem still predominantly Chinese. What has changed is 
that those spaces were once populated by ordinary working-class native Shanghairen, but now 
mainly by wealthy Chinese originating elsewhere. 
It is again not necessarily true that in the suburbs, or outer-ring and beyond live 
predominantly displaced native Shanghairen. In Qingpu or Songjiang counties 
[remote suburbs], the living cost is relatively lower than that in the inner-city, so it 
would be easier for them [working-class non-natives] to settle down. What I find 
accurate is that most [native] Shanghairen now live between middle-ring and outer-
ring. 
Though displaced from the most desirable upper-corner neighborhoods and relocated to the rim of 
the inner- or middle- ring, native Shanghairen still hold a relative privilege compared to millions 
of migrant workers. The majority of non-natives possess neither the access to the heavily 
subsidized urban public housing granted through urban hukou and state-owned work units, nor the 
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financial capacity to purchase housing from the market (Logan, Fang & Zhang, 2009; White, Wu 
& Chen, 2008:130).  The visible presence of affluent foreign expats conceals the reality of better-
off non-natives’ residency in the urban center, and the hardship of the truly disadvantaged migrant 
workers highlights the dispossession and downward mobility of their native Shanghairen 
neighbors. Nevertheless, what is captured in native Shanghairens’ relocation stories and the 
debunked popular saying is the reality of the quickly changing social stratification in the economic 
reform era.  
 
Class Restructuring 
The massive displacement and relocation of urban residents in Shanghai in the last two 
decades, especially those driven away from the most desirable upper-corner neighborhoods, 
constitute a story of a discriminatory urban political economy. But unlike market-initiated and 
profit-driven gentrification cases as we might find in the Western context, the case of Shanghai 
illustrates the most recent power shifts on the national scale and suggests the rising of the new 
elites.  
Since the 1990s, the urban landscape in Shanghai saw the birth of new elites, at the expense 
of old elites whom the communist party had fostered and put into place in the Maoist era. As we 
saw in chapter two, the creation of the upper- and lower-corner distinction in early 20th century 
Shanghai was a manifestation of social hierarchy of the semi-colonial past — when better quality 
housing was built for and occupied by colonizers or affluent Chinese merchants and political elites 
of the Republic era (1911-1949). Through a close examination of Guorong’s housing situation 
over three generations, I will show how housing allocation in Shanghai is a story of power and 
class, and further, how it illustrates the shift in the party’s favoritism. The multiple rounds of 
relocation and shifts in geo-social mobility experienced by his family constitute just one example 
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of hundreds of thousands of native Shanghairens’ family stories, and Guorong’s story will serve 
as the paradigmatic example of the shifted social stratification. 
Guorong’s previous neighbors sharing the four-floor single-family house in the Zhang 
Garden26 indicates the important role housing played in the recognition of elite status in the pre-
1990s Shanghai. The pre-1949 elites were replaced by communist-era elites such as Guorong’s 
grandparents, and later in the 1990s, Maoist-era elites were displaced to make way for building 
infrastructure for the global-city-to-be. Below is how Guorong briefly described the households 
sharing that garden villa with his family: 
My paternal grandfather came to Shanghai with the Liberation Army in 1949, and 
was assigned housing in the mansion that once belonged to a senior official of 
Kuomintang Party of the Republic [of China] (1911-1949). The four story house 
was shared by 16 households, and the three bathrooms and one big kitchen on the 
first floor were shared by all.   
Guorong gives a vivid depiction of the Maoist elites in the building he grew up in. When the old 
elites of the Kuomintang Party in the Republic era were driven out to Taiwan in 1949, the single-
family occupancy house was awarded to the new elite in the Maoist era. They comprised the 
People’s Liberation Army officer, Communist Party members employed in the new municipal 
government, renowned intellectuals and artists useful for the party’s propaganda, technocrat, ‘red’ 
revolutionary workers and some old elite renounced their affiliation with the capitalist West or the 
Kuomintang Party: 
On the first floor were retired municipal government officials, and a professor from 
Fudan University.  There were six households on the second floor, and from room 
201 to 206 were families of a senior electrician, a single woman returned from the 
U.S., a cameraman working at the Shanghai TV Station, and both household heads 
of room 204 and 205 worked in the municipal government. People living in room 
206 didn’t talk much to neighbors. On the third floor there were four big rooms, 
occupied by four families. Room 301 was by a guy with connection to the district 
                                                          
26 Zhang Garden was initially built as a spacious park west of the International Settlement where elites came for 
leisure (Pan 1982:68-70). Later, as an upscale residential neighborhood, it occupied the area north to West Beijing 
Road, south to Weihai Road, east to Shimen No.1 Road, and west to Shanxi South Road (Cheng, 1987). 
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government. The retiree from the municipal government in room 302 raised many 
pigeons, and I remember visiting him often to see the birds when I was little. The 
famous movie director Shen Xilin and his wife lived in room 303. The woman who 
lived in room 304 is said to have connection with Kuomintang Party, and married 
a “red” worker to get out of political trouble. Our family occupied the entire fourth 
floor, two huge rooms. My uncle and aunt lived in the smaller one, and my parents 
and I lived in the bigger one with grandparents.  
A low standard of living was nearly universal in the “redistributive economy” in the Maoist era. 
Earnings and resources were collected by the state and redistributed to individuals according to 
their positions in the politically defined and ranked bureaucratic system (Bian & Logan, 1996). 
Though living in an extremely crowded dwelling, Guorong’s family and his neighbors enjoyed the 
geographic advantage and the sense of being in the center of everything in metropolitan Shanghai. 
In a previously single-family occupancy garden villa, tenants would have shared a bathroom with 
their neighbors, regardless of whether one was working as a party official in the municipal 
government, or a famous movie director working for the state-owned movie production work-unit, 
or a proletarian “red” worker.  
The structural and behavioral dimensions of the pre-reform status hierarchy as identified 
by Bian (2002) are exemplified in the different households sharing the villa with Guorong’s 
grandparents and parents. First of all, the public housing confiscated by the party upon founding 
the People’s Republic was granted to all urbanites, especially those “liberated” the city, such as 
Guorong’s paternal grandfather. Secondly, those employed by the state directly (such as the 
municipal government officials) or indirectly through state-owned work-unit (such as the movie 
director or the senior electrician) were granted top-tiered housing. Since income was universally 
low in the pre-reform era, the party instilled social hierarchy and presented their favorites with 
state-owned, heavily-subsidized rental housing, access to which was contingent on political 
position, work unit authority, seniority, education and skills (Logan, Fang & Zhang, 2009). 
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Besides urban hukou status and contingent categories associated with education and 
profession, the individual’s political characterization as “revolutionary” or “anti-revolutionary” 
was also important. The true revolutionary “red (proletarian)” class and anti-revolution “black 
(bourgeoisie)” class are defined by a mixture of family class origin and the individual’s political 
attitude and performances in numerous party-led campaigns (Bian, 2002).In terms of family class 
origin, the urban poor and property-less peasant belonged to the “red” class, and landed gentry, 
merchant or industrialist the “black” class. The disadvantage of being categorized as a member of 
the “black” class could be mitigated through individual’s demonstrations of adherence to the 
communist party’s leadership and ideology. For example, the female occupant of Room 304 used 
her marriage arrangement with a revolutionary “red” worker to demonstrate her political attitude, 
and thus was allowed to remain in the highly desirable housing.  
Despite the need to share a single-family house, the living standards for Guorong and all 
of his neighbors were still higher than the hundreds of thousands who lived in old shikumen 
housing, which did not have indoor plumbing. The sense of loss felt by displaced Shanghairen 
such as Guorong and his family stemmed from their loss of symbolic capital, embodied in their 
relative lack of proximity to the urban center, and their loss of relative privilege, represented by 
the condition and location of their state-allocated housing unit.  
Guorong described how he and his neighbors needed to boil water in the shared big kitchen 
on the first floor and haul it to the shared bathroom on their floor if they wished to take a bath. 
When he noticed me jotting down that fact, he quickly added, “[r]eally, it was not that bad. It was 
already much better than the situation in shikumen housing.”  A similar qualification was given to 
the crowdedness of the 33 square meter room which Guorong shared with both of his parents from 
age three to sixteen, and before that, his paternal grandparents as well. That is to say, a space 
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approximately 350 square feet once served as living room, dining room and bedroom for two 
couples and the younger couple’s baby. Guorong’s “not that crowded” comment was based on the 
worse living arrangement endured by the majority of native Shanghairen families living in 
shikumen housing. But this relative privilege disappeared at the point of their relocation to 
Minhang district outside of the inner-ring, when hundreds of thousands of native and non-native 
Shanghairen families remained. Beyond the sense of deprivation experienced by Guorong and his 
family, the sense of loss shared by millions of displaced and relocated native Shanghairen has 
other dimensions embedded in the broader picture of Shanghai’s urban redevelopment in the last 
twenty years. 
 
Multi-dimensional Sense of Loss 
The natives’ sense of loss amidst Shanghai’s rising global-city status on the world stage 
has three dimensions. The first dimension, as discussed above, is their displacement from the urban 
center, which is the geographical and material base of their Shanghairen identity.   
Even when the displaced visit their old neighborhoods, nothing is recognizable apart from 
the street names. This disconnection with the urban landscape or, more precisely, this 
disorientation in the new urban landscape, is the second dimension of natives’ loss. It has 
socioeconomic roots; the discriminatory urban political economy excludes natives based on 
socioeconomic status. Office towers hosting Fortune 500 headquarters or commercial complexes 
are beyond the reach of many of the displaced natives. These new offices are not places where 
many of their job applications would be accepted, and the luxury boutiques are not where many 
could afford to shop. The space where working-class native Shanghairen used to live, work, and 
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shop — the neighborhood of shikumen housing and alleyway gossip in Shanghai dialect — is now 
Shanghai’s CBD and upscale shopping centers.  
Truth be told, among the glass-façade office towers and shopping centers, a handful of 
pockets of shikumen housing or garden villas have been preserved. But the preservation of historic 
buildings is mostly driven by economic and political interests rather than by concerns for 
protecting cultural heritage (Ren, 2011:102) or for relocation of the displaced; what is preserved 
is a superficial shell for spectacle. The lilong housing preserved at Xintiandi is a Shanghai-flavored 
display of global consumer culture of fashion, cuisine and clubbing, instead of the mingling in 
alleyways or produce shopping from street vendors. The redevelopment erased the everyday living 
experiences of crowding, noise, and dinginess in the original neighborhoods. By recalling historic 
times, it only created a new site for a modern consumerist lifestyle (Shen & Wu, 2011:264). Thus, 
it has nothing to do with the Shanghairen’s shikumen-living lifestyle. The renewed façades and the 
surrounding pedestrian zone form an Old-Shanghai theme park, and inside is a museum gift shop 
for those curious about or nostalgic for the cosmopolitan Shanghai of the 1930s.   
For a working-class or even middle-class Shanghairen, the only recognizable or familiar 
element in this theme park is the architectural shell of the place. Their emotional distance from the 
upscale global consumer culture is not closed by the familiar-looking architecture; on the contrary, 
it widens. Behind the shikumen façade of those historic neighborhoods, the vibe is alien: a stage-
set for a play performed by and for other people. The life associated with shikumen housing for 
natives, be it quarreling over shared kitchen space, children roaming the alleyways afterschool, or 
a sense of a big extended family, is forever gone under bulldozers.  
The dispossession of a lifestyle and the dispersion of a community formerly harbored in 
shikumen neighborhoods constitutes this second dimension of loss. David Harvey (2001: 407) 
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inquiries about which segment of the population benefits from the commodification of local culture; 
who reaps monopoly rent from the locale’s symbolic capital? Clearly, the answer is not the native 
Shanghairen. The symbolic capital embodied in the vernacular shikumen housing and associated 
way of living is the charm, distinctive ambiance, and proof of authenticity of those urban central 
neighborhoods. However, the long term contributions of natives to this reservoir of symbolic 
capital over decades does not grant them access to this Disneyfied shikumen neighborhood. 
The third dimension of loss is driven by the perception of betrayal by the government in 
the global-city-making process. In the minds of many dislocated native Shanghairen, their earlier 
sacrifice, by relocation, is under-recognized and under-appreciated.  
The ideological dimension of the displacement in Shanghai is quintessential of the 
communist China. The signing of the displacement and relocation agreement bestows the honor of 
sacrificing personal gain for the collective good. For example, the government slogan for the 2005 
World Expo Displacement Project (to make space for the 2010 Shanghai World Expo) reads: 
“Caring about the World Expo, For the Interests of the Whole, and Saying Goodbye to Old Homes 
with a Smile”. 27  This slogan suggested not only a politically correct attitude to come to terms with 
one’s displacement, but also a performative action – smiling – to show one’s contentedness with 
the relocation. Thirty-one hundred households signed the relocation agreement during the first 
phase of the relocation; in the process, they were taught a lesson to sacrifice “willingly” for the 
collective good.  
                                                          
27 Ding, Limin. “The largest ever displacement project in Shanghai, first wave of World Expo relocation agreements 
signing in Pudong.” Xinhua News. April 1, 2005. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2315/nw4411/u21aw103287.html.   
The slogan is seen on the red silk banner in the photo in the news report on Shanghai Municipal Government’s 
website. 
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The particular sacrifice here is to support the government’s plan to host the 2010 World 
Expo, which, coupled with the 2008 Beijing Olympics, was part of a larger goal to shift the world’s 
view of the country, “a kind of one-two punch designed to knock-out old conceptions of China 
(Wasserstrom, 2009:127).” Furthermore, the assumption of the displaced was surely that the new 
Shanghai would still be theirs. Their willingness to relocate was not a renouncement of their right 
to the city.  It was for their modern Shanghai, and for the connection to the West that they were 
deprived of during the Maoist era, that they were willing to sacrifice personal immediate interests.  
The reality of the life after the relocation is harsher than anticipated when those displaced 
need to rely on themselves to move back, and are no longer cared about by their former district 
government. In Guorong’s case, their current apartment by the middle-ring, given to them by the 
government, is worth RMB 2.7 million yuan. This is less than half the worth of an equivalent 
apartment in his old neighborhood. As an IT manager whose annual income is RMB 150,000 yuan, 
and who is living with his pensioner parents, Guorong does not dare to dream of moving back to 
his old neighborhood.  
The new luxury condos are well beyond former residents’ affordability and instead cater 
to the new elite, who are not necessarily natives.  The new residents could be from anywhere, 
while the old residents are, without exception, native Shanghairen. Using hukou status data of two 
inner-ring neighborhoods, He and Wu highlight that 100 percent residents of Jinganli, a declined 
lilong housing neighborhood are native Shanghairen, while 35 percent of Zhongyuan 
Liangwancheng, an upscale new housing development by the cleaned-up Suzhou Creek are non-
natives (2007:193-97).  
Though the area of the municipality of Shanghai is eight times that of the urban center, 
Shanghairen is the identification reserved to people living in that highly dense core of eighty-six 
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square kilometers (approx. 21,250 acres). For them, leaving there would mean being thrown out 
into the backward remote rural area (Yu, 2010). So when they were relocated to Meilong area in 
the previous Minhang Township, or Zhoupu Township in the previously rural Pudong, native 
Shanghairen left behind the very urban space that molded their Shanghairen identity.  
In essence, the growth machine indiscriminately forced native Shanghairen to pave the 
road — quite literally, as the homes of Guorong and his neighbors were demolished to make way 
for the construction of the Nanjing West Road Station on the No.2 subway line —for building a 
global city in the economic reform era. As Low and Altman (1992:10) point out, “the place may 
be a medium or milieu which embeds and is a repository of a variety of life experiences, is central 
to those experiences, and is inseparable from them.” The displacement broke the physical bond 
native Shanghairen have to the urban core landscape. At the same time, the relocation strengthened 
their emotional attachment and desire to reclaim the place which had provided them with self-
esteem, self-worth, and self-pride.  To assert the symbolic claims to their old neighborhoods and 
urban Shanghai lifestyle, and to reaffirm their Shanghairen identity, native Shanghairen bring the 
intangible but concrete signifier, Shanghai dialect, into focus. However, what they find is that the 
practice of the dialect is slipping away from them as well.  
 
Dispersion of the Speech Community 
The linguistic consequences of displacement and relocation for the former residents has 
rarely been discussed in literature on changing urban landscapes of China. Instead, the focus has 
mostly been on the policies driving the changes, and the exclusiveness of the emerging gated 
communities (e.g. Logan, 2004; Miao, 2003; Tian & Wong, 2007; Wu, 2003; Zhou & Logan, 
1996). Milroy and Milroy (1985:56-7) point out that one important mechanism to encourage 
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stability in the use of a dialect is the informal pressure exerted by members of a peer group existing 
in well-defined territorial communities. In the global-city-making process, dislocation and 
community disintegration broke down the dense Shanghai urban central shikumen communities, 
violently disrupting the territorial prerequisite for the practice of speaking the Shanghai dialect. 
Since the birth and development of the hybrid Shanghai dialect are attributed to the waves 
of migrants settling down in the city over the last century and half, the spatial component is of 
great importance for the dialect speech community. When the renowned Chinese linguist and 
Shanghai dialect expert Qian Nairong (2007:12) defines Shanghai dialect, he stresses the historical 
urban Shanghai as the geographical boundary in discussing the dialect’s history and changes. In 
the pre-reform era, this urban speech community excluded the entire Pudong region, and the 
majority of areas outside of the inner ring, which were categorized as rural. 
The relocation of more than one million Shanghairen households from the urban center to 
mostly outside of the inner-ring, and to Pudong, uprooted the Shanghai dialect speech community 
from the territory which defined it spatially. During the first wave of urban renewal and 
redevelopment in the early 1990s, ready-for-move-in housing in the periphery was provided to the 
displaced, which enabled a mini speech community to survive. Even today, the dialect is still 
spoken in certain “relocation buildings (dongqian fang).” As Lue, a retired editor from Xinmin 
Evening Newspaper, told me: 
I have many friends used to live in the city center, in Jing’an district, all native 
Shanghairen. They were all displaced and relocated to Hanghua or Minghang28[in 
the late 1990s]. Those were bleak and desolate areas, very remote when they moved. 
Now it is more connected with the urban center with the subway line, and there are 
lots and lots of non-natives [living there]. The funny thing is as soon as you climb 
up the stairs of old relocation buildings, would you hear the Shanghai dialect [in 
hallways].  
                                                          
28 Hanghua area sits between the middle and outer ring, and Minghang district is mostly outside of the outer-ring. 
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Those islands of Shanghai dialect speech community, which are so removed from the urban center, 
amazed Lue. It clearly shows the importance of geographical proximity for language vitality. For 
Shanghai dialect to be sustained, there needs to be a space for neighboring, as well as a group of 
neighbors capable of communicating in the dialect. These are the two prerequisites for the 
Shanghai dialect to survive as a language in active, social use, as opposed to surviving as a tape 
recording played in a folk culture museum.  
In addition to the survival of these pockets of Shanghai dialect speech community, Lue 
also vividly illustrates the segregated housing situation in those recently developed outskirt urban 
areas. Those displaced from the center formed small Shanghai dialect speech communities in 
government-built relocation buildings, which were surrounded by new housing developments 
inhabited mostly by lower middle-class non-natives because of the relatively low housing and 
rental price in those peripheral areas. Lue’s description of the linguistic space in those 
neighborhoods sounds similar to a depiction of a Chinatown in the North American context: an 
island of a “foreign” language, preserved but marginalized by the mainstream society. What is 
different is the fact that those Shanghai dialect speakers do not live in a foreign land, but rather 
still live in their native municipality of Shanghai. 
To investigate the linguistic scene in a relocation neighborhood, I travelled to Sanlin 
Township outside middle-ring in Pudong in the winter of 2013. At that point it looked quite 
desolate and bleak. Getting out of the Pusan Road Station of the No.11 subway line, I saw broad 
but empty sidewalks, new gated apartment complexes, vacant lots of weeds, and a total lack of 
shops. I was told by Ling Jie, the principal of a private kindergarten there, that it was much better 
now than seven years ago when she had opened the kindergarten.  
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The kindergarten made its name by teaching the Shanghai dialect. Ling explained to me 
about her kindergarten’s popularity:  
There are many “relocation buildings” here in Sanlin to house those displaced by 
the Shanghai Expo 2010. For those parents relocated from Puxi, they had a strong 
sense of loss, away from the atmosphere and culture of the urban Shanghai, thus us 
teaching their kids Shanghai dialect is such a big comfort.  
The responses of the native Shanghairen parents to the Shanghai dialect teaching, as described by 
Ling, suggest a positive future instead of endangerment for the Shanghai dialect. What is not so 
helpful, however, is the current linguistic landscape in Sanlin. Since the rural Sanlin people do not 
speak the urban version of the Shanghai dialect, the language for them to communicate with the 
relocated native urban Shanghairen from Puxi would be Putonghua Mandarin: the lingua franca to 
communicate with both rural and urban native Shanghairen. The prevalence and dominance of 
Putonghua speaking is the linguistic context of the kindergarten’s Shanghai dialect initiative. If 
Shanghai dialect was still the lingua franca, as was the case in the pre-1990s Shanghai, Shanghai 
dialect teaching would not be a subject in kindergarten curriculum. If the urban Shanghairen had 
not been displaced to the rezoned, previously rural Pudong, the use of the Shanghai dialect would 
not serve as their connection to urban living and a much-needed reaffirmation of their Shanghairen 
identity.  
To those dislocated parents, the removal from inner-ring Puxi neighborhoods has a double 
dimension, both geographic and linguistic. Though the urbanization process rezoned Sanlin 
Township as part of urban Shanghai, the categorical change did not shorten the distance. Across 
the Huangpu River is the old home where they cannot afford to live. At the very least, they hope 
to continue speaking Shanghai dialect at home and with their children, to maintain the connection 
with the city and to assert their Shanghairen identity. The dialect-teaching offered at Ling Jie’s 
Modern Baby Kindergarten in this remote Pudong neighborhood brings the warmth of home to 
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those displaced households. Geographically, they are displaced; but linguistically, they are still 
holding onto Shanghai’s urban culture. 
Across the Huangpu River, back in Puxi, the presence of rural Shanghairen speaking 
another version of the dialect is less of a danger to the dialect than the increasing presence of 
Putonghua-speaking non-natives.  The logic of the real estate market, coupled with the deep-rooted 
desire to live in the upper-corner among native Shanghairen, worked to dismantle islands of the 
speech community in “relocation building” neighborhoods. Living in the periphery means greater 
inconvenience of the daily commute, poor infrastructure and limited social services, though in a 
larger and newer unit. The initial relocation was involuntary, but over time, those with more 
financial resources purchased housing closer to the urban center and sold or rented out their 
apartments in the “relocation buildings” to non-natives.  
Guorong, who has lived in Meilong with his parents since the relocation in 1997, explained 
the transition to me: 
Buildings in our neighborhood are mostly ‘relocation buildings (dongqian fang)’ 
initially inhabited by old neighbors from the urban center. At the beginning, you 
heard Shanghai dialect spoken everywhere, but now it is totally different. If you 
walk around my neighborhood in the morning, all you hear is quarrel over dogs, 
whose dog bit whose, Putonghua with Shanxi accent, with Northeastern accent, 
absolutely no Shanghai dialect. I don’t hear much people in my neighborhood 
speaking the dialect any more. 
It appears that many of Guorong’s relocated neighbors had moved away, but he and his family 
stayed. Over the years, his neighborhood has changed from a community of relocated native 
Shanghairen to a mixed community of both natives and non-natives from all across the country 
(predominantly non-natives, according to Guorong).  The working of the real estate market created 
a residential community that was socioeconomically more homogeneous, but linguistically more 
heterogeneous.  
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This is in stark contrast to pre-1990s Shanghai when housing was controlled and 
redistributed by the municipal government and state-owned work units. More often than not, 
employees of various ranks, seniority or professions lived in the same building owned by a single 
work unit, which hired only those with a Shanghai urban hukou. That means those more 
linguistically homogenous neighborhoods were of native Shanghairen with diverse habitus and 
socioeconomic status. From the example of Guorong’s previous neighbors in that garden villa, we 
have seen a proletarian “red” worker lived next door to a famous movie director, and to municipal 
government officials.  
Relocation from shikumen or lilong housing to more spacious apartments over the last two 
decades not only moved millions of native Shanghairen away from the metropolitan core to live 
in mixed-origin neighborhoods but also changed their relation to public space in the neighborhood 
they live in. The overcrowded living conditions in shikumen housing meant intermingling in public 
spaces such as alleyways and shared kitchens, which served as the spatial condition for building a 
close-knit community and practicing the Shanghai dialect. This condition disappeared in the 
relocation and the associated adoption of apartment-living. To illustrate the change, Lu Yan, an 
elementary school teacher in her early 40s, compared her childhood experience with her son’s: 
When I was young [1980s], I played with neighbors in the alleyway all the time. 
Now my son is 9 years old. What does he do after school? Watching TV alone at 
home. It’s very difficult for him to make friends in the neighborhood because most 
of his classmates don’t live close by, or they need to stay at home to do homework. 
Lu Yan made this comparison to explain why her son did not speak Shanghai dialect with his 
classmates and friends. To her, it is not only the outworking of the discriminatory language 
ideology taught to him at school, or the Putonghua TV programs he watched, but also the linguistic 
environment and social circles.  
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Sacrificed in the housing upgrade are one’s own opportunities to interact with one’s 
neighbors and the children’s opportunities to play with classmates after school: opportunities, 
therefore, to practice the Shanghai dialect. As Lu Yan elaborated: 
Comparing to our times, they don’t play with each other much. I remember when I 
was in elementary school, we didn’t even have landline telephones, and you didn’t 
need to [arrange playdates with it]. You just went out into the alley and shouted out: 
“let’s meet up after dinner and play!” Kids would then show up and play all sorts 
of alleyway games.  
During childhood, Lu Yan lived with her parents and grandparents in a small dwelling in an old 
shikumen housing complex in the working-class Hongkou district close to the industrial end of the 
Bund. Now with her husband, her mother and her son, she lives in a nice three-bedroom condo in 
Jiangwan area of the Yangpu district beyond the middle-ring. She does not seem to regret moving 
away from the old working-class shikumen housing, in contrast to those research participants who 
grew up in Western-looking villas or upscale lilong housing in the former foreign settlements. To 
her, the cash compensation from relocation enabled her and her family to purchase nicer housing 
in an upscale (albeit more remote) neighborhood. What she lamented was the loss of community 
and tangible social circles close to her home. Instead of the everyday mingling in shared courtyards 
and alleyways she used to experience in the old neighborhood, now talk with neighbors is mostly 
limited to “Hello” and “Bye” when riding the elevator together. Both the circle of classmates living 
close by and the afterschool alleyway games she once enjoyed are lost to her son, who lives in an 
upscale apartment with his own room.   
The reconstruction of the Shanghai dialect speech community is not as easy as building 
residential high rises. For a language to stay alive, two important conditions are necessary. Firstly, 
the speech community must live in close proximity to allow communication to take place. And 
secondly, people in that community must practice the language with each other on a regular basis. 
As we see at Meilong in Puxi and Sanlin in Pudong, the dongqian xiaoqu (relocation 
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neighborhoods), the logic of the real estate market leads to the dismantling of the speech 
community, although some odd cases such as the one in  Hanghua remains. Although Gumperz’s 
relational definition of a speech community (2001:43) emphasizes the presence of the non-
speakers to identify the boundary, living in close proximity with non-speakers of the Shanghai 
dialect inevitably leads to bilingual Shanghairen opting to communicate in Putonghua. Further, the 
modern lifestyle, conducted largely behind locked apartment doors, diminishes the use of public 
space and limits the opportunity for interaction between neighbors.  
The linguistic landscape inside of the inner-ring, though not dominated by English (as 
demonstrated above), is no less hostile to the Shanghai dialect. Putonghua dominates the linguistic 
space in those upscale condominiums. Zhou Zhou is a native Shanghairen in her mid-30s who 
once worked for Google China and is now a senior director at EF Education First; her husband 
once worked as an investment banker for Goldman Sachs Hong Kong and is now a high-rank 
financial officer at Alibaba.  They live in one of those upscale high rise condos.  
Zhou Zhou understood the reasons behind the changed linguistic environment in urban 
central Shanghai as twofold: the geographical dislocation and dispersion of native Shanghairen; 
and the influx of Putonghua-speaking non-natives, to whom the Shanghai dialect is as 
unintelligible as a foreign language. As she put it: 
There is nowhere in Shanghai now that can claim to have solely native Shanghairen 
residents. Say you initiate a conversation with a stranger in your building in 
Shanghai dialect, more than likely that s/he [being a non-native] would reply in 
Putonghua and even give you a dirty look suggesting your rudeness of using [an 
informal] language that they wouldn’t have known how to speak.  
The way she was treated by equally affluent neighbors when initiating a conversation in the 
Shanghai dialect explains why she now regards Putonghua as a default language choice: 
Encountering situations like that for a few times and you [being a native] would 
stop using Shanghai dialect with strangers. There is no solution, no future for 
Shanghai dialect. There is no space for it.  
 164 
 
Talking from personal experience, Zhou Zhou sees no future for Shanghai dialect when the public 
space for its practice has evaporated in the process of urban redevelopment and internal migration. 
Thus, because of the language ideology — where and when it is proper to speak which language, 
and how the language choice reflects on the speaker — speaking Putonghua instead of the 
Shanghai dialect to strangers is a practical and calculated choice in current urban Shanghai.  
Between the dispersion of the Shanghai dialect speech community and the impossibility of 
reconstructing such a community in new residential neighborhoods all across the city, the outlook 
is grim for the Shanghai dialect. In the global-city-making process, what is also lost in the minds 
of millions of native Shanghairen is the city’s symbolic capital, the durable distinctiveness 
represented in its East-meets-West built environment from the semi-colonial times. Bulldozers 
smashed not only dilapidated shikumen housing, but also garden villas, art-deco apartment 
buildings and their sycamore-tree-lined neighborhoods. In the last two decades, nationwide 
urbanization rendered Chinese urban centers uniform with glass façade office towers and high-rise 
apartment buildings. In the same time period rises Pudong, the new face of Shanghai, which looks 
similar to the rest of the modern urban China. Grieving for the loss of an authentic urban space, 
native Shanghairen embark on a quest to find Shanghai’s distinctive character. 
 
Loss of Urban Character 
A city loses its character when such unique features as the vernacular architecture, the 
layout of the urban neighborhoods, the commercial scene, and the lifestyle of its inhabitants are 
no different from any other city. In the economic-reform era, this is exactly what has happened to 
many, if not all, Chinese cities under the public-private partnership in the urbanization and urban 
redevelopment process. This singular trajectory of urban changes grew from a “catch-up-with-the-
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West” ideology which was initiated at the governmental level and facilitated by real estate 
developers. The erasure of local characteristics was carried out in the name of progress, in the era 
of neoliberalism, with Chinese characters (Harvey, 2005).  
The visible proof of Shanghai becoming a node in the network of global cities is its new 
uniformed look, which signifies consumerism and suggests accommodation for capitalist 
globalization. After decades of neglect and disinvestment in the Maoist era, this global city look 
initially made natives proud and made non-natives feel welcomed and included. By the same token, 
vernacular built environments such as shikumen housing alienates non-natives who were not 
familiar with the lifestyle associated with it. Between 1995 and 2013, according to the Shanghai 
Statistical Bureau, roughly eighty million square meters of residential neighborhoods were 
demolished or taken through eminent domain.29 With the city changed beyond recognition, the 
earlier excitement among natives was replaced by bewilderment and disorientation. Proshansky et 
al. (1983) explain that individual’s place identity involves memories, feelings, attitudes, 
preferences and values associated with everyday physical environment. What the overhaul of the 
familiar residential neighborhoods and the new uniformed urban landscape brought to native 
Shanghairen is the realization that there is no longer a distinctive place they can identify as 
Shanghai, to differentiate the city from other Chinese cities, and to anchor their place identity.  
The nationwide urbanization and building frenzy in the economic reform era brought urban 
China uniform-looking modern infrastructure, on par with the redeveloped Shanghai, though on a 
smaller scale. Once wrapped in a “Paris of the Orient” air of fame and privilege, the unique 
architectural character of Shanghai was quickly disappearing into dust under bulldozers. When the 
East-meets-West urban landscape represented by shikumen housing neighborhoods was to a large 
                                                          
29 Chart 18.4 Demolition and Eminent Domain of Properties, 1995-2013. Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2014 [in 
Chinese]. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nj14.htm?d1=2014tjnj/C1804.htm 
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extent erased from the urban landscape, native Shanghairen started to reject the new image of 
Shanghai. Instead of a dialogue between the old and the new, and the reproduction of an authentic 
urban space through negotiation and appropriation, what occupies the urban core in Puxi and the 
waterfront CBD in Pudong now is the face of a global city, indistinguishable from others.  
Decentralization of power from the central government provided great freedom for local 
governments to implement entrepreneurial development policies (Ren, 2011:138). City centers 
were hollowed out at their core and both people and economic activity were shifted to outer zones 
(Wang & Zhou, 1999; Zhou & Ma, 2000). Inspired by the success of urban renewal to increase 
property values and to enhance the image of top-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai, other 
municipalities have begun replicating the process. It has been occurring in most economically 
vibrant cities in the eastern part of the country, such as Beijing (Zhou & Logan, 2008:143), 
Shanghai (Gao & Jiang, 2002), the southern metropolis Guangzhou in Canton (Xie & Ning, 2002; 
Zhou & Xu, 1996), the northern industrial city Shenyang (Zhou & Meng, 1997), Dalian (Chai & 
Zhou, 2000), and big cities in the Yangtze Delta region close to Shanghai, such as Hangzhou (Feng 
& Zhou, 2002; Zhou, 1997), Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou (Zhang, 1998).  
What do these cities’ urban centers look like after redevelopments? The commodification 
and redevelopment of urban centers in China introduced architectural designs transplanted from 
elsewhere to project an “imagined” global image (King & Kusno, 2000; Wai, 2006). Government 
officials in partnership with real estate developers cared little about the consequences for the locals, 
because the image of the city on a global scale would matter more for the trajectory of their political 
career and profit margins than the concrete experience of the locals. City officials regard the 
symbolic capital carried by global-oriented urban landscapes as leverage to win the inter-city 
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competition (Yeoh, 2005; Kong, 2007) qualified in terms of attracting tourists, catering to the 
emerging middle class (Robinson & Goodman, 1996) and luring capital investments.  
Urban redevelopments in China involve two steps: a massive upgrade of urban 
infrastructures to adopt a uniformed “global city look,” followed by a few preservation-themed 
projects bearing vernacular flavor to seek competitive edge despite the destruction of local culture 
and social fabric accomplished in the upgrade. In the search for a competitive edge through the 
urban built environment, a few major second-tier cities such as Nanjing30 (Song & Wu, 2010), 
Kunming31 (Zhang, 2006) and Chengdu32 (Huang & Yang, 2010) have experienced preservation-
based redevelopment and gentrification since the 2000s. Some others, instead of drawing 
inspiration from vernacular architectural features, opted for copying already-proven, globally 
successful models of redevelopment.  
Seeing the success of Xintiandi, the profit-driven, preservation-anchoring redevelopment 
project in Shanghai, mayors of other Chinese cities sent invitations to the architects responsible 
for the project, asking them to clone Xintiandi in their cities. The Xihu (West Lake) Xintiandi has 
already been completed in Hangzhou, a two-hour train ride south of Shanghai. Chongqing in the 
inland Sichuan province plans to have its (Xin)Tiandi completed in 2018. 33 Just like Xintiandi in 
Shanghai, these projects do not bring historical relevance to their cities; instead, they bring global 
consumer culture to China’s new rich. Even when a few vernacular architectural elements are 
incorporated, the essence of that urban space is altered. Borrowing an old Chinese saying, it is 
using an old bottle to sell new wine (jiu ping zhuang xin jiu). The practice can only fool dilettantes 
                                                          
30 The provincial capital of Jiangsu province adjacent to Shanghai 
31 The provincial capital of the Yunnan province 
32 A major political, economic and cultural center of Sichuan province in Western China 
33 Shui On Land. City Centre Master-planned Communities. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.shuionland.com/sol/tabid/217/Default.aspx 
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and can only appeal to those who value the outlook of global modernity more than the vernacular 
flavor.  
The irony of nationwide urban redevelopments for inter-city competitive edge is that when 
cities try to imitate each other, the strategy might fail to boost local standing, especially when “the 
advantage of being the first to do it has been lost” as Molotch et al. (2000:818) argue in their 
comparative study of two California cities. Furthermore, these copycat bolstering measures have 
brought uniformity and McDonaldization (Ritzer, 1999), instead of distinctiveness to the urban 
landscape across the country. It appears counter-intuitive that inter-city competitions do not 
generate more innovation, but instead a uniform approach to demolition, building modern but 
nondescript high-rises, along with the preservation of a few historic buildings to stimulate tourism 
and consumption. To a certain extent, glass-façade office towers are no different than renovated 
historic landmark buildings because both of them represent the sweeping forces of state-led 
economic reform and capitalist globalization.  
Within less than twenty years, Chinese urbanites are now surrounded by those identical 
looking office towers and residential high-rises. They treat them less as spectacles than surrogates 
of Western lifestyle and modernity, which had been refused to them for decades. The rising of 
other Chinese cities means Shanghai is no longer the only Chinese modern metropolis, a title and 
recognition held dearly by native Shanghairen for decades is slipping away more quickly than they 
can comprehend. It is against this backdrop, native Shanghairen came to realize the loss of the 
distinctive character of Shanghai, and Chinese cities in general.  
Having witnessed how Shanghai’s urban center has been changed beyond recognition, 
native Shanghairen are even more surprised to see how widespread that alien, modern look is 
across the country. For example, working as a product manager in a French company, Peng traveled 
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around the country for product launch and roadshows on a regular basis. Beyond Shanghai, Beijing 
and Guangzhou, the three top-tier cities, he has been to many second- and third-tier cities with 
populations of more than one million. He was disappointed at the lack of characteristics of urban 
China in general: 
Because of work, I have been to many Chinese cities, big or small, more than thirty 
a year. Even though some of them claimed to be tourist cities, none of them, none 
of Chinese cities has its own character.  
In his judgment, Peng emphasized those cities recognized as “tourist cities” (lueyou chengshi), 
which is a recognition awarded by the China National Tourism Administration based on the 
evaluation of a city’s tourism resources and the development of the tourist industry. By invoking 
this category, Peng stressed that if those cities, recognized as such, failed to demonstrate their local 
character, then other cities lacking the title would be subject to even greater loss of character.  
What exactly are the distinctive characters of a city? Other than historic landmarks or 
spectacles, how could we tell one city apart from another? Peng suggested that the vanishing 
vernacular urban landscape was the answer: 
To me, a city’s characteristics are the Forbidden City in Beijing, the Drum Tower 
in Xi’an, or some folk arts in the Northwest. But the distinguishing features between 
Chinese cities? Really, any city in mainland China, northeast to Shenyang, or south 
to Guangzhou, every downtown looks the same, no difference!  
To him, landmarked historical sites are certainly distinctions, but the urban built environment is 
much more than a few tourist sites. Moreover, not every city in vast China is blessed with being a 
capital of past dynasties. 34 He elaborated on the sameness of those urban China downtowns in this 
way:  
In Chinese cities, all neighborhoods look the same. All buildings look the same, all 
shopping malls look the same, even all railway stations! Airports? After the Pudong 
                                                          
34 Beijing was the capital city of small or large empires in China since BC 770. Xi’an is the current provincial capital 
of Shannxi. Historically it was the starting point of the Silk Road, and hosted the capital of thirteen kingdoms and 
empires since BC 202.   
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International Airport was built, the design and blueprints were sold to many cities. 
All look the same, even interior design materials!  
The examples he gave, such as identical shopping malls or transit hubs, were the kind of non-
places Auge (1995:78) identifies that “cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or concerned 
with identity.”  
Those non-places constructed during China’s economic boom over the last two decades do 
not have locally rooted anthropological meanings, and certainly do not integrate residents’ earlier 
experiences with the locale. In Relph (1976)’s word, what they represent is placelessness. Those 
characterless urban centers are places without any distinguishing features. A monopoly of urban 
built environments most accommodating to the global economy is the most hostile to 
unstandardized, unruly, locale-specific vernaculars, in relation to both architecture and urban 
planning.  
 The creation of non-places is consistent with the ideology of neoliberal urbanism, in ways 
to generate monopoly rent for developers and to accommodate capitalist globalization. Over our 
lunch interview at a restaurant on the Bund with the view of the Pudong waterfront CBD (see 
Figure 4.1), Zhang Weiyun, a female native Shanghairen who works as a senior marketing manager 
at PepsiCo, pointed out how China embraces neoliberalism by eliminating local character: 
Look, do you see [the Pudong waterfront skyline has] any difference from the 
Victoria Harbor in Hong Kong? The decision makers at the municipal and the 
central government level don’t think Shanghai needs any distinctive character. The 
China now doesn’t appreciate diversity. 
The creation of identical urban landscapes follows the capitalist globalization’s logic of rational, 
functional and revenue-maximization. To replicate proven models of generating revenue and urban 
spatial configurations seems to be the guaranteed road to success. Therefore, there is no space for 
less-profitable configurations generated locally, bearing vernacular features for non-profit-
generating purposes, such as sense of belonging, collective memories, local solidarity, etc. In the 
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end, the prototypical built environment in globalizing cities is celebrated by policy makers as 
modern and cosmopolitan, though rootless and placeless in the eyes of local residents.   
Considering the identical-looking urban landscape, what is left to inform us about the 
identity of a particular place, to differentiate one urban center from another? The well-traveled, 
retired radio station editor Ge vividly depicted how important language was to help him distinguish 
a city: 
It is highly homogenized, anywhere you go in China. Last year I went to Qaramay 
City. The city is a rich oil town, and looks identical to Shanghai! I felt I had never 
left Shanghai after getting off the plane there. A joke I always tell is that if I 
parachute out of a plane blindfolded, I can’t tell where I am after landing. How did 
I realize that I was no longer in Shanghai? There are Uyghur there speaking their 
language. 35 Language is the only tool to tell the difference.   
The ethnic minority’s language is the only indicator Ge was able to find to tell one city apart from 
another. The example he gave, Qaramay City, is located in the northern desert area of the Uyghur 
Autonomous Region close to the border of Kazakhstan, and more than 2,600 miles away from 
                                                          
35 A Turkic language with an Arabic-based alphabet spoken in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
 
Figure 4.1 View from M on the Bund, located on the 7th floor  
of the Nissin Shipping Building at No. 5 The Bund. Photo by author. 
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Shanghai, which sits on the Pacific coast. Being Han Chinese, Ge did not find the cultural and 
ethnic characteristics he had anticipated in this city which historically has a large ethnic minority 
Uyghur presence. That is to say, even remote cities in ethnic minority autonomous regions are not 
saved from the sweeping unified look of the new urban China. 
Beyond the urban built environment, the “China Dream” vision has further strengthened 
the uniformity of the linguistic sphere in the future of urban China. While ethnic minorities are 
still guaranteed some freedom to speak their own language, Putonghua is the mandate for ninety-
two percent of the country’s population, the Han Chinese majority. For them, the local dialect 
serves as an ever more important signifier for their city and their own identity. To Peng, to preserve 
the local dialect is the last effort to combat total loss of urban character: 
The only thing left is dialect, to tell where you are from and who you are! If the 
linguistic difference is also wiped out, then there is no distinguishing feature of the 
people, or of the city. 
It is the urban landscape, and the people living in it, that imbues a city with soul. The modernization 
and developmental policies of the economic reform era and the sweeping power of capitalist 
globalization ultimately transformed the landscape of urban China and the Chinese urbanites 
themselves. As Peng stressed, if deprived of a linguistic difference, one could hardly tell the origin 
and identity of any individual. Out of the same dread of losing local character, native Shanghairen 
have distanced themselves from Pudong, the new, modern face of Shanghai, on the streets of which 
one rarely hears Shanghai dialect.   
 
Pudong is not My Shanghai 
The disconnection with the uniform built environment in Pudong felt by native 
Shanghairen, and their sense of loss from the displacement process, led to a rejection of Pudong. 
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Three strategies have been developed to discredit the new face of the global-city-to-be Shanghai, 
juxtaposing it with Puxi, the de facto and de jure cosmopolitan Shanghai before the 1990s. Firstly, 
native Shanghairen reject the architectural spectacles newly built in Pudong, pointing out their 
placelessness and disconnection with the locale. Secondly, those financially better off make their 
preference for Puxi clear when considering relocation. Lastly, the rejection of Pudong is built into 
a consensual identification of being a Shanghairen.   
Over a century’s worth of vicissitudes defines the soul of the city, and the native 
Shanghairen’s place identity is bound up with the layered urban history in Puxi. The renowned 
Japanese architect, Kisho Kurokawa (1991) once said that without historical imprints and traces 
underlining the urban built environment, we are at a loss in terms of reading and understanding 
the culture of the city, and the city becomes bland. The built environment of a city not only 
constructs its image, but also has important implications for an individual’s social identity and 
embodies the city’s collective memory (Zukin, 1995:19). When the old urban landscape 
disappeared, the layered urban history lost its material basis; the new buildings that sprouted up to 
fill the physical void only brought strangeness and anxiety to native Shanghairen (Xu, 2004: 213-
14). In addition to the disorientation occurring in city center, every native Shanghairen I 
interviewed discussed their discomfort with and rejection of the new landmarks in Pudong.  
Prior to 1994, when the Oriental Pearl TV Tower rose on the east bank of Huangpu River, 
all of the city’s significant landmarks had been located in Puxi. At that time and even until now, 
to many natives Pudong seemed, as it had for more than a century before, a place apart, not really 
a section of their metropolis at all. Before the 1990s, many residents of Shanghai lived out their 
lives without ever venturing across the river (Wasserstrom, 2009:118). The current capitalist 
globalization, represented by the newly configured urban landscape and conspicuous consumption 
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patterns, came as a shock to native Shanghairen. Unlike their non-native counterparts, who came 
to Shanghai for a taste of Western urban modernity for the first time, the natives are trying to 
realign their understanding of the West and of modernity in Shanghai’s rapidly changing reality. 
The physical changes accompanying Shanghai’s new global city status remind native 
Shanghairen every day about their loss. The spectacles that put Shanghai on the world map inspire 
indifference in Shanghairen to the degree that they proudly reveal they have never visited the 
Oriental Pearl TV Tower, which is now a symbol of Shanghai shown on postcards, domestic and 
Western TV news, Hollywood movies36, videogames37 and travel magazines; for example, the 
tower serves as the focal point in “The Next Time You’re in Shanghai,” from the March 2015 issue 
                                                          
36 The 23rd in the Bond franchise, Skyfall (2012); Mission Impossible: 3(2006); or Godzilla: Final Wars (2004), in 
which the monster Anguirus attacks the city and destroys the Oriental Pearl TV Tower. 
37 The waterfront CBD of Pudong with the TV Tower in the center is one major landscape scene in the world top 
video game developer Electronic Art’s (EA) latest downloadable content for the game Battlefield 4, titled “China 
Rising.”  
 
Figure 4.2. “The Next Time You’re in Shanghai”. Travel + Leisure, March 2015. Pg.168. 
Puxi 
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of Travel + Leisure (Figure 4.2). The Shanghai World Financial Center is similarly dismissed as 
“the bottle-opener” among native Shanghairen. These architectural spectacles are not how native 
Shanghairen perceive their city. These visual representations of modernity belong to the country, 
or to the world, but never to them. 
Despite Pudong is presented as the image of the globalizing Shanghai, native Shanghairen 
do not hesitate to voice their aversion of it. It is a reaffirmation of their Puxi-rooted local identity 
and loyalty to the only authentic place they recognize as Shanghai. It also explains why only two 
out of my fifty native Shanghairen interviewees, and a handful of my two hundred and fifty native 
Shanghairen survey respondents, live in Pudong. 38 New practicalities such as broad new roads, 
relatively cheaper housing, and an easier commute to work cannot offset the sense of disconnection 
and exclusion.  
Zhu Zhenmiao, the Chinese language Ph.D. student active in the Shanghai dialect 
preservation movement showed me a tweet that he posted a few days before and which enjoyed 
many retweets on Weibo, the Chinese Twitter:  
Shanghai now is not the Shanghai before, it has changed completely. Those [new] 
buildings in Shanghai are like cancer cells, ugly, pathological, ever spreading. 
Those skyscrapers will not be demolished in a hundred years, or turn into benign 
cells. What were and will be demolished are old lilong housing.   
Displaced to Pudong, Zhenmiao’s reminiscence of the old Shanghai is both of the tight-knit 
community congruous with lilong housing and the image of the aesthetically harmonious urban 
landscape in Puxi. In his eyes the urban redevelopment of the last twenty years was an 
encroachment on the healthy, historic lilong housing by hostile skyscrapers. In this juxtaposition, 
                                                          
38 I used a mixture of snowball sampling and quota sampling to recruit research subjects, and the location of 
residency was not one of my quota categories. Though the proportion of natives living in Puxi in my sample might 
not be accurate when compared to the data from the Shanghai Statistical Bureau, it nevertheless shows natives’ 
preference for living in Puxi. 
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Puxi is the authentic old space called Shanghai, while Pudong (farmland, in the memory of most 
adult native Shanghairen) is a global space, a character-loss place they do not identify with.  
The second strategy for the rejection of Pudong, the preference for living in Puxi, is driven 
by this lack of identification. The rejection of Pudong is not necessarily a class-based sociospatial 
hierarchy of urban neighborhoods, such as the upper-lower corner division in Puxi for the last 
century. Rather, it segregates the natives and non-natives along the Huangpu River. The natives 
cling to Puxi, and the non-natives favor the recently urbanized and newly-built Pudong. Close to 
the CBD by the riverfront in Pudong, there are luxury rentals; more into the heart of Pudong, there 
are upscale, gated communities such as Lianyang Biyun Community. Both are worlds beyond the 
means of the majority of native Shanghairen. As Yujie, the marketing manager at the Siemens 
Headquarters put it: 
I used to work for Ford, which provided executives or senior managers from the 
U.S. luxury condos close to the office in Lujiazui, the Pudong riverfront CBD.  
She continued to describe the housing choice of a college classmate of hers, who is from Shenyang 
in northern China, and whose husband is also non-native: 
The apartment Li Zhuo and her husband recently bought is of more than RMB 
50,000 yuan per square meter (approx. $800/ft2). It is in the high-end Lianyang 
Community. There are also quite a few foreign expats living there. The first choice 
for elites!  
Considering that the annual household disposable income in the year of the study (2013) is 
reportedly RMB 43,851 yuan, according to the Shanghai Statistics Bureau, Yujie certainly gave a 
vivid depiction of the disparity between the city’s new non-native elites and the mass. The 
distinction between Puxi and Pudong is no longer the urban versus rural divide as in the pre-1990s, 
or a class-based preference, rather it has a heavy emotional connotations. The choice of 
international and national elites to live in upscale Pudong neighborhoods is not the kind of 
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conspicuous consumption better-off native Shanghairen would emulate. Loyalty and tighter bonds 
to Puxi make natives draw the line.  
It is a preference having more to do with location than housing quality. It indicates the 
wide-recognized symbolic capital embodied in a particular urban locale. An old saying among 
native Shanghairen still popular in the 2000s captures the extreme of this appeal: “rather a bunk 
bed in Puxi, than an apartment in Pudong” (ning yao Puxi yi zhang chuang, bu yao Pudong yi jian 
fang). This emphasis on housing location is more powerful now when there are upscale residential 
neighborhoods in Pudong providing all the amenities the non-native wealthy favor, as Yujie 
observed. 
Housing choice is more available to those economically better off. As we have seen above, 
the majority of the displaced natives can hardly leap out of their relocated neighborhoods by the 
middle-ring. The appeal of residence in Puxi, when the international professionals and national 
elites find all they could ask for from a global city in upscale neighborhoods in Pudong, lies in its 
connection with the city’s distinctive East-meets-West history and an urban culture developed in 
the “Paris of the Orient” period in the early 20th century.  
Wang Yufeng, who is in his early 40s, grew up in Jing’an district in central Puxi and works 
as a financial director for a Fortune 500 company. He explained to me: 
I don’t like Pudong. There were people asking me why I didn’t move to Pudong 
since I worked there [the waterfront CBD]. I just don’t like it! Skyscrapers are all 
over Pudong [CBD], making it not my Shanghai. The reason why I don’t like 
Pudong is that everything, everywhere is new.  
Yufeng’s critique of the urban landscape of Pudong superficially resembles a Luddite’s rejection 
of the ‘new’ and of ‘progress’; essentially, it points out the character-loss and ahistorical nature of 
the uniformed modern office towers and residential complexes. 
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You don’t see any trace of [Shanghai’s local] culture. If you go to Madang Road, 
or Hengshan Road39, you would sense the flavor of Shanghai. Or if you go to 
Jing’an District, in the Yuyuan Road neighborhood, you can feel the Shanghai 
character in the air, right there! Pudong, has what?? Merely skyscrapers, all 
identical! 
Yufeng’s disdain for Pudong grows from his nostalgia for the Shanghai he knew growing up and 
for a neighborhood that bore the character of the former semi-colonial times in its built 
environment. The Yuyuan Road neighborhood he mentioned is located at the heart of the urban 
center, less than two miles west of the People’s Square. Home to the Paramount Ballroom, Jing’an 
Park, Buddhist Jing’an Temple, busy shopping streets and sycamore tree-lined upscale residential 
streets of lilong housing, garden villas and art-deco apartment buildings, it was once one of the 
fanciest and most fashionable neighborhoods. Since the late 1990s, urban redevelopment projects 
displaced many long-term residents from that neighborhood to make way for elevated expressways, 
broadening urban major thoroughfares, and the erection of office towers.  
The charm of the old Yuyuan Road neighborhood lay in its cosmopolitan diversity and its 
mixing of East and the West, old and new, which Yufeng defined as the character of Shanghai. It 
is this visually multilayered character, the result of cultural dialogue, negotiation, appropriation 
and symbiosis with the urban communities that Yufeng did not see in the skyscrapers of Pudong. 
Yufeng’s nostalgia for a cosmopolitan past imprinted in that neighborhood serves as a 
reaffirmation of his connection with the authentic Puxi, and a constant reminder of how inauthentic 
and un-Shanghai Pudong is. The placeless quality of Pudong, in his eyes, lies in the uniformity of 
Le Corbusier’s urban planning of skyscrapers, broad sidewalks, and walking-unfriendly super 
blocks. Compared to the Yuyuan Road neighborhood, the built environment itself and the lack of 
                                                          
39 Both are located in the previous French Concession, in the “upper corner”. 
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human interaction it engenders in Pudong alienates Yufeng. For these reasons, taking up residence 
in Pudong simply because of the practicality of his daily commute has no appeal for him. 
The centrally-planned, modern but uniform-looking urban built environment is the 
opposite of diversity and organic growth. Urbanization of the once rural Pudong swallowed any 
remaining local regional character and regurgitated a cookie-cutter urban landscape void of 
character. By rejecting architectural spectacles and refusing to live in Pudong, native Shanghairen 
voice their resistance to the top-down global-city building process, an un-democratic process 
imposed on them by an authoritarian state. Given the impossibility of organizing protests to openly 
halt the process, native Shanghairen resolved to develop strategies to denounce and dis-recognize 
Pudong as Shanghai.  
Pudong epitomizes the natives’ aversion to the urban redevelopment of Shanghai, not only 
because of Pudong’s disconnectedness with Shanghai’s cosmopolitan past, but also due to its rapid 
transition from farmland to the new face of Shanghai within a twenty-year span. This quick rise, 
bolstered by state developmental policies, showed the cosmopolitan Shanghai on the west bank, 
which acquired world fame more than almost a century ago with little state intervention, little 
respect. Thus, native Shanghairen again and again remind tourists or non-natives that Pudong is 
not Shanghai. Indeed it is a strategic project initiated, enabled and created by the state, a Special 
Economic Zone that happens to be located east of the Huangpu River.  
The last strategy native Shanghainese deployed to discredit Pudong is to build this attitude 
into the criteria of Shanghairen identity. By articulating a sense of belonging, , native Shanghairen 
actively use their housing choice to reaffirm their local identity, as seen by Kerry Jiang, who grew 
up in the Jing’an District and married an investment banker who is also native to Shanghai: 
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We native Shanghairen have this deep-rooted preference for Puxi. You know, I am 
a Shanghairen, therefore I belong in Puxi. It is that simple! I think it applies to all 
native Shanghairen.  
To her, native Shanghairen’s preference for Puxi does not need an explanation; it is accepted as a 
fundamental part of who they are as Shanghairen.  The natives’ Shanghai is in Puxi, which 
showcases a cosmopolitan hybridity and local agency, instead of a uniformed global modernity 
and state power.  
The contrast between Puxi and Pudong is the juxtaposition of the old and the new, the 
imprints of colonization of the past and globalization in current times, represented by the 
geographical opposition between the west and east banks of the Huangpu River. The Bund on the 
west bank, the epitome of early 20th century cosmopolitan Shanghai, is having a face-off with the 
recently-erected spectacles on the east bank. The two banks of the Huangpu River, competing 
images of Shanghai developed a century apart, are both spectacles telling the story of East-meets-
West. The two waterfront spectacles, though open and free for everyone to view, are appreciated 
and appropriated by and for different audiences. To a certain extent, native Shanghairen’s rejection 
of Pudong is a weapon of the weak, an emotional compensation of their real material loss 
calculated in their increased socioeconomic and geographical distance from the urban center.  
 
Conclusion 
“An ocean receiving hundreds of streams” (hai na bai chuan) has been the motto of 
Shanghai for more than a century. It portrays Shanghai as a place that absorbs various global trends, 
including architectural styles, fashions, cuisines, languages, and lifestyles, and appropriates them 
as her own.  This co-existence of trends is one that Shanghairen elderlies still vividly recall. It is 
this kind of hospitality, this kind of embrace of diversity and autonomy, and this kind of wit of re-
appropriation that characterized the pre-1949 Shanghai. It sits in sharp contrast to the uniform 
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urban life in the Maoist era that was characterized by blue and grey outfits, limited goods sold 
using a ration system and a universal conformity to a singular communist ideology. In the reform 
era, China’s door to the West was reopened, but the inflows have been highly controlled in the 
economic sphere and censored in the cultural sphere. Central government’s developmental policies 
modeled urban China after a single version of global modernity in the hope of catching up with 
the West. On the ground, it meant to provide a welcoming environment for capital investment and 
flows of labor force.  
The “soul” or distinctive character of Shanghai is more than an attitude toward outside 
influences, as captured in the motto, but an integration process worked out by millions of 
Shanghairen. Since the opening of the Treaty Port in 1843, the changes occurring in Shanghai were 
never wholesale or full replacement of the old with the new, as seen in the current Pudong and 
many parts of Puxi, but a battle and a negotiated incorporation process that strived to maintain the 
Chinese vernacular roots while embracing outside trends. Once the most Westernized city in 
mainland China, Shanghai is at a crossroads. It is in a transitional phase and must strike a balance 
between the Western culture it was once familiar with, and the rising and dominant Chinese 
national culture and identity, for which it is not necessarily ready to give up the Shanghai identity.  
If shikumen housing characterizes Shanghai’s hybridity in the most visible and tangible 
way, then the Shanghai dialect is the intangible counterpart rooted in the city’s history, and an 
essential part of the Shanghairen identity. The hostility toward the all–encompassing and uniform 
“global-city-look” is born from the organic working of the Hai style, and from natives’ insistence 
on the negotiation phase of the reproduction of urban space. The top-down developmental policies 
in the redevelopment of Puxi and urbanization in Pudong clearly denied the innovative agency of 
the locals.  
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The image of Shanghai that is presented to the world now is a non-place of consumption 
or transaction for the global elites. To reboot reinstall the city’s authenticity is not to close down 
the door and lock the city back in, but to interpret, re-appropriate and integrate outside flows to 
produce something unique to its own. This is the process we saw in the creation of the hybrid 
shikumen housing nearly a century ago, and the creation of the hybrid Shanghai dialect, which kept 
updating itself by inventing new vocabulary to capture the zeitgeist — until 2001, when Putonghua 
started to dominate the city’s linguistic landscape. 
In this regard, the preservation of the hybrid Shanghai dialect is key to rescuing the city’s 
dying authenticity. Over the last two decades, the state’s language policies were accompanied by 
city-wide urban redevelopment. Under the logic of urban political economy and the real estate 
market, the Shanghai dialect speech community was dispersed geographically to neighborhoods 
of mixed-origin residents. Out of practicality, as well as under the influence of the language 
ideology, most bilingual native Shanghairen opt to speak Putonghua.  Nevertheless, it does not 
mean that they are willing to see the extinction of the dialect, or accede to a Putonghua-
monolingual future. Shanghai dialect is an essential part of their Shanghairen identity, as well as 
their residency in Puxi.  
In the next chapter, I will focus on the social integration of non-natives, even though their 
preference for housing location is opposite to that of native Shanghairen, they are accepted into 
the natives’ social circles, at least those of middle class background. Since the majority of natives 
are Putonghua- and Shanghai-dialect bilingual, the language conflicts between the two groups are 
not issues of communication but battle fields of authentic Shanghairen identity, and hence, rights 
to the global city.  
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Chapter 5: Social Integration and a New Shanghairen Identity  
 
In this chapter I examine the emerging patterns of selective social integration of non-
natives in Shanghai in the last twelve years after the reforms of the household registration (hukou) 
system. Since the late 1990s, the loosening of the registration system brought to Shanghai nearly 
ten million internal migrants, and increased residents in Shanghai to 24 million, according to the 
2014 Shanghai Statistic Yearbook. The sixth census conducted in 2010 reveals the composite of 
the migrant group based on their home origins and educational levels. Among the nine million 
internal migrants then, only 14.1% have associate degree or above education; in terms of home 
origins, 79.4% of the nine million are from rural regions. It is the demographic context of my 
investigation on the class-based social integration of non-natives.  
Reforms of the hukou system also granted more and more non-natives Shanghai urban 
hukou status. With this legal status, non-natives are no longer strictly outsiders (Waidiren), which 
is a derogatory term in contrast to Shanghairen. After analyzing the gradually increasing social 
integration of non-natives, I will discuss according to different criteria and cultural authorities who 
counts as a Shanghairen, and what role the Shanghai dialect plays in the natives’ evaluation of who 
is qualified for this identity.   
The loosening of the hukou system, and especially the reform at the end of 1990s and early 
2000s, allowed greater geographical mobility for Chinese citizens, who were then able to move to 
and settle in more economically developed regions. This measure was applauded by some social 
scientists and seen as symbolic of the tearing down of the legal and institutional framework 
maintaining what was called a dual society (Chan, 1994), “apartheid” (Alexander & Chan, 2004) 
or internal passport system (Chan, Liu & Yang, 1999; Chan & Zhang, 1999:830). Conversely, 
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other scholars such as Solinger (1995) predicted the persistence of subtle social and cultural 
barriers; they claimed that the hukou system would continue to shape individuals’ socioeconomic 
status and life chances (Wu & Treiman, 2004:365).  Almost twenty years after the beginning of 
the reform, my study in Shanghai shows that the effects are more nuanced than predicted in earlier 
literature. On the one hand, migrants now have better overall chances for structural acceptance and 
integration as institutional barriers represented by an individual’s hukou status have receded; on 
the other hand, social and cultural boundaries are effectively maintained through language and 
lifestyle.  
Instead of a dual society characterized by those with an urban hukou and those without, my 
study suggests that current social stratification in Shanghai is based on a combination of hukou 
status and socioeconomic status. More specifically, a selection mechanism has been put in place 
to integrate certain highly educated and wealthy non-natives into the job market and social circles, 
while less-educated rural migrants are excluded.  
Before reforms of the hukou system in the 1990s, three pillars of self-identification firmly 
established a Shanghairen identity legally, geographically and linguistically: the Shanghai hukou, 
urban residency and fluency in speaking the Shanghai dialect.  Previously these three were 
inseparable and worked simultaneously; for example, if one was born in Shanghai to Shanghairen 
parents, legal hukou status was granted automatically. The individual’s hukou would be registered 
in a household booklet associated with a single urban Shanghai address. These two pillars would 
have implied the third: fluency in the dialect. Collectively, these affirmed a Shanghairen identity. 
However, during the last two decades, state developmental policies aiming to remake 
Shanghai into a global city have disrupted the legal (hukou) and material (urban housing) basis for 
determining a local identity, and have diminished the privilege this identity once carried. Such 
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privilege usually denoted social services enjoyed by native Shanghairen that were granted through 
their hukou status and accessed conveniently in the central urban neighborhoods where they lived. 
However, as I detailed in chapter four, urban redevelopments and economic reform not only 
displaced millions of natives from the zone of privilege in the urban center, but also extended 
Shanghai hukou status and its associated privileges to recent migrants.  
This increased the significance of the Shanghai dialect in determining a Shanghairen 
identity. This significance is outside of the realm of legal or socioeconomic status, but derives 
from habitus. From a Bourdieusian perspective (1996), we can understand the competence of the 
Shanghai dialect as linguistic habitus, or a dimension of Shanghairen habitus nurtured from 
decades of institutional privilege. In the early 20th century, the experience of living in a 
cosmopolitan metropolis transformed the first generation of internal migrants settling in Shanghai, 
providing their children with unique embodied cultural and social capitals, which were 
interdependent with the economic capital connected to both urban residence and cultural 
consumption. After 1949, native Shanghairen enjoyed decades of economic and social privileges 
granted by the Communist Party’s hukou system and the planned economy that favored urban 
areas. Over generations, this experience influenced Shanghairen’s way of thinking, speaking, and 
interacting with others.  
Moreover, to native Shanghairen, competence in the dialect suggests civility, familiarity 
with urban living, and Shanghairen group membership. These traits are embodied in the socially 
constructed disposition of the linguistic habitus, which implies both the “linguistic capacity to 
generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the social capacity to use this 
competence adequately in a determinate situation (Bourdieu, 1991:37).” Thus competence in the 
Shanghai dialect serves as an effective barometer for identifying non-natives in every day 
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interaction. Holding onto this last pillar of Shanghairen identity, older generations use their 
linguistic habitus to reaffirm that identity, and in the process strengthen the symbolic power of 
distinction.  
 
Relative Deprivation of Hukou Privilege 
Chinese urbanites, especially those living in metropolises such as Shanghai, acutely feel 
the shifting social stratification brought about by the combined forces of economic and hukou 
reforms. I identify a gradual change in social stratification from an urban/rural dichotomy to a 
three-tiered social hierarchy. Early literature on internal migrants or the so-called “floating 
population” characterized the group as or rural origin, less educated and of low socioeconomic 
status. However, my study shows recently more highly educated non-natives settling in Shanghai, 
and becoming members of the top tier in the new social hierarchy. This leaves less educated 
migrants at the bottom, working in jobs few native Shanghairen are willing to do, along with 
marginalized native Shanghairen, who are left behind after three decades of economic reforms and 
industry restructuring.  
 
The Issue of Hukou 
The household registration system, or hukou system, was implemented in 1958 and 
categorized all citizens of the People’s Republic of China into two groups. The first classification 
is the “type” of an individual’s hukou, commonly referred to as “agricultural” for residents of rural 
areas, and “non-agricultural” for urbanites (Chan & Buckingham, 2008:587). An individual’s 
hukou status defines their entitlement to an array of state-provided welfare under the planned 
economy until the late 1980s (e.g. Cheng & Selden, 1994). The second classification indicates the 
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location of an individual’s claim to such social resources (Chan & Buckingham, 2008:588; Chan 
& Zhang, 1999:829; Solinger, 1999). For example, the municipality of Shanghai is only 
responsible for those with Shanghai hukou. In most cases, the hukou status is associated with one’s 
birthplace. Thus, in the era before hukou reform, it functioned as an ascribed status and severely 
limited life chances (Vendryes, 2011:680).  
The entitlement to social resources associated with hukou and the disparity of social 
resources between coastal cities and inland rural regions sharply divided Chinese citizens into two 
tiers. In the upper tier, urban (non-agricultural) hukou status granted superior economic and social 
opportunities in contrast to rural (agricultural) hukou status, in terms of education, healthcare, 
employment and pension. The hukou system “created a chasm in Chinese society and produced 
and reproduced social segregation and social disparity” (Chan & Zhang, 1999:830).  
Changes to the hukou system did not take place in accordance with the economic reform 
in 1978. As Lu points out, the hukou system was actually enforced more strictly during the first 
decade of these reforms as a way to monitor population flow and maintain social stability 
(2002:127).  As a result, the divide between urban and rural hukou was deepened.  It was not until 
1992, when state power related to resource allocation and population mobility control was 
decentralized, that hukou system reforms in various forms started to emerge in more economically 
developed coastal regions. This was when Shanghai adopted an investment-based “Blue-Stamp” 
hukou system to bypass the national hukou system, and grant non-natives’ right to reside in the 
city (Chan & Zhang, 1999:838-39).  
Borrowing Bourdieu’s concept of capital conversion, I argue that the exorbitant fee charged 
to “Blue-Stamp” hukou applicants and the rigid criteria imposed upon them is a state-initiated 
conversion of economic capital to socio-political capital objectified in hukou status. The “Blue-
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Stamp” hukou system is similar to the employment or investment based immigration visa in the 
United States, but used internally to differentiate Chinese citizens. Through it, the municipal 
government of Shanghai recruited desirable non-native talent or entrepreneurs by guaranteeing 
them privileges that previously were enjoyed exclusively by native Shanghairen. Politically and 
economically, the non-natives with this “Blue-Stamp” or “achieved” hukou status challenged the 
natives’ symbolic ownership of the city.  
The effects of earlier hukou reforms (1997-2002) are the departure points for my study. 
National studies conducted shortly after reforms made in the early 2000s show that at that time the 
hukou system still performed “a crucial role to determine socio-political stability, facilitate a rapid 
but uneven economic growth, and shape socio-economic stratification and spatial inequality in 
China” (Wang, 2004:115). I have discovered that Shanghai in early 2010s is transitioning from the 
hukou-defined dualism into a three-tiered social hierarchy caused by the lingering symbolic capital 
of hukou status and the increasingly significant urban political economy. A legal status mainly 
designed for social control in the Maoist era, hukou status is now a highly effective way to mobilize 
a select labor force and direct investment capital into the most aggressively developing urban areas.  
The municipal government incentivizes labor and capital movement with access to top quality 
social services and a modern urban living environment.   
 I understand the positive results of hukou reforms through the lens of Bryan Turner’s 
argument about the two dimensions of modern citizenship - social membership and the right to an 
allocation of resources (1993:2).  In terms of social membership, integration has taken place in 
three dimensions of social life – workplace, social circles, and family – among the highly educated 
and wealthy non-natives.  For rural, less-educated migrant workers, the social exclusion persists. 
Rural migrant workers, as a group, are not even mentioned when my native Shanghairen 
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interviewees discuss non-natives’ social integration. As for the allocation of resources, the 
transition from the state- to market- dominated redistribution of social services promotes the social 
inclusion of non-natives, especially those with high cultural and economic capital, into 
comfortable urban living in Shanghai. However, the urban political economy is no less a 
classification system than the previous hukou system; both ultimately cast rural migrants, as well 
as some native Shanghairen to the bottom of the social hierarchy. The urban citizenship in 
Shanghai thus is enjoyed fully by those of high socioeconomic status with a Shanghai hukou, 
regardless of origin. Native Shanghairen with hukou in general are able to claim their citizenship 
through the social membership and the remaining power of the hukou status. Rural migrants, 
though provided with a limited amount of social services, remain second-class citizens in Shanghai.  
  
Selective Acceptance in Workplace 
In the last ten years, acceptance of non-natives into Shanghai’s labor force has shifted away 
from predominantly manual labor jobs. In the implementation of developmental policies aimed at 
turning Shanghai into the kind of global city characterized by a strong tertiary sector of the 
economy and research and development facilities, the municipal government projected that 
Shanghai would need a labor force of up to 2 million professionals by 2015 (Chen, 2009:xxiii, 
xxix). Against this backdrop of labor shortage, the retreat of the state’s role in job allocation based 
on an individual’s hukou status, and the decentralization of state power in hukou reforms, one 
group of non-natives in Shanghai enjoy a much better chance for social acceptance and upward 
social mobility. They are those who have obtained Shanghai urban hukou through educational 
credentials or financial investment (Fan, 2002:103). This suggests a new, and more complex social 
stratification than the clear-cut polarization of natives versus non-natives (Ren, 2011:173).  
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Institutional changes of the hukou system and changes in the hiring process granted both 
state-owned and private companies autonomy to move towards more merit-based recruitment. This 
gave rise to China’s new business elite, who enjoy privileges on par with expats, princelings, or 
party cadres. These elite can be roughly categorized into two groups. First, the topmost stratum 
comprised of “foreign-sector managers”—Chinese nationals who manage the foreign-backed 
businesses that have been allowed to operate in China since the late 1970s. Within this group, there 
are also professionals and technocratic managers in both foreign and domestic sectors. As a whole, 
members of the business elite group tend to be young and well educated—in their twenties and 
thirties at the time of Pearson’s research in the late 1990s. The second stratum of the new business 
elite is made up of private entrepreneurs. Members of these two groups have gained control of 
substantial economic resources, leading to higher incomes and a higher standard of living for them 
and their families (Pearson, 1997:3-7). These new business elite in Shanghai are not necessarily 
native Shanghairen.  
As I described in the introduction, that I interviewed fifty native Shanghairen of a plethora 
of professions in organizations owned by the state, foreign corporations, or domestic private 
entrepreneurs. My interviews with native Shanghairen about their non-native bosses and co-
workers show that the hiring process in many industries has moved away from a hukou-based 
system, which leads to better chance of upward mobility for highly educated non-natives in 
Shanghai.  
Kerry, a native Shanghairen holding an Australian passport and a bachelor’s degree from 
the University of New South Wales in Sydney, has worked at HSBC’s headquarters Shanghai for 
ten years. She told me about their new recruits, who are mostly non-natives: 
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They are mostly with a graduate degree from top universities such as Tsinghua 
University or Peking University.40 In big companies like ours, they are entitled to 
the same benefits as native Shanghairen. They occupy relatively high-up positions.  
Evidently, non-natives with educational credentials from top domestic universities fare well in 
banking, and appear to be just as good, if not better than, native Shanghairen in the eyes of foreign 
banks.  
These educational credentials are also favorably recognized in the previously highly 
exclusive, state-controlled sectors, such as mass media. A native Shanghairen journalist who works 
for Xinmin Evening News  describes the careerism among new non-native hires since 2000: 
They [non-natives] are very good at earning high scores at university entrance 
exams [which determine one’s major such as the highly sought-after Journalism], 
which means most [new recruits] since 2000 are not [native] Shanghairen. 
Instinctively they want to integrate into Shanghai society, so they work really hard. 
They work overtime a lot and seek quick promotions…Now all the mid-level 
managerial positions in our newspaper are held by non-natives.  
We see a clear career trajectory of those non-natives trying to make it in the newspaper business 
in Shanghai. Beginning in high school, non-natives originating from less developed inland regions 
aim to earn a diploma from a top domestic university based on standardized test scores. After 
obtaining that degree, they compete with natives to earn a highly sought-after position as a 
journalist. To natives such as the one I interviewed, this position is a good and comfortable career 
destination; however, in the example of the Xinmin Evening News, for non-natives, it is merely a 
start. For a better and more secure future in Shanghai, they continue to push themselves further to 
acquire managerial and editorial positions.  
In this case, both recruitment and internal promotion appear to be merit-based, or at least 
they seem to be dissociated from one’s Shanghai hukou status. Although there is no way for us to 
know whether non-natives are more qualified than their native Shanghairen counterparts in the 
                                                          
40 These are the top two universities in China, according to U.S. News’ Best Global Universities in China list. 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/china 
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news paper’s hiring and internal promotion process, my interviewee appears embittered and 
expresses a sense of relative deprivation of privilege once granted by hukou.   
Another sector that has experienced this shift in recruitment practice is the once rigidly 
hukou-based top-tier public schools. David Chen, a current sophomore at China’s third-ranked 
university, Fudan University, and graduate of the affiliated high school, reflects on his experience 
with his high school science teachers:  
None of my high school teachers are [native] Shanghairen. Not to mention 
Shanghai dialect, they don’t even speak proper Putonghua! Some of them have such 
a heavy accent, for example, my math teacher is from Henan Province and holds a 
master degree from Fudan University. It took my classmates and me a good month 
to distinguish “suo yi shuo” [so to say/therefore] and “shuo yi shuo” [let’s say] in 
his lectures. 
When I express my surprise about the inadequacy of his former teacher’s Putonghua fluency, since 
there is a mandatory language test for a teaching certificate, David stresses that in terms of 
academic credentials, his math teacher is of the top rank, so language skills could be overlooked 
in the hiring process. This example shows the emphasis on merit, that besides the applicant’s hukou 
status, national standard language requirements can be ignored in the hiring process as well.  
The example of the math teacher also shows that a grey area exists in Shanghai’s job market. 
Instead of automatically excluding people without a Shanghai hukou, employers have the 
flexibility to bypass national or municipal regulations in their pursuit of recruiting the best and 
brightest in the country. The existence of this grey area is likely due to the labor shortage in 
Shanghai’s fast development, especially at the professional level. Nurse Le, who works in the 
Pediatric Hematology and Oncology Department at the Shanghai Children’s Medical Center, 
explains the high percentage of non-native doctors employed there: 
The chance for native Shanghairen medical school fresh graduates to obtain a job 
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in Triple A [san jia] top-rank hospitals41 such as ours is slim because we want to 
recruit those with more experiences or having studied abroad [regardless of hukou]. 
I can safely say in Triple A hospitals in general, non-natives account for 70 percent 
among medical doctors.  
The competitive job market at the children’s medical center is another example of how little hukou 
status matters. The above cases in media, the public school system, and in hospitals demonstrate 
that in Shanghai today, with the institutional barrier in the hiring process eliminated, highly 
educated and hardworking non-natives are enjoying a better chance of integration at workplace 
and upward social mobility.  
So far we have seen the increasing social integration in the reform era Shanghai job market, 
resulting from both the foreign and once state-controlled sectors recruiting based on merit instead 
of hukou status, party membership, or any other pre-reform criteria. The private sector in Shanghai, 
reborn in the economic reform era in the early 1980s, has also experienced an influx of non-natives’ 
participation. Yingli who works as a sales aide, though not mentioning the hukou status of her 
bosses, recounts their origins:  
The company I work for sells machines. The head of our sales department is from 
Zhejiang Province. The big boss of the company is her uncle twice removed, and 
her husband, also a non-native, has his own business. They are senior level white 
collars, if not higher.    
In her eyes, her bosses, being non-natives, are doing much better than native Shanghairen like 
herself. Better-off are also her non-native co-workers: 
Our sales representatives need to have an engineering background and willingness 
to travel. They are earning good money. With their high commission rate, they were 
all able to purchase housing in Shanghai. They married in Shanghai, and now have 
children. Really, they are better off than us. Look at their nice cars! 
Yingli again does not mention her colleagues’ hukou status. In her opinion, hukou is irrelevant to 
one’s socioeconomic status and material success. Being a native Shanghairen, Yingli seems to be 
                                                          
41 It is the top rank of hospitals in China, according to the ranking system developed by the State Council. For a total 
registered long-term population of 25 million, there are only 35 triple A hospitals including specialist ones.  
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pleased with her office job because without any engineering background, she does not see herself 
as a successful sales representative in the company. Instead devoting more time to her young 
daughter, she understands that hard work and technical knowledge are the reasons for her non-
native colleagues’ higher socioeconomic status.  
The shift from hiring practices based on hukou or other ascribed status, such as family 
political background, to a merit-based job market has contributed to Shanghai’s prosperity and 
development into a global city. At the same time, those new business elites’ participation in 
Shanghai’s economic expansion has been rewarded with considerable prestige (Pearson, 1997:7). 
Moreover, their educational credentials, higher positions and income level pave the way to easily 
acquire an urban hukou, for example through Shanghai’s “Blue Stamp” hukou system. We can 
consider them as new elite members of a privileged local community in global cities. 
In the low-end job markets, employers use the same flexibility granted by hukou reforms 
to take advantage of rural migrant workers’ geographical mobility. Equally essential for 
Shanghai’s development is the participation of less-educated non-natives employed in low-status 
jobs.  
 
Non-natives in Low-end Workplace 
Studies in the 1990s and early 2000s show large-scale lay-offs (xiagang) due to structural 
changes of state-owned enterprises in urban China “through consolidation, mergers and relocations” 
(Chen, 2009: xxiii). As a result, hundreds of thousands of native Shanghairen were pushed into 
early-retirement and low-status jobs in the service sector. Drawing data from Shanghai’s Statistic 
Yearbooks, Davis finds that from 1990 to 1995, more than 600,000 industrial jobs disappeared - 
510,000 of which were in production (1999:33). At that time, China's major urban centers like 
Shanghai focused on recruiting highly educated labor for the newly rising sectors, as well as 
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attracting the super-rich (Wang, 2004:120). Thus, workers laid off from manufacturing jobs found 
opportunity in the service sector. Starting in the early 2000s, when those laid-off workers who 
moved to service jobs began to retire, and Shanghai was experiencing massive urban 
redevelopments to achieve a global-city-look, it was more and more common to see rural migrant 
workers in trade, restaurant services, manufacturing and construction (Feng, Zuo & Ruan, 
2002:529).  
Ten years after those earlier studies, occupational segregation continued, with less-
educated rural migrants clustered in low-end jobs. Data from 2013 is represented below in Figure 
5.1, drawn from a report published by the Shanghai Statistical Bureau titled “Non-Shanghai Hukou 
holders count more than half of Shanghai’s labor force”. 42  The areas listed, manufacturing, 
construction, hospitality and restaurants, and repair and other services have more non-native than 
native workers.  
                                                          
42 Non-Shanghai Hukou holders count more than half of Shanghai’s labor force [in Chinese]. Shanghai Statistical 
Bureau. June 26, 2014. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/fxbg/201406/271085.html 
 Manufacturing Construction Hospitality 
and 
Restaurant 
Repair and 
other services 
Total 
Non-native 
Labor Force  
1,486,700 608,700 172,922* 37,785* 3,328,600 
Entire 
Labor Force 
2,524,700 912,594* 296,100 64,700 6,500,400 
Non-
native’s 
percentage  
58.9% 66.7% 58.4% 58.4% 51.2% 
 
Figure 5.1 Non-native’s participation in four industries and in Shanghai’s whole labor force. 
The three statistics with asterisks are not directly provided in the report, but calculated by the 
author based on statistics in the report. 
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My observations of staff at stores, restaurants, barbershops, and other retail or hospitality 
settings of the staff support those statistics, that the language I overheard was predominantly 
Putonghua with accent of other dialects. When I inquired about where they would usually 
encounter non-natives outside of their own office workplace, or immediate social circle, 
interviewees pointed to low-status service jobs in restaurants, supermarkets, or as janitors and 
couriers. To help me understand the prevalence of rural migrant workers occupying those jobs, 
Jianyuan, a retired native Shanghairen, described to me his grocery shopping routine: 
That’s why during the Spring Festival [week-long Chinese New Year holiday], we 
have nowhere to buy fresh groceries in the wet market [fresh food market with 
individual venders]! They [rural migrants] all go back home. This is the [only] time 
that I use my fridge. Usually I buy fresh veggies and meat daily from the wet market 
across the street. 
He regards the lack of fresh ingredients from non-native venders at the wet market as an 
inconvenience during the Chinese New Year holiday. At the same time, it shows how the labor 
force of the wet market is comprised entirely of non-native rural migrant workers. Their annual 
absence during the New Year holiday brings the whole market to a halt.  
Another industry that continues to be dominated by rural migrant workers is construction. 
As indicated in Figure 5.1, 66.7% of the labor force are non-natives. Zhenhai, who works as a 
project manager at Shanghai Construction Group tells me about the hierarchy that characterizes 
their labor force: 
Those senior architects or technicians are mostly [native] Shanghairen; many of our 
internal project meetings are conducted in Shanghai dialect. Since now we do more 
management than actual construction, we don’t directly hire laborers, but outsource 
the job to contractors. They are all non-natives, some from Sichuan province, and 
some from Hunan province. Below them, those laborers are from everywhere!  
In the construction industry, according to Zhenhai, native status still corresponds with seniority 
and expertise, unlike in other sectors that allow non-native college graduates to climb quickly. 
Almost twenty years ago Chan argued that “state construction enterprises hire many peasant 
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laborers, in the form of ‘contract workers’ and ‘temporary workers’ to fill strenuous manual and 
low-skilled jobs shunned by urban labor” (1996:144). This corresponds with my data and with 
observations made by Feng, Zuo, and Ruan in the early 2000s (2002:530).  
The part of hukou reforms most relevant to rural migrant workers is access to manual labor 
jobs in urban areas. The results of reform are twofold. On the one hand, the urban government 
allows rural migrants to set up small businesses such as shoe-repair shops, barbershops, tailor 
shops, grocery stores, and restaurants (Wu & Xie, 2003) for which there are unmet needs in urban 
centers (Solinger, 1999:14). On the other hand the growing market sector demands more unskilled 
labor, beyond what the native population is willing or able to supply (Wu & Treiman, 2004:365). 
Therefore, thanks to hukou reforms, rural migrant workers are geographically mobile and able to 
fill the labor force voids in Shanghai. They are also now entitled to social services such as 
healthcare and education for their children, which is available after establishing residency in 
Shanghai through a non-job-associated Shanghai Residence Permit, as I have explained in chapter 
two. 43 
Regardless of the mobility and opportunities on the job market provided to non-natives, 
the hukou system remains intact as a major divide between the rural and urban populations, , such 
as Chan and Buckingham observed in the mid-2000s (2008:582). Loosening restrictions to 
facilitate the flow of capital and labor does not shake the dual citizenship structure, although it 
does open up space for a select few non-natives to acquire Shanghai urban hukou status. In the 
mid-1990s, Chan argued that “the opportunity structure of today for most of these migrants still 
bears heavily the stamp of social stratification forged over decades by the orthodox communist 
                                                          
43 Shanghai Residence Permit Regulation. May 23rd, 2013. In effect starting July 1st, 2013. Issued by the Shanghai 
Municipal Government. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/u26ai36128.html 
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system” (1996:146). Rural migrant laborers, in other words, were still far from being integrated 
into urban Chinese societies (Feng, Zuo & Ruan, 2002:539). Ten years later, in the early 2010s, 
the situation remains the same. A third aspect of the changing social hierarchy in Shanghai is the 
downward mobility of a group of native Shanghairen, who saw their hukou-associated privilege 
slip away in the economic reform era. 
 
The Native Shanghairen Left Behind 
The reforms of state-owned enterprises (work-unit, danwei) in the 1990s shattered state-
guaranteed employment security and laid-off hundreds of thousands of native Shanghairen. These 
structural changes left those laid-off from the textile industry, for example, without the skills to 
gain employment in the booming commerce, banking and insurance tertiary sectors.  As the new 
economic elites ascended to power, the disadvantaged—the urban unemployed and pensioners in 
particular—drifted to the margins of China’s efforts to mold Shanghai into a global city (Ren, 
2011:176; Zhang, 2000: 24-39).  
To understand how badly native Shanghairen pensioners fare, I collected information from 
my middle-age interviewees about their parents. One interview subject, Ouyang, shares his 
mother’s feeling of systemic unfairness: 
My mother is a retired high school teacher. Her pension is much lower than those 
of her position retired in the [adjacent] Jiangsu or Zhejiang province. And if you 
add the high living cost in Shanghai on top of it…  
The financial hardship for pensioners is not limited to retired schoolteachers. Since the calculation 
of the pension is based on one’s pre-retirement salary, seniority and type of workplace, whether 
with a foreign company, a state-owned enterprise or organization, or a collective, makes a 
significant difference in the pension an individual is entitled to. According to documents published 
by the Shanghai Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, the monthly minimum 
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pension is RMB 1,500 (approx. US $250) for 2013, the year of my fieldwork.  At the beginning 
of 2013, the bureau announced that pensioners city-wide would receive a RMB 140 (approx. US 
$23) raise, and an additional RMB 3 (approx. US $.50) for each year an individual has paid into 
social security; and lastly a 3% increase of the monthly pension.44 That meager raise was intended 
to compensate for the inflation rate. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the Consumer 
Price Index in 2013 was 2.5%.45  
Against this backdrop, we can understand Ouyang’s dissatisfaction in the financial 
condition his mother and other native Shanghairen pensioners are left in:  
There are many elderly women like my mother who receives about two thousand 
yuan per month (approx. US $325). Their lives are bitter and difficult. They haven’t 
benefitted from the urban growth, instead they shrank lower, and marginalized. 
They are quasi-paupers now. They are just above the migrant workers selling 
manual labor.  
If we take RMB 2,000 as his mother’s base pension, add the RMB 140 representing the 3% 
increase, and assume she contributed to social security for 20 years since the beginning of that 
system, a quick calculation shows the increase will bring his mother’s 2013 monthly and annual 
pension to RMB 2,260 and RMB 27,120, respectively. Considering the per capita disposable 
income for urban Shanghairen in 2013 was RMB 43,851,46 it was no exaggeration when Ouyang 
described his mother’s financial standing as “quasi-pauper”, whose entire pension is only 62% of 
the per capita disposable income. On the socioeconomic hierarchy, these pensioners are closer to 
the migrant manual laborers than to their fellow natives.   
                                                          
44 Notice about 2014 Basic Pension Adjustment for Retirees from Urban and Township Corporations [guanyu 2014 
nian tiaozheng benshi chengzhen tuixiu renyuan jiben yanglaojin de tongzhi]. Shanghai Municipal Human 
Resources and Social Security Bureau. December 27, 2013. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.12333sh.gov.cn/201412333/xxgk/flfg/gfxwj/shbx/ylbx/201405/t20140506_1181520.shtml 
45 Analysis of CPI and PPI data of December, 2013 by Senior Analyst Yu Qiumei. National Bureau of Statistics of 
the People's Republic of China. January 9, 2014. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/sjjd/201401/t20140109_497148.html 
46 Chart 10.5. Urban Household per capita Disposable Income for Main Years. Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2014 
[in Chinese]. http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/tjnj/nj14.htm?d1=2014tjnj/C1005.htm 
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The deepening of economic reforms drastically reduced employment opportunities and 
state-subsidized welfare for urban hukou holders (Chan & Zhang, 1999:842). The political and 
structural framework of the country’s transition to a market economy, or quoting David Harvey, 
“neoliberalism with Chinese characters” (2005:120), has created a group of disadvantaged native 
Shanghairen, who, though they contributed to building a “New China (xin zhongguo)” under Mao 
for decades, were left behind to fend for themselves in the economic reform era.  
 
Social Circles 
In a period of large-scale influx of internal migrants, achieving full-scale social integration 
of the newcomers into the native Shanghairen’s social life within less than twenty years’ is likely 
to be wishful thinking. Indeed, while most of my fifty interviewees reflect that they have more and 
more non-native friends, acquired through school or work, lack of integration persists.  
Among the younger generations, those who grew up in the late 1980s and especially those 
in the early 2000s, when the presence of highly educated non-natives was common in schools and 
workplaces, I find a general trend of friendship based on shared lifestyle and experience.  Hukou 
status and Shanghai dialect competence appear to matter little.  For example, David Chen, a native 
Shanghairen born in 1996 studying at Fudan University explained to me his circle of friends: 
As long as they share with me experience and memories, I will make friends with 
them. I have a good friend since high school, who is a non-native and doesn’t speak 
the Shanghai dialect. We play soccer together and are now enrolled in the same 
university.  
Since his non-native friend attended the same high school, which is a top rank public high school 
affiliated with Fudan University, I can safely predict that the friend’s parents belong to the group 
of state-sponsored non-natives, who are either highly educated or wealthy and have acquired 
Shanghai hukou. Only with that status can non-natives send their children to public high schools, 
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since it is beyond the free nine-year mandatory education that the state requires local governments 
to provide for internal migrants, regardless of their hukou status. Therefore, I understand the 
friendship between David Chen and his non-native good friend as based on habitus: the similar 
socioeconomic status of their families, and their shared interest in sports. 
Beyond the school setting, David gives me examples of other types of shared experience, 
which to him, would foster friendships: “same experience, you know, colleagues, neighbors or you 
travel together.” Taking into consideration the role of the urban political economy in sorting 
residents over the last two decades of urban redevelopment and relocation, I understand David’s 
friendship circle as based on household income, which is represented by the housing location and 
consumption patterns including vacation destinations. 47 It is the working of Bourdieusian habitus 
that converts economic capital into cultural and social capitals.  
Another interviewee, Jenny, is more than fifteen years David’s senior. She worked for the 
Bank of East Asia and was enrolled in an MBA program at the China Europe International Business 
School 48  at the time of the interview. She regards those only making friends with native 
Shanghairen narrow-minded: 
I don’t mind making friends with non-natives. We are all Chinese, as long as you 
are a nice person [then we can be friends]. I am enrolled in an MBA program, and 
many of my classmates are non-natives. They are all brilliant people. I am not that 
kind of narrow-minded people who only make friends with [native] Shanghairen.  
The non-natives in her narrative are certainly highly educated, and belong to upper-middle if not 
upper class. The similar socioeconomic background and shared graduate school experience, which 
includes a half year study in Paris and traveling around Europe together, brought Jenny and her 
                                                          
47 Though I argue the preference of native Shanghairen for housing in Puxi, and non-natives for that in Pudong in 
the previous chapter, it does not alter the fact that housing price sorts residents of different socioeconomic status into 
different neighborhoods.  
48 China Europe International Business School is ranked No.1 in Asia and No.17 in the world for its full-time MBA 
program by Bloomberg Businessweek for 2014. 
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non-native classmates together. The exclusiveness of her friendship circle is not based on hukou 
status or birthplace, but habitus visible through socioeconomic status and consumption patterns.  
From David, we gain a glimpse of the opinion of the college age future elite native 
Shanghairen, and from Jenny, of the group that occupies the top stratum in the socioeconomic 
hierarchy. Lu Yan, a private elementary school teacher in her early 40s, who grew up in a working 
class neighborhood in the northeast of Shanghai, adds her understanding of the change in native 
Shanghairen’s social circles, “there are more and more non-natives living in Shanghai. About half 
of my friends now are non-natives.” She regarded this transition as an inevitable consequence of 
demographic changes in the city in the last two decades, rather than describing it as an issue of 
class, shared exclusive experience or compatible habitus. Her experience echoes that of most of 
my other interviewees.  
Though the majority of my interviewees describe their social circles as integrated between 
natives and non-natives, I still characterize this pattern as transitional because of the persistence 
of segregation. At a time when more and more natives were making friends with non-native co-
workers or their children’s non-native classmates’ parents, the scene at a research institute housed 
in the Shanghai Normal University suggested persistent boundaries, such as native Shanghairen 
Chen Ji observes: 
Those just relocated to Shanghai for work, are very eager to make friends through 
the Internet. As soon as they find someone [via Internet] from the same hometown, 
they would call each other every day and have meals every day! I couldn’t imagine 
doing something like that with anyone except for one’s boyfriend or husband.  
As someone who was born, grew up and has lived in Shanghai all her life, Chen Ji could not 
understand the kind of friendship that develops between recent migrants solely based on shared 
home origins: 
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How could you call those friends? You just have meals together, without any 
[emphasis added by the interviewee] connection or understanding at a deeper level. 
Maybe it is because they are lonely. 
What Chen Ji attributed to loneliness, I understand to be a product of the social exclusion non-
natives face in the city. In an effort to build their own social circle outside of the native Shanghairen 
community, they seek people from their own hometown, which results in these regional-identity 
based social circles. 
From Chen Ji’s further elaboration of the formation of her non-native colleague’s social 
circle, I learn about mutual exclusion: 
All of his friends share a similar experience with him. They originate from [less 
developed] inland provinces, having studied abroad, and now come to Shanghai to 
work. And the other kind is purely home region based network, such as from Anhui 
[province] or from Hubei [province]. They don’t usually hang out with [us] 
Shanghairen. 
Chen Ji’s non-native colleagues did not share similar experience with her, unlike those teenage 
children of the first-generation non-native Shanghairen David went to high school with. In Chen 
Ji’s eyes, the social circle non-natives cultivate is intentionally with other non-natives. This 
demonstrates how social exclusion between native and non-native Shanghairen is maintained from 
both sides.  
What Chen Ji described in the academic setting bears similarity with the segregated social 
circle in the HSBC Headquarters Kerry worked for. Given foreign enterprises’ tendency to hire 
directly from top Chinese universities, enabled by the reformed hukou system which facilitated the 
geographical mobility of highly qualified talent, many interviewees working at Fortune 500 
companies in Shanghai describe to me the mixed origin workforce in their offices. However, 
meritocratic hiring processes do not necessarily mean a full integration at the social level. As Kerry 
described:  
It is fairly segregated in my office. Outside of the native Shanghairen circle, there 
is the waidiren [non-natives] never been abroad, and waidiren having studied 
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overseas, and the third “non-native” group is 100% foreigners. They don’t hang out 
across the lines.  
Kerry’s observation illustrates that in a foreign bank, the social circles are the same as those in a 
research institute housed on a state-owned university campus.  
Therefore, in the cosmopolitan Shanghai, home origin, educational background, overseas 
experience and Chinese citizenship 49  all serve as barriers to form inclusive social networks. 
Likewise, in Beijing, not only are low-wage migrant workers discriminated against, but also those 
with a relatively high income suffer from discrimination in terms of the difficulty to make friends 
with natives (Zhan, 2011:264). With the diminishing relevance of hukou, shared socioeconomic 
status brings more social integration between natives and non-natives. However, lifestyle, home 
origin and life experience, which are manifestations of habitus, continue to maintain and reproduce 
mutual exclusion.  
 
Family 
Transitions taking place in native Shanghairen’s social circles run parallel to recent 
changes in marriage patterns.  A quick tally of the marriage status of my fifty interviewees shows 
that in comparison to the generation in their 50s and 60s, the generation in their 30s shows higher 
incidence of marriage between Shanghairen and non-natives. 50 Though five of my interviewees 
are still in college and below the legal marriage age51 and eight are in their 30s to 40s but still 
single, of the remaining thirty-seven interviewees, 60% are married to native Shanghairen. Among 
those twenty-two married to peer natives, six are fifty-five years old and above. That is to say, 
                                                          
49 Since P.R. China does not allow dual citizenship, it is very rare for a foreigner to adopt Chinese citizenship. 
50 Data from the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau show that the average age of first marriage is 30.2 and 28.2 years old 
for male and female respectably in 2013 (Chen, 2015) so I use the age of 30 to group my interviewees in the analysis 
of the marriage pattern. 
51 According to the People’s Republic of China Marriage Law, the legal marriage age for male is 22, and female 20.  
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from my non-representative sample, sixteen native Shanghairen in their 30s to 40s are married to 
natives, while fifteen to non-natives. Marriage status was not one of the criteria of my research 
subject recruitment, but I believe the snapshot it provides can supplement the data from the 
Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau, where marriage licenses are issued. Of the 147,820 couples married 
in 2013, 55,373 are of unions between a native Shanghairen and a non-native, accounting for more 
than 37 percent. According to a report in the Xinmin Evening News on February 28th, 2014 titled 
“Shanghai has the highest percentage of native and non-native unions across the country with 
men’s average first marriage age at 34,” the intermarriage rate in 2013 was 10% higher than it was 
in 2012.52 
We can interpret the increasing rate of intermarriage between native and non-natives as a 
deepening of social integration. Furthermore, unions of this kind will lead to the decline of 
prejudice against non-native in the future. Yujie told me about her changes in opinion after 
marrying a non-native, who was a graduate school classmate of hers, and originated from the 
neighboring Zhejiang province:  
Years ago I would comment on some uncivilized behavior of a native Shanghairen 
by saying something like, “What the hell, are you a Waidiren [non-native]??” I 
wouldn’t say it now. It used to be very common that whenever something 
uncivilized, or bizarre happened, native Shanghairen would attribute it to Waidiren. 
It’s very likely that because my husband is a Waidiren, my opinion has changed, 
and also I am more open to people from elsewhere in general.  
Yujie’s self-reflection illustrates how years of college and office life, living and working side by 
side with non-natives, and later marriage to a non-native, have changed her attitude towards non-
natives as a group.  
                                                          
52 Li, X. (2014). Shanghai has the highest proportion of marriage between native and non-natives nation-wide, 
average marriage age for male is 34. Xinmin Net. February 28, 2014. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://shanghai.xinmin.cn/msrx/2014/02/28/23645449.html 
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However, this does not necessarily translate to the elimination of prejudice outside of the 
home. Yin, a native Shanghairen, who has worked her entire professional life in a highly state-
controlled performing arts institute that once followed a rigid hukou-based hiring process, told me 
about her observation of native/non-native intermarriages: 
It is very common to see inter-marriage, for example a few of my best female 
friends married non-natives. And they [need to] speak Putonghua at home. 
Sometimes when we have a dinner party, I need to converse with them in Putonghua, 
otherwise their husbands couldn’t understand.  
This quote exemplifies the ripple effect that makes social interaction and integration of non-natives 
go beyond the individual household into the larger native Shanghairen community. The effects of 
this integration of social circles are double-edged, however: on the one hand it increases non-
natives’ social integration generally, making Shanghairen more open-minded about non-natives. 
On the other hand, this example points out a resulting linguistic isolation; communication in 
monolingual Putonghua Mandarin to accommodate non-native’s unfamiliarity with Shanghai 
dialect reinforces an outsider identity.  
Furthermore, the insider/outsider contrast can potentially increase prejudice, as Yin 
continued her comment on the intermarriage phenomenon: 
As far as I know, most intermarried couples lived/moved into the native 
Shanghairen’s home. That’s why I always say the intention of non-natives marrying 
native Shanghairen is suspicious.  Those closely involved cannot see as clearly as 
those outside {she chuckled} …  
These comments should be understood in the context of the practice of state-owned housing being 
provided by work units to their Shanghai urban hukou holder employees in the pre-economic 
reform era, and later those units were sold at a heavily subsidized rate to sitting tenants. Taking 
into consideration the current housing situation in Shanghai as well, where prices are skyrocketing, 
Yin suspects non-natives’ intent to marry native Shanghairen to be motivated more by material 
considerations, such as the availability of free or cheap housing, than by love.  
 207 
 
The transition to a more integrated Shanghai in terms of employment, social circle, and 
marriage patterns has altered the social hierarchy significantly. Once a crucial criterion for defining 
who is a Shanghairen, the Shanghai urban hukou has diminished significance. In its place, 
individual’s socioeconomic status plays an ever more important role for prestige and entitlement. 
In this vein, a common theme emerges again and again during interviews with native Shanghairen. 
They assess the status of non-natives based on two new criteria— housing and Shanghai dialect 
competence. The first criterion is a direct representation of one’s financial strength, and the other 
is the non-native’s willingness to assimilate by learning the Shanghai dialect.  
The integration of non-natives into the native Shanghairen community, though mostly 
class-based, leads to the decline of the exclusive linguistic space of the Shanghai dialect. Bilingual 
native Shanghairen tend to switch to speaking Putonghua whenever a non-native is present. 
However, this does not mean that Shanghai dialect has lost its significance for Shanghairen identity 
and its symbolic capital of distinction. As Woolard observes in the linguistic accommodation 
practiced by bilingual Catalonians in Barcelona to Castilian-speaking migrants, the code-switch 
means “the denial of access to the full membership in the solidary local group; those cannot who 
penetrate the language barrier cannot penetrate group boundaries” (1989:82). 
With a growing population of non-speakers, the dialect emerges as a tool used by natives 
to evaluate non-natives’ cultural assimilation, hence it is the second criterion I identify in the native 
Shanghairen’s acceptance of non-natives. Zhan (2011:260-61) concludes from her study of inner 
Mongolian migrants’ social integration in Beijing that the separation of social circles and identity-
based exclusion are the two mechanisms used to maintain social boundaries. I argue that the two 
criteria in my study, housing location and the Shanghai dialect competence, provide a similar 
exclusive function. Native Shanghairen use these two as manifestations of habitus to judge and 
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evaluate non-natives, whether they can be recognized as true Shanghairen. In the next section, I 
will explore the officially endorsed category of New Shanghairen, and its connection to Shanghai 
dialect competence. 
 
Who is a (New) Shanghairen? 
In the same period that the Shanghai hukou lost its aura of exclusiveness, a new category, 
New Shanghairen, was invented and endorsed by the Shanghai Municipal Government. 53  It is 
used in government documents and the state-controlled mass media to differentiate the highly 
educated, Shanghai hukou holding non-natives from their poor and less-educated counterparts. 
From a Bourdusian perspective, struggles over regional identity, which is linked with birthplace 
and its associated durable marks such as language or dialect, is a struggle over classifications, and 
over the power to legitimate grouping and ungrouping (1991:221). Official categories 
notwithstanding, native Shanghairen evaluate non-natives’ level of assimilation through their 
Shanghai dialect competence. Based on data I have collected through social media and in-depth 
interviews, a near consensus of native Shanghairen feel that the Shanghai dialect is an essential 
part of local identity, and that if non-natives want to become authentic Shanghairen, not merely on 
paper—either through hukou status or by other government policy—then they must learn the 
dialect.  
In this process of classification, millions of rural-origin migrant workers are excluded due 
to their lack of state sponsorship and legal claim to the city represented by a Shanghai hukou. Many 
of them are street venders, barbers, locksmiths, or seamstresses (e.g. the seamstress who speaks 
fluent Shanghai dialect whom I described in chapter three), who rely heavily on neighborhood 
                                                          
53 The first official mention of the category New Shanghairen is the December 13th, 2001 Issue of the People’s Daily 
– Oversea version, citing then Municipal Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai, Huang Ju (Chen & Ye, 2001).  
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business and thus have economic incentive to learn Shanghai dialect. Indeed, many of them have 
obtained working knowledge of Shanghai dialect and are able to conduct simple conversations 
with native Shanghairen customers. However, because of their lack of a Shanghai hukou and their 
low socioeconomic status, they are not included in the New Shanghairen category in either the 
official rhetoric or native Shanghairen’s perceptions. On the contrary, the highly educated New 
Shanghairen, in general, do not care much about Shanghai dialect competence, since they have 
been officially granted local legal status, in additional to socioeconomic right to the city.  
 
Shanghai Dialect 
Earlier studies, such as John Gumperz and Jenny Cook-Gumperz’s, highlight that group 
members’ common interests must be based on shared culture (1982:5-6), which does not 
necessarily rely on residence in close proximity or being socioeconomically homogenous. 
Shanghairen identity now relies to a great extent on a shared linguistic culture, beyond residence 
and socioeconomic status.  In the last chapter I showed that more than one million native 
Shanghairen households have been displaced and relocated over the last two decades of urban 
redevelopment, and in the first half of this chapter, we saw that a new stratum of urban poor is 
growing among elderly native Shanghairen.  Also important to remember is the fact that those who 
identify as “native Shanghairen” are themselves second or third generation migrants from other 
parts of the country. Thus local rootedness is less relevant to the social identity of Shanghairen 
than language and shared values.  
Language has historically played an important role in social exclusion and discrimination 
in Shanghai. Honig notes the prejudice held against the Subei people in Shanghai, who were 
impoverished refugees fleeing war and famine north of the Yangtze River in the early 20th century 
(1992). Though low socioeconomic status and poor education were the basis of discrimination, 
 210 
 
their distinctive accent when speaking the Shanghai dialect singled them out and resulted in social 
exclusion. The status of a language is closely related to the status of its speakers. Dorian argues 
that if the people who speak a language have little power and low prestige, their language is 
unlikely to be well thought of (1999:3-4). The discrimination against the Subei people, then, can 
be viewed through this lens, that their accent in speaking the Shanghai dialect suggested 
unfamiliarity with Shanghai’s urban lifestyle and hence their lower social status.  
However, in contrast to the Subei people, more recent migrants in Shanghai are not uniform: 
neither arriving from a particular region nor occupying the bottom of the social hierarchy. Many 
who have acquired Shanghai hukou through academic credentials or wealth occupy a higher 
socioeconomic status than many native Shanghai residents. The fact that the native Shanghairen 
group is not socioeconomically homogeneous adds another layer to the nuanced and ambivalent 
relationship between speakers’ social position and their languages.  
The association between Shanghai dialect and Shanghairen identity is created and 
maintained against the backdrop of the dominant language ideology. That is, despite the lower 
status of the Shanghai dialect when compared to Putonghua Mandarin, the local dialect is still able 
to assert symbolic power of prestige and exclusivity owing to its long history as the lingua franca 
of a cosmopolitan metropolis.  
Expansion of the definition of Shanghairen or invention of categories to characterize non-
native residents in the city started before the officially endorsed term “New Shanghairen.” As 
Rudolph and Lu discovered in late 2000s, some non-natives, who quickly adapted to the city, 
“modestly called themselves ‘quasi Shanghainese’” (2008:172). But, as my research demonstrates, 
native Shanghairen usually dismiss the self-identification of non-natives. These same Shanghairen 
dismiss the official category as well, by stressing that their parents or grandparents are migrants to 
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Shanghai.  By tacitly invoking their family’s migration history, they stress the voluntary cultural 
identification among the earlier generation. This locates Shanghairen identity not in hukou status, 
residency, or dialect, but behaviors that combine all three, a purposeful adherence to cultural 
signifiers, which these Shanghairen do not see practiced by many recent migrants.  
Native Shanghai residents who hold a personal stake in preserving the Shanghai dialect 
often express a strong association between Shanghairen identity and dialect competence. Qian 
Chen, a famous Huaji Xi (Shanghai dialect theater) performer in his early 50s and the vice 
president of the Shanghai Huaji Xi Troupe, spoke fervently about the voluntary cultural 
assimilation of earlier migrants such as his family when I asked about the concept of Shanghairen 
in relation to the recent waves of internal migrants to Shanghai: 
We are not true Shanghainese either! Indeed I was born in Shanghai, but my parents 
and my paternal grandparents came from the adjacent Zhejiang Province. We have 
undergone the transition from New Shanghairen to Old Shanghairen. It is the same.  
He pointed out that since his parents and grandparents assimilated to Shanghai’s urban culture 
through practicing Shanghai dialect more than fifty years ago, recent migrants should do likewise. 
After all, he implies, the migration story is the same. In his formulation, new migrants who are 
unwilling to learn and speak the Shanghai dialect cannot qualify as Shanghairen.  
For motivation to learn the dialect, Qian focuses on love or emotional attachment to the 
city, rather than the pragmatism among the earlier migrants who acquired the local dialect to get 
by or to find work. According to Qian, adoption of the Shanghai dialect is both a demonstration 
and a requirement of a Shanghairen identity: “Being a Shanghairen, you should love your city, and 
love your mother tongue!” In his opinion, to be recognized as Shanghairen, newcomers need to 
shed their hometown affiliations and wholeheartedly embrace the dialect. Otherwise, one does not 
truly belong. 
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To some, the significance of Shanghai dialect competence is so paramount that they 
completely reject the official New Shanghairen category. Wu Wei, a native Shanghairen, is dialect 
preservation activist in his early 30s who developed a mobile app for typing Shanghai dialect. He 
says of the importance of dialect to true Shanghairen identity: 
First and foremost, if that person doesn’t know how to speak the Shanghai dialect, 
s/he is not a Shanghairen, regardless of the “new” prefix, or hukou.  
His assertion places the Shanghai dialect competence above the hukou status, and likely also above 
the newcomers’ long-term residency in Shanghai, and even socioeconomic status. To him, 
linguistic competence is the sole determinant of a Shanghairen identity.   
 Ordinary Shanghai residents view the connection between Shanghairen identity and 
Shanghai dialect competence with more nuance than preservation activists. Zhejun, 34, a native 
Shanghairen assistant professor in computer graphic design, explained: 
Firstly, whoever can speak the Shanghai dialect is definitely a Shanghairen. I mean 
whoever can speak accent-free Shanghai dialect, you can identify that person as a 
true Shanghairen.  
In his opinion, Shanghai dialect competence satisfies a necessary and sufficient condition to 
qualify for Shanghairen identity. However, Shanghairen identity under certain conditions, can be 
extended to non-speakers: 
However, it is not necessarily true that those unable to speak the dialect are 
Waidiren (non-natives). Many people have relocated to Shanghai. For years, they 
did not feel like learning to speak the Shanghai dialect. They don’t think it is 
necessary since everyone around them speaks Putonghua. Also, they do not 
necessarily want to integrate into Shanghai’s alleyway vernacular culture. I regard 
those with Shanghai hukou, living in Shanghai for years and with no intention for 
leaving Shanghai as Shanghairen.  
The three criteria of a Shanghairen identity he acknowledges are legal status, length of residency, 
and the intention and financial capacity to stay. He also narrowly associates Shanghai dialect with 
the alleyway-living lifestyle that characterized the majority of working-class Shanghai for most of 
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the 20th century. At a deeper level, Liu admits that dialect competence persists as a barrier for non-
natives to be accepted into the Shanghairen community:  
But, at the level of acceptance, I only recognize those able to speak the Shanghai 
dialect. I would regard them as a Shanghairen from head to toe. Otherwise, the 
recognition stops at the surface. In the Shanghairen circle, if you speak Putonghua, 
it would still be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to accept you as a 
Shanghairen.  
Criteria at the institutional level might guarantee Shanghairen identity in terms of material claims 
to residency, but to be accepted as an insider by native Shanghairen is a different issue, for which 
the Shanghai dialect competence is the ultimate determinant.  
Regardless of any ambition to be recognized as a true Shanghairen, the efforts non-natives 
put into learning and practicing Shanghai dialect are usually seen in a favorable light by my native 
Shanghairen interviewees. They usually acknowledge the socioeconomic status and hukou-based 
distinction within migrant groups, and take non-natives’ willingness to learn the dialect as a 
sufficient indicator of cultural assimilation. Chengyu, the manager of the customer service 
department in the Shanghai Grand Theatre, who employees are predominantly native Shanghairen, 
explains to me his understanding of the category of New Shanghairen:  
New Shanghairen is non-natives with Shanghai hukou. They are “imported” 
professional talent, unlike migrant workers, who hold only residence permit. The 
categories are different.  
Interestingly, right after explaining the categorical difference, Chengyu gives me an example of 
successful cultural assimilation without mentioning hukou status:  
A manager in our security department is from Shandong province. He speaks very 
good Shanghai dialect, and well integrated into our society. However, his level of 
fluency is rare.    
Chengyu directly indicates how legal status separates the two groups of migrants, but that 
ultimately cultural acceptance still depends on Shanghai dialect competence.  
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Other interviewees working in state-owned or foreign companies echo Chengyu’s 
observation about the rare cases of Shanghai dialect fluency among their non-native co-workers. 
According to them, even their highly educated non-native colleagues generally hold a distant and 
somewhat indifferent attitude toward the Shanghai dialect.  
Outside of the workplace, interviews with native Shanghairen who married non-natives 
speak of the importance of non-natives’ adoption of the Shanghai dialect for social integration into 
the native Shanghairen community. When asked about native Shanghairen’s language choices at 
home, and their understanding of the association between Shanghai dialect competence and 
Shanghairen identity, they routinely expressed surprise when some non-natives gained dialect 
competency quickly. Jin Dabei, who is married to a non-native and has a two-year-old son, shared 
with me anecdotes of her non-native colleagues’ journey of cultural assimilation:  
Some [female] non-natives, especially those who married native Shanghairen, tend 
to learn the dialect with more enthusiasm. They would suggest using Shanghai 
dialect when conversing with me. A colleague of mine can already speak the dialect 
quite well that she shows hardly any accent. Sometimes when I initiate a 
conversation in Putonghua, she will reply in the dialect. 
Dabei approves of her colleague’s dialect competence, and then provides a “complete” case 
connecting hukou status, educational level, marital situation, and Shanghai dialect acquisition: 
Another colleague of mine from Shanxi [about 1,000 miles inland from Shanghai] 
applied for Shanghai hukou after getting her MBA. She learned the dialect very 
quickly and married a native Shanghairen.  
In both cases, intermarriage with a native Shanghairen and acquiring a legal status are indicative 
of a motivation to complete cultural assimilation. By approving non-natives’ Shanghai dialect 
competence, a native Shanghairen such as Dabei seems accept non-natives as well-behaved guests 
in the “host city” of Shanghai. From this perspective, it appears too soon to suggest that native 
Shanghairen accept them as peer residents, who share in the ownership of the city.  
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The spectrum of acceptance and assimilation, in terms of the association between Shanghai 
dialect competence and Shanghairen identity, indicates that as long as non-natives are willing to 
learn the dialect, not necessarily to the level of accent-free fluency, native Shanghairen would 
show hospitality. This seems to align the official motto of Shanghai, “an ocean receiving hundreds 
of streams” (hai na bai chuan), but at the same time deviates from that sentiment in important 
ways. This motto suggests an all-embracing outlook and acceptance; in practice, however, it puts 
more emphasis on hospitality rather than a willingness to share ownership. As Derrida makes 
explicit, hospitality requires one to be the “master” of the house, city, country or nation (2000), 
hence it reestablishes the ownership of the host, and to a certain degree, the owner’s control of the 
people who are being hosted.  
Where the deviation from the official motto takes place is at the surface. Native 
Shanghairen understand themselves as “moral” owners (Zukin, et al., 2015), who have the right to 
determine the language spoken “at home”. At an institutional level, however, a different 
understanding emerges. Not only the central state determines the language spoken, but also since 
a selected group of non-natives are granted Shanghai hukou, they legally have the right to share 
ownership of the city with natives. Further, non-natives who do not speak the Shanghai dialect 
have the support from the state for their language choice at their new home, i.e. Putonghua. 
Disjunctions between moral, legal, and institutional forms of integration in the city contribute to 
the ambiguity surrounding the association between dialect competences and achieving accepted 
status as Shanghairen. This in turn engenders more conflicts around language spoken in Shanghai.  
 
Language Conflicts  
Recent language conflicts between native Shanghairen and New Shanghairen center on 
informal social encounters between the two groups, where the latter do not allow the former to 
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speak the dialect in public, for the suggested purpose of universal communication. This is 
perceived by native Shanghairen as non-natives’ attempt to challenge the natives’ right to the 
linguistic space of the city, undermine the linguistic habitus of native Shanghairen, and dilute the 
dialect’s status as integral to Shanghairen identity. 
At the surface, this conflict has to do with the fact that the Shanghai dialect and Putonghua 
Mandarin belong to different linguistic families. The vast difference in pronunciation between the 
two languages means even bilingual natives must exert some effort to switch back and forth 
between the two, “switching brains” as some natives put it. This belief is in essence language 
ideologies held by native Shanghairen to inform their linguistic practices. Thus they claimed that 
out of convenience, they would prefer Shanghai dialect when the audience is a fellow Shanghai 
dialect speaker. According to my native Shanghairen interviewees, non-natives within earshot 
interpret this as a form of social exclusion, insisting that native Shanghairen communicate in 
Putonghua, while native Shanghairen do not think it is relevant or necessary to include nearby non-
natives in conversation.  
Using the analogy of a host accommodating guests, Peng, 43, a native Shanghairen graphic 
designer working in a French fast-moving consumer goods company finds non-natives’ attitudes 
and practices disrespectful, and to a certain extent suggests that it is an attempt by the guest to take 
over the host’s position: 
Their attitude is ‘I don’t understand [Shanghai dialect], so no one is allowed to 
speak it when I am around, even though the communication is between native 
Shanghairen and I am not part of it’.  
Indeed, the unintelligibility of the Shanghai dialect to non-natives is a clear sign they are being 
excluded from a conversation. But to native Shanghairen, non-natives’ attitude is unacceptable. 
From Peng’s understanding, the Putonghua-speaking non-natives discriminate against the 
Shanghai dialect: 
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They think Shanghai dialect is backwards, not decent, so that they don’t need to 
learn it, and they don’t want to learn it. They will be happy when Shanghai dialect 
is eliminated.  
Peng’s opinion demonstrates the linguistic deprivation he feels. The opinion of non-natives 
towards Shanghai dialect that he perceives has roots in decades of language ideology imposed by 
state policies promoting Putonghua.  
Most native Shanghairen interviewees, such as Peng, spoke about the desire for a mutually 
respected boundary of linguistic space. As the social boundary between monolingual Putonghua-
speaking non-natives and bilingual natives dissipates further, the prospect of a linguistically 
segregated social space becomes less likely. Peng’s opinion about the language conflict indicates 
native Shanghairen’s unease about the diminishing linguistic space and perceived disrespect from 
non-natives. Moreover, it also points to the social mechanisms that breed the conflicts in public. 
Peng suggests a simple solution to the language conflict, leaving aside the fact that the generation 
of native Shanghairen born after 1990 rarely speak the dialect due to the state’s promotion of 
Putonghua, as I have shown in chapter three: 
Ru Xiang Sui Su [the equivalent Western idiom is When in Rome, do as the 
Romans do]. If they don’t want to learn, if they reject Shanghai dialect, then please 
go home. Shanghai does not welcome you!  
Although Peng clearly regards himself as the host, who, according to Derrida (2000), holds a 
certain degree of control over the guest, migration policy is determined by the central state and the 
municipal government’s talent-recruitment strategies. Native Shanghairen have little space to 
maneuver—except in cultural practices that they control, such as their linguistic habitus. 
My deeper investigation into the issues of language competence revealed that Shanghai 
dialect incompetence among non-natives generates and escalates conflicts. According to Gumperz, 
inter-group conflicts arise when interactions normally seen as routine, in this case speaking the 
dialect to strangers, are repeatedly met with unforeseen communication problems (1982:2-3). 
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These conflicts do not go away with the intensity and frequency of encounters, rather, every new 
isolated encounter adds to the misunderstanding and frustration. Eventually, misunderstandings 
can harden into value-laden ideological distinctions between in-groups and outsiders. Therefore, 
the growing social integration that we have seen in the first half of this chapter does not necessarily 
erase boundaries between natives and non-natives, even though to a certain extent it reduces 
prejudice and discrimination.   
The crucial factor for local identity is determined by embodied linguistic capital. 
Regardless of achieved legal and socioeconomic status, a part of the Shanghairen identity is forever 
elusive without the linguistic capability to converse in Shanghai dialect. Only those who “truly” 
desire Shanghairen identity can achieve this linguistic capital. As Zhu Zhenmiao, a dialect 
preservation activist says:  
I regard those enthusiastically learning Shanghai dialect as no doubt Shanghairen, 
even though they are not fluent, and have come to the city only for a few years. 
His/her active learning demonstrates his/her identification with the local culture. 
According to his interpretation, non-natives’ attitude toward learning the dialect is more important 
than fluently speaking the language itself. Their enthusiasm connects these particular non-natives 
to the whole set of cultural values and ways of thinking shared by native Shanghairen. At the same 
time, Zhu Zhenmiao rejects both institutional criteria of moral ownership and hukou-based legal 
recognition: 
Conversely, even if you were born in Shanghai and live in Shanghai for your whole 
life, without stepping foot outside of the city boundary even once, as long as you 
think of Shanghai dialect as backward and useless, and urge your child to speak 
Putonghua, I don’t count you as a Shanghairen.  
He excludes anyone, even native-born Shanghairen, who devalue the local linguistic culture. Peng, 
a native Shanghairen who does not take part in the preservation movement, shares this strong 
opinion on this issue:  “Whoever speaks Shanghai dialect is [part of the Shanghairen] family.” 
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To sum up, the tensions between dialect competence and Shanghairen identity, “New” or 
not, are beyond the formal criteria of legal or socioeconomic status. These tensions speak to 
cultural assimilation. Further, increased social integration does not lead to the erasure of the 
boundary set by linguistic differences. The evidence discussed above is further compounded by 
my ethnographic experience in public spaces such as subway stations or retail settings in late 2013 
in Shanghai, where I discovered that all conversations strangers initiated with me were in 
Putonghua. As soon as I dropped a trace of Shanghai accent in speaking Putonghua, those native 
Shanghairen among them would immediately switch to Shanghai dialect to continue the 
conversation, signaling a feeling of security and trust shared with insiders. This insider 
membership can be granted to those who learn to speak Shanghai dialect as well, but ultimately it 
is the set of group characteristics I call Shanghairen habitus, including the ability to speak the 
specific dialect of the city.  
 
Shanghairen Habitus 
Use of Shanghai dialect still implies—in Shanghairen’s language ideology—that the 
speaker is urbane, civil, and knows how to behave properly in a big city. Thus, the significance of 
the dialect to local identity also lies in the idea that language embodies the intellectual wealth of 
the people who use it (Hale, 1999: 204). The Shanghai dialect represents and contains wisdom 
developed and passed down through generations of aspiring Shanghairen, striving to better 
navigate the overwhelming metropolis of Shanghai.  
Yixin, who has worked for Boeing in Shanghai and Hong Kong since the 1980s, shared his 
insight on the close association between Shanghairen identity and speaking Shanghai dialect: 
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Shanghai dialect is one of the most important characteristics of a Shanghainese. 
The words you choose and the way you speak determine the mode of your thinking, 
hence, your behavior.  
To him, a person’s upbringing is clearly shown in the way that they speak and think. Gumperz and 
Cook-Gumperz’s argument on the symbolic representation of identity suggests that distinction is 
drawn through behavioral and thought patterns (1982:2). From a Bourdieusian perspective, the 
differences in behavior and thought patterns are the enactment of habitus; specifically, the 
reflection and results of individuals’ socioeconomic backgrounds and the broad social environment 
they grew up in (1984). Here, what Yixin exemplifies is a Shanghairen habitus represented by 
dialect competence. Growing up in metropolitan Shanghai, which provided relatively higher 
quality of life and more access to cultural and educational institutions even in the Maoist era, 
influenced ways of thinking, and speaking, becoming a set of behaviors.  
To a certain extent, the cultural distinction between Shanghairen and non-natives (Waidiren) 
represented through dialect makes native Shanghairen see the regional identity as something close 
to an ethnicity. This quasi-ethnicity is created when the native Shanghairen community defines 
itself against a cumulative category of Waidiren, which is the Putonghua-speaking group that 
encompasses elites and professionals, as well as manual laborers from the rest of the country. 
Competence in the dialect represents the socially constructed disposition of the linguistic habitus, 
which weighs significantly for Shanghairen identity, as Yixin elaborated further:  
The Shanghai dialect pronunciation and word choices express what kind of a person 
you are when you interact with other people and deal with things, your manner and 
your demeanor. Your tone and your facial expression would be different when 
speaking the Shanghai dialect. 
He is proud of the embedded elegance in the Shanghai dialect, and how it differs from Putonghua 
Mandarin.  
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Important to note here is that most native Shanghairen, except those in their 70s and older, 
are bilingual. The contrast between the natives and Waidiren is not between two monolingual 
groups, but between a bilingual local group and perceived monolingual Putonghua speakers. 54 
What Yixin articulates is the ability to correctly switch between two languages, and the linguistic 
habitus deployed to demonstrate a set of characteristics beyond those associated with speaking 
Putonghua. His understanding of the association between speaking Shanghai dialect and a 
Shanghairen identity highlights not only the language competence, but the language preference 
aspect of the linguistic habitus.  
Beyond linguistic competence, the assumed civility, manner, or distinctive character 
communicated through the Shanghai dialect forms the core of a Shanghairen habitus. As Yu Qiuyu, 
a renowned Chinese writer, acknowledges in a piece titled “Shanghairen” in his book A Bittersweet 
Journey through Culture (Wen Hua Ku Lue) published in 1992, that the characteristics of 
Shanghairen are distilled into a few traits. The first and foremost is tolerance, and to a certain 
extent a Simmelian indifference, captured in the common Shanghai dialect phrase “go gui go” 
(mind one’s own business).  
This is a point the author of the recent best-selling Shanghai dialect novel, Jin Yucheng, 
also stressed over our interview in the fall of 2013. According to both writers, tolerance is a trait 
developed in the cosmopolitan culture of Old Shanghai in the late 19th century. The phrase “go gui 
go”, and the attitude behind it, is the closest thing to the notion of multiculturalism in current China, 
because in essence it accepts the rationale of various viewpoints and ways of life. According to 
Yu Qiuyu, it is a social contract of coexistence and mutual benefits born from the promises of a 
                                                          
54 Native Shanghairen are aware that most migrants speak their hometown dialects besides Putonghua, but to 
emphasize the distinction, they loosely group all non-speakers of Shanghai dialect as monolingual Putonghua 
speakers.  
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multicultural world (1992). In addition to this utopian view, we should not forget the sociopolitical 
context—segregated jurisdictions between imperialist powers in Old Shanghai—when this key 
component of the Shanghairen habitus was born.  “Go gui go” was the best translation of Simmel’s 
blasé attitude which was displayed by dwellers in Berlin coping with metropolitan life 
(2002[1903]). Hundreds of thousands of migrants from other parts of China needed to adapt on a 
daily basis, and to respect one another’s language, culture, religion and viewpoint.  
Shanghairen have witnessed so much and learned to keep their distance in a century and a 
half of political, social and cultural vicissitudes. Colonialism since the mid-19th century, 
occupation by Japan during WWII, the Communist Party founding the People’s Republic, the 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the shift of national cultural center from Shanghai to Beijing, 
economic reforms, massive internal migration, and Shanghai acquiring global city status; amidst 
all these changes, Shanghairen learned to mind only one’s own business.  In doing so, they become 
tolerant, suspicious and distant observers, not wholeheartedly submitting to any authority (Yu, 
2001).  
To navigate all these changes, Shanghairen developed a strategy to maximize the usage of 
time and money, while simultaneously minimizing one’s effort. This is a type of habitus similar to 
dwellers of most commercial cities including New York City. It is understood to be shrewd and 
petty by non-natives, while Shanghairen regard it as the very principle of survival in the urban 
jungle. This principle leads to unwritten rules shared by Shanghairen when conducting business or 
interacting with strangers. For non-natives unfamiliar with this, a normal social interaction may 
end up in misunderstanding or even accusations of rudeness or discrimination.  Nurse Le, who 
works in the pediatric hospital described a scenario commonly seen there: 
[Native] Shanghairen usually estimate how much time [to wait] for each step, 
seeing the doctor, getting blood test, fetching the lab report to the doctor, paying in 
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the lobby or getting the medication, etc. They will manage to get through these 
steps in a calculated order after studying the length of lines.  But non-natives usually 
don’t understand it when we [nurses] suggest them to do likewise, and think some 
natives cut lines when the latter get everything done before them.   
The difference Le found about non-natives, echoing Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz’s argument, 
cited earlier, that isolated incidents suggesting different ways of thinking reinforce the symbolic 
representation of identity (1982:2). Material roots for the difference in habitus lie in the social 
context of Shanghairen’s upbringing. Native Shanghairen urban sociologist Yu Hai attributes this 
Shanghairen logic to the crowded alleyway dwellings (2012). Over decades, the limited social 
resources and crowded space and the proximity to and frequent contact with strangers have 
contributed to Shanghairen’s strategy for navigating their daily lives.   
From another perspective, the tendency to micro-manage one’s daily life perpetuates 
negative stereotypes about Shanghairen. As Yu Qiuyu points out, the shrewdness of Shanghairen 
molds them more into petty bourgeoisie than warriors (2001). This “go gui go” mentality, the 
epitome of Shanghairen habitus, is regarded as a virtue by native Shanghairen, but as a calculated 
coldness, or even hostility by non-natives. Yufeng provided me with a vivid depiction of this 
difference in terms of the practice of “going Dutch” between him and his non-native wife, who 
originates from northern China: 
There is a cultural difference between me and my wife. For a Shanghairen, it is 
normal to be clear in financial matters, even with people close to you. But for people 
in other parts of China, such as my wife from the north, it is very calculative, cold 
rationality. She would feel hurt because to her it means I don’t trust her, look down 
on her or regard her as family. 
To him, borrowing an American idiom, “Short reckonings make long friends.” This is the kind of 
proper conduct every Shanghairen is taught from a young age, and takes for granted in social 
interactions. But his wife was clearly socialized to think otherwise. 
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 Scholarly literature stresses that Shanghai is and always has been a place where hundreds 
of thousands of strangers come and go, and so it is important to take care of one’s own welfare 
and wellbeing, especially financially (i.e. Li, 2006; Qian, 2007; Xiong, 2012). These norms differ 
significantly from those of the village life that still prevails in many inland places, where one 
cannot get away from debt since everyone knows you and your family, if your neighbors are not 
remote relatives to start with.  Thus, in Shanghai, mutual agreement or formal contract is valued 
more than personal connections or favors.  
In addition to the manifestation of the spirit of the metropolis in an individual’s financial 
mindset, Chen Ji gave an example of a second quality, which is regarded as a virtue by Shanghairen, 
but as a vice by most other Mainland Chinese: 
To be polite, Shanghairen would pretend to get along with everyone, even with 
those they disagree with. For example in the college I work for, two Shanghairen 
faculty members would still smile and shake hands with each other in public even 
though they are in terribly bad relations. 
To elaborate on how this social etiquette, taken for granted among native Shanghairen, is not quite 
usual in other parts of the country, she described the viewpoint of a colleague from inland Anhui 
province.  
He would regard the two faculty members’ behavior as proof of Shanghairen’s 
insincerity and dishonesty. He told me that if a similar scenario was taking place in 
a college in northern China, the two faculty members would either avoid each other, 
or confront each other with open scolding whenever they bump into each other.  
This example again illustrates an embodied cultural capital between natives and non-natives that 
will not be overcome easily by increasing social interaction, even among individuals of equally 
high educational and socioeconomic status.  
The third and last big difference between natives and non-natives, mentioned in many 
interviews across age groups, is Shanghairens’ worldliness, shown in an overwhelming interest in 
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anything foreign, regardless of individual’s socioeconomic background. It is best illustrated in my 
interview with novelist Jin Yucheng in his reminiscences of the early 1980s:  
A few years after the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) ended, foreign novels started 
to show up on Shanghai bookstores’ shelves. 55 I was told only few people bought 
them in other cities, but in Shanghai, I remember lining up with others overnight to 
buy them. Everyone read those translated books, regardless of profession or 
educational level. A [native Shanghairen] butcher in the wet market once discussed 
Tolstoy’s Anne Karenina with me.  
His depiction of native Shanghairens’ thirst for foreign knowledge and new cultural products 
shows the cultural capital criterion of Shanghairen identity. The way worldliness manifests itself 
in language is best captured in the answer given by the Xinmin Evening News reporter Zhu over 
our interview: “A [native] Shanghairen is someone with rich cultural experiences, is worldly and 
sophisticated and knows when to say what to whom in which way.”    
 
Conclusion 
Since the early 2000s, economic and household registration reforms have enabled and 
facilitated the increasing social integration of non-natives in Shanghai. Due to these reforms, we 
have seen a shift from a dual society largely based on an individual’s hukou status to one based on 
a more nuanced criteria for stratification. In this chapter, I have shown that the earlier overt 
exclusion and discrimination based on hukou status has, today, declined significantly at workplace, 
in social circles, and family – the three dimensions of social membership. However, the increasing 
social integration does not necessarily mitigate cultural differences. Rather, it sometimes produces 
backlash by reducing linguistic space for the Shanghai dialect.  
The disappearance of legal and social barriers between native and non-natives has also 
created confusion about the criteria that define Shanghairen identity.  The three pillars of this 
                                                          
55  One could only find writings by Marx, Lenin and Mao during the ten years of the proletarian revolution. Cheng. 
Life and Death in Shanghai. 1987. 
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identity, hukou, urban residency, and Shanghai dialect proficiency, have been shaken by both 
internal and external forces. The current effort by native Shanghairen to reassert a Shanghairen 
identity reaches a resolution in the recognition of Shanghairen habitus, a combination of unique 
mindset and linguistic competence.  
There is likely to be more integration in the social sphere among future generations because 
they will grow up in a period where hukou has diminished relevance in both components of modern 
citizenship, that social membership is extended to more non-natives, and market forces are central 
to social resource allocation, in terms of obtaining previously hukou-based privileges such as 
education, healthcare, or housing. In addition, the younger generation born and growing up in 
Shanghai now are acquiring Putonghua as their mother tongue under the mandate of state language 
policies. Nevertheless, due to a particular Shanghairen habitus, the Shanghai dialect will retain its 
symbolic power as the most important marker of Shanghairen group identity. In this way, it serves 
to preserve the right to the city for “true” Shanghairen.  
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Conclusion  
 
In an article titled “Chengdu, China Gets a Modern Makeover” in the November 2015 issue 
of the Travel + Leisure magazine, the author writes that “for many foreigners, there’s a 
geographical hierarchy of authenticity. Shanghai is at the silicone-fake end of the spectrum.”56 The 
conventional understanding of authenticity lies in the unique character of a locale. Why is 
Shanghai seen as inauthentic by foreign tourists who expect Chinese traditional architecture, panda 
bears, and exotic cuisine? It is now also seen as inauthentic by native Shanghairen.  This lack of 
authenticity, or loss of it, is ironically authentic Chinese in the sense that all cities in China are 
being redeveloped to be modern, global, and identical to each other.  
Over the course of the last two decades, Shanghai has experienced an unprecedented 
transformation, as China’s economic globalization and urban expansion have increased rapidly. 
What the article considers ‘fake’ about Shanghai is its status as a global city and international 
economic dominance, a glossy sheen of luxury and power that suggests the non-existence of local 
character. From studying the changing language practices among Shanghai’s urban population, 
and researching policies in the areas of promotion of the official language, urban redevelopment 
and urbanization, and internal migration, I argue that the transformation of Shanghai demonstrates 
the power of the state, and the top-down ideology of strengthening a national identity and instilling 
national pride. Shanghai presents a unique case, differing from Beijing, Tokyo, Taipei, Seoul, or 
Singapore, in the sense that participating in globalization with state-directed economic growth, it 
is not a capital city, or home to a dominant national culture. In the global city building process in 
                                                          
56 Beam, Christopher.  “Chengdu, China Gets a Modern Makeover”. Travel + Leisure. November 10, 2015. 
Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/chengdu-china-modern-makeover 
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Shanghai, the local linguistic heritage has been sacrificed, and millions of Shanghairen are 
displaced and dispossessed, while the city has regained its status as a cosmopolitan metropolis, 
though tightly controlled by the central government.  
Shanghai’s rise to global city status has mostly been characterized using statistics about 
economic growth, such as the amount of foreign direct investment or the number of Fortune 500 
company headquarters, or by reference to the futuristic looking urban environment. Rarely do we 
hear voices from the city’s ground level, from the millions of Shanghairen who have witnessed 
and experienced the unprecedented urban transformation.   
The last two decades in Shanghai were a period of transition, during which time the trend 
of “forward to the past” (Ren, 2008) took hold of residents’ imagination. But selective nostalgia 
for the Golden Age of the old Shanghai in the 1930s did not include the full picture of the contested 
social space and class structure during that time. It was a rosy picture of East meets West glamour 
and urban consumer culture (Lee, 1999). Changes that I have documented in this study go beyond 
statistics and visible architectural spectacles; instead, I have shown a contested linguistic space, a 
restructuring of social class. And, in reaction to these changes, a quest to reaffirm local identity 
and the unique character of the city. Contested social processes such as those are crucial for our 
understanding of the impact of globalization on urban China. The effort to build global cities 
during the economic reform era opened up Shanghai not only to the world, more importantly, to 
the rest of the country. Though under the minute control of the central government, the flexibility 
granted to the municipal government under the framework of neoliberalism with Chinese 
characteristics (Harvey, 2005), migrants and investment capitalists flowing into the city brought 
about a full scale of transformation, essential for and inseparable from the city’s globalization.  
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The uniqueness of Shanghai’s transformation lies in the authoritarian state that has initiated 
and carefully directed the process. In exchange for the city’s global city status and improved 
standard of living, Shanghairen have been relocated away from the urban center, while their 
linguistic right to the city is threatened, and experienced relative deprivation of privileges in terms 
of exclusive access to top quality social services. These changes most native Shanghairen perceive 
as greatly affect their daily life. In this study, they come together to tell a story of the price locals 
pay when an authoritarian, centralized state fashions a city compatible with and competitive for 
globalization.  
 
Diminished Linguistic Space 
In chapter three, I examine the decline in proficiency of speaking the Shanghai dialect, and 
decline in preference for speaking it, in response to the rising prevalence of Putonghua. State 
language policies established a language ideology that set in motion the dominance of Putonghua. 
This dominant language ideology rendered regional dialects, such as the Shanghai dialect vulgar, 
improper for formal settings, and incompatible with the social and economic progress of the 
country. With the passing of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken 
and Written Chinese Language, in effect since 2001, the state gives the use of Putonghua the same 
significance as loyalty to the ruling Chinese Communist Party, making language choice a political 
choice. If one speaking Putonghua in Shanghai, it indicates that the speaker being a law-abiding 
citizen devoted himself/herself to the prosperity of the country under the Chinese Communist 
Party’s leadership.  
Under the state’s continuous promotion of the official language through annual propaganda 
events and the school system, native Shanghairen have come to believe Putonghua proficiency is 
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an essential tool for them and their children to achieve the “China Dream”. From a Bourdieusian 
perspective, the state has created since late 1990s a market for exchanging linguistic capital, 
represented by proficiency in Putonghua, for cultural, social and economic capital in the forms of 
educational achievement and upward social mobility. The historical background for the creation 
of this market was the shift from a planned to a market economy, which opened up venues for 
individuals’ upward mobility, and social class restructuring.  
Through language laws and the market for capital conversion, the state has successfully 
reduced the linguistic space of the Shanghai dialect, and driven it to the brink of extinction.  Over 
the course of a single generation, the Shanghai dialect has shifted from being regarded as the lingua 
franca of a city and region to a local dialect incompatible with modern China. The state’s 
promotion of Putonghua has been so successful that Shanghai dialect is barely understood among 
those born in the 2000s.  
Against this background of dialect degradation, marginalization and rapid endangerment, 
a dialect preservation movement has gained momentum. It started with vernacular theatre 
performers and intellectuals, whose livelihoods rely upon the Shanghai dialect. These advocates 
stress that the dialect as an invaluable cultural heritage, and further activists identify the Shanghai 
dialect as an important indicator of a place-bound Shanghairen identity.  
The grassroots resistance to the promotion of Putonghua and a uniform Chinese identity 
represents not only native Shanghairen’s attitude toward the state in the linguistic and cultural 
realm, but also points to the lack of democracy embedded in the building of Shanghai as a global 
city, from the linguistic environment to the physical urban landscape.  In fear that the city losing 
its distinct and local character, native Shanghairen have refused to accept Pudong, as the new, 
modern face of Shanghai.   
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Shanghai dialect is a hybrid urban tongue born in the alleyway housing of the old Shanghai 
in the early 20th century.  Its vocabulary represents a way of life that has, to a large extent, been 
destroyed in the urban transformation of the last two decades. Those trying to preserve the dialect 
treat it as a surrogate for a Shanghai of crowded shikumen housing and quiet sycamore tree-lined 
streets that will never return. Since the material base is gone, only the linguistic urban culture that 
the built environment once fostered can sustain their collective memory and Shanghai’s distinct 
urban character.  
 
Indistinguishable Urban Space 
Beginning in the early 1990s, more than one million Shanghairen households were 
displaced from the historical urban center to accommodate massive construction and expansion. 
In chapter four I illustrate the multiple social processes at work in Shanghai’s urban transformation, 
in particular the life after relocation. Renters of dilapidated state-owned properties in the historic 
urban center before the economic reform became owners of new apartments with modern 
amenities in the periphery of the city. Despite moving up to better housing, the dissolution of 
residential neighborhoods in the traditional and overcrowded shikumen housing has led to the loss 
of a sense of community, and in particular, dissolved a speech community of Shanghai dialect 
speakers. Moreover, specific, colorful idioms developed in the early 20th century describing the 
way of urban life in shikumen neighborhoods have become irrelevant and obsolete.  
In place of shikumen housing neighborhoods, spectacular skyscrapers rose to dominate the 
city’s landscape. They were built to impress the countrymen and the world. This spectacular vision 
of a global Shanghai created by the national elite and their delegates in Shanghai has disregarded 
local urban history, generations of lived experience, and native Shanghairen’s attachment to 
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particular urban spaces, replacing that with glass-façade buildings that render a sense of alienation 
and placelessness (Relph, 1976). This manufactured placelessness, a consequence of losing old 
ways in a rapidly globalizing city, leads native Shanghairen to attach their place-bound identity to 
Puxi, the west bank of the Huangpu River, the historical Shanghai, and reject the east bank – 
Pudong, which had been farmland until the early 1990s, as the most meaningful representation of 
their city. Through preference for Puxi residency, and disdain for the architectural spectacles of 
Pudong, native Shanghairen insist on their vision of the global Shanghai against the state’s and the 
world’s.  
 In turn, this attachment to place also serves as an indicator of a native Shanghairen identity, 
when compared with recent internal migrants attracted by job opportunities, modern amenities, 
and the “global city look” in Pudong. The Shanghai represented by Pudong is a three dimensional 
printout designed by the state to conform to a nationalist vision, without input from native 
Shanghairen, who hold on to a more historical Shanghai, a hybrid and dynamic urban space 
representing more than a century of growth and change. Since the opening of the Treaty Port in 
1843, the changes that occurred in Shanghai never completely replaced the old with the new, as 
seen in the current Pudong and many parts of Puxi, but sustained a constant dialogue and 
negotiation that integrates outside trends with Chinese vernacular roots.  
The destruction of this distinctive urban environment has led many to believe that the local 
dialect spoken on the street is the last remaining signifier of the city’s distinctive identity. But the 
influx of millions of non-speakers from across the country disrupts the linguistic space of the 
Shanghai dialect and contributes to the dominance of Putonghua. With the gradual decline of 
structural barriers for non-natives to settle in Shanghai, geographical mobility in the economic 
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reform era has brought back the identity of Shanghai as a migrant city. Unlike a century ago, this 
new cosmopolitanism now has a nationalist undertone, and speaks of globalization in Putonghua. 
 
Social Integration and Shanghairen Identity 
Geographical dispersion of native-born residents has not been the only reason for the 
endangerment of the Shanghai dialect; in chapter five I explain another process that has contributed 
to the language’s decline. Under state language policies, native Shanghairen, as well as all citizens 
speaking local dialects across the country, acquire Putonghua as their second language. Given the 
vast difference between the Shanghai dialect and Putonghua, and the lack of incentives for 
migrants to acquire the dialect, the replacement of the Shanghai dialect by Putonghua in daily 
communication between strangers was inevitable.  
To recruit a talent pool befitting a global city, the Shanghai Municipal Government 
bypassed the national household registration restrictions by screening and selectively granting 
migrants Shanghai hukou. It is a legal status cementing a Shanghairen identity, the lack of which 
once served as a marker for migrants’ second-class status. By extending this legal status to highly-
educated and wealthy non-natives, the municipal government eliminates the institutional barrier 
for migrants’ social integration. Indeed, my investigations have shown migrants gaining 
acceptance at workplaces, and in native Shanghairen’s social circles and families. However, this 
institutional inclusion triggered further confusion in Shanghairen identity, an awareness of relative 
deprivation among natives, and a contention over the right to the city.  
The urban/rural dichotomy created by the hukou system has gradually broken down since 
the global city building process reached Shanghai in the 1990s. This withdrawal of the population 
control measure also entails a transition from a socialist redistribution system to a market-based 
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system that places more emphasis on personal financial capacity in terms of access to housing, 
education, and healthcare. On the one hand, migrants now have better overall chances for social 
integration and upward mobility since the structural barriers represented by the hukou system have 
receded; on the other hand, native Shanghairen have developed nuanced criteria anchored to 
dialect speaking, lifestyle, and mentality to effectively draw new social and cultural boundaries 
around social status.  
Grouped under what I call Shanghairen habitus, Shanghai dialect competence and 
particular personality traits associated with long-term urban living such as blasé attitude, financial 
shrewdness and worldliness function as new criteria of social distinction.  However, among the 
younger generation of native Shanghairen, there is ambivalence about membership in this group; 
since younger Shanghairen speak less and less Shanghai dialect under the influence of state 
language policies. This failure of the dialect to rise along with the city onto the national and global 
stage reveals that the process of globalization in Shanghai has not endowed the urban linguistic 
culture and local identity with a desirable status; rather, in the authoritarian state, such ‘local’ 
markers of habitus are replaced by a uniform national language and national identity. The top-
down building of Shanghai as a global city has in fact strengthened development of the national 
state. 
Promotion of the official language, transformation of the urban built environment, and 
social integration of certain internal migrants, are the three primary state policies that converge on 
the site of the globalizing Shanghai. As it once again becomes a migrant city, Shanghai embraces 
a cosmopolitanism with Chinese characteristics, that is, an all-encompassing, uniform Chinese 
identity, and an indistinguishable global city look. Rather than presenting vernacular characters, 
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the city pledges loyalty to the Communist Party, rejects diversity, and represents the country on 
the world stage using a standardized official language.  
 
Future of the Shanghai Dialect 
Factors contributing to the rapid decline of Shanghai dialect in the last decade and a half 
have not encountered many obstacles, though lately grassroots efforts have emerged to save 
Shanghai’s local linguistic heritage. From my investigations, the reasons for the dialect’s dim 
prospects are threefold. First, the ambiguity in associating dialect competence with Shanghairen 
identity; as I have shown, the younger generation of native Shanghairen rarely speak it. Second, 
the debates within the dialect preservation community, that focus on the authenticity of the dialect; 
there are many activists competing for authority and fame in terms of defining “the” authentic 
version of Shanghai dialect, and cultivating the symbolic power of dialect discrimination. And 
lastly, the economic resources and human effort devoted to cultural products using the Shanghai 
dialect are limited and often negatively sanctioned by the state.  
Native Shanghairen who insist on the significance of Shanghai dialect competence for “true” 
insider membership run into the dilemma that their children and grandchildren barely speak the 
dialect, and mostly identify Putonghua as their mother language. Dorian points out that when a 
language shift is already well under way, it is impossible to insist on the association between a 
social group’s collective identity and the ancestral language (1999:20). Defining identity in terms 
of language would exclude most of the younger people from insider membership, since even those 
who do not speak the language are still legally, geographically, and ancestrally qualified to be 
considered native Shanghairen. Looking ahead, the cohorts growing up in the first and second 
decades of the 21st century in Shanghai are native Shanghairen who do not speak the dialect. And 
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it would be safe to predict that without immense societal efforts to reestablish and promote dialect 
speaking among younger generations, they are unlikely to actively acquire Shanghai dialect as a 
second language, and later pass this linguistic heritage down to their children.  
This leads us to the issue of dialect acquisition, which relies heavily on personal motivation, 
given that the dominant language ideology incentivizes only the use of Putonghua. I have pointed 
out the popularity of the kindergartens where Shanghai dialect is taught in Pudong, and also some 
native Shanghairen’s astonishment at their children’s lack of Shanghai dialect competency; both 
are positive signs of potential retention of the Shanghai dialect, which will continue as long as 
native Shanghairen realize the cultural value of the local dialect.  
However, the dialect preservation activist community, which has published dialect 
textbooks, lexicon, and promotional materials, is troubled by debates about the “pure” and 
“authentic” form of the Shanghai dialect. I have shown the disputed origin of the Shanghai dialect, 
with disputes about whether it is a hybrid of multiple southern Chinese dialects, or a main branch 
of Wu language with loanwords and grammatical structures borrowed from other languages or 
dialects during the cosmopolitan early 20th century. Similar to what Woolard notes in her study of 
Catalan in Barcelona that “minority language activists often find themselves imposing standards, 
elevating literature forms and uses, and negatively sanctioning variability in order to demonstrate 
the reality, validity, and integrity of their languages” (1998:17), the disagreement over which 
“correct” version of the dialect to teach will discourage grassroots dialect teaching, which likely 
emerges among lay dialect speakers with limited linguistic background. After all, it is a language 
still spoken by most of the current generation of grandparents in Shanghai. Future research is 
needed on the effectiveness of dialect teaching within households across generations.  
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Lastly, the role of mass media in producing theatrical, radio and television programs, and 
movies using the dialect, and the general public’s access to these cultural goods are crucial to the 
fate of the endangered Shanghai dialect. Grenoble and Whaley argue that economic factors, in 
terms of financial and human resources in the production, promotion and accessibility of cultural 
goods, “are a driving force behind much of language attrition and may override other factors which 
support maintenance of the indigenous language” (1998:52-3). That is to say, when mass media 
such as radio and television stations, and movie studios are under the control of state agencies such 
as the State Department of Propaganda or the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, 
financial resources are rarely available for cultural production in the Shanghai dialect, furthering 
the dominant language ideology that has already degraded regional dialects.  
Market mechanisms offer little help. To attract the largest possible audience, media 
production primarily uses Putonghua, spoken nationwide, in contrast to regional dialects. A 
feature-length animated film released in August 2015 illustrates this market pressure. Dubbed in 
both Putonghua and the Shanghai dialect, “Sargent Black Cat – Emerald Star” (heimao jingzhang: 
feicui zhi xing) is a sequel to a Putonghua television cartoon series “Sargent Black Cat” produced 
in 1992, which was a sensation for a generation of Chinese children growing up in the 1980s and 
1990s.  According to an article titled “Good Idea but Hard to Promote, ‘Sargent Black Cat’ in 
Shanghai Dialect” in the August 11th, 2015 issue of the Xinmin Evening News, one of the most 
popular local newspapers, this animated film was shown in 1,530 daily screenings during initial 
release in Shanghai, and among these, roughly 15 showed the Shanghai dialect version.57 Less than 
one percent of shows were in Shanghai dialect. In the same article, the reporter also mentioned 
                                                          
57 Zhang, Yi. Good Idea but Hard to Promote, ‘Sargent Black Cat’ in Shanghai Dialect [huyuban heimao jingzhang 
chuangyi hao tuiguang nan]. Xinmin Evening News. August 11, 2015. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
http://www.jfdaily.com/wenyu/new/201508/t20150811_1743774.html 
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that the audience for the dialect version was comprised mostly of Shanghairen in their 30s and 40s, 
who explained that their children were not able to understand the dialect or read the subtitles.  
It was a bold effort by the studio to even produce and release a Shanghai dialect version—
considering the original television series was in Putonghua; but ultimately the profit-driven market 
determined the limited screenings and impact. This suggests a continuing downward spiral for the 
future use of the Shanghai dialect in the socialist market economy in China. With cultural 
censorship and the dominant language ideology ever present, there will never be a “full-fledged 
commitment of financial resources and manpower”, which Grenoble and Whaley see as a crucial 
factor to offset the trends toward monolingualism (1999:54). The fewer mass media cultural 
products using the dialect, the less likely it is that the younger generation will be exposed to the 
dialect other than from family members, making the retention of Shanghai dialect even more 
difficult. Besides the school system, and the entertainment industry, finding other ways to prevent 
language obsolescence in China invites further exploration and research. 
 
In Comparison with Hong Kong 
It is clear from my dissertation research that the Shanghai dialect preservation movement 
attempts but so far has failed to engage native Shanghairen politically to fight for the cultural and 
linguistic right to the city against the Putonghua-speaking national elites. In contrast, recent news 
from Hong Kong shows that the “Umbrella Revolution” for universal suffrage, though crushed by 
the Chinese Communist Party’s central government and its delegates, succeeded in uniting the 
local Hong Kong people through political messages communicated in Cantonese, which is their 
local dialect and is as different from Putonghua as the Shanghai dialect is. In light of the 
confrontation between the Hongkongers and the central government’s forces in Hong Kong, what 
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is the future for advocates of the preservation of local dialects in Mainland China? What does the 
recent rise of the grassroots resistance movement to teaching Mandarin Putonghua in schools tell 
us about the civic society in Hong Kong? In the end, does the pursuit of the “China Dream” mean 
the sacrifice of local diversity and democratic visions? 
In an article titled "Speaking up for Cantonese, a Tongue in Peril" in the international 
edition of October 9th, 2014 issue of the South China Morning Post, the reporter quoted a 
linguistics professor at the University of Hong Kong, local artists, and ordinary Hong Kong parents 
to depict a bleak future for Cantonese in Hong Kong, placing blame largely on the government’s 
push for using Putonghua as the medium for instruction in schools.58 
Contrary to the dominance of Putonghua in Shanghai, Cantonese is still Hong Kong’s de 
facto lingua franca, which dominates broadcast media, print media, and is used in official speeches 
by local politicians. The concern for losing this linguistic cultural heritage stems mostly from the 
younger generation’s inability to read Chinese characters with Cantonese pronunciation, less 
severe than the case in Shanghai where children treat the Shanghai dialect as a foreign language. 
Regardless, in that news article, So Real Real (Su Zhenzhen), who wrote Picture Cards of Trendy 
Expressions in Hong Kong Cantonese, was quoted warning that “[i]n future, Putonghua will 
become the cultural identification for these [Hong Kong] children." Thus losing the linguistic 
heritage is in Hong Kong a matter of erasing local cultural identity. As in Shanghai, below the fear 
and concern about language is the issue of adoption of a uniform Chinese identity, in contrast to a 
local Shanghai/Hong Kong identity. 
                                                          
58 Chow, Vivienne. Speaking up for Cantonese, a Tongue in Peril.  South China Morning Post, International Edition. 
October 9th, 2014. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1603994/speaking-cantonese-tongue-peril 
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Rather than a linguistic coexistence sought after by activists in Shanghai, the circumstance 
is more confrontational in Hong Kong; after all, language choice is a political choice. The slogans 
and theme song “Uphold the Umbrella”59 of the pro-democracy “Umbrella Revolution” in the fall 
and winter of 2014 were created in Cantonese, rather than in Putonghua. Language clashes are not 
only struggles for identity, but also a way for Hongkongers to demonstrate their dissent from the 
authoritarian state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. In a Time article titled “A Year after the 
Umbrella Revolution, Calls for More Autonomy, Even Independence, Grow in Hong Kong” 
published on September 27th, 2015, the reporter described a confrontation between dancers in a 
Putonghua musical performance and local Hongkongers in Mong Kok, which is the Cantonese-
speaking heartland of Hong Kong. 60  The reporter observed that “a musical performance in 
Mandarin (Putonghua) is a symbol of cultural encroachment by a detested sovereign power.” It is 
apparent that local Hongkongers regard speaking Cantonese as a form of resistance, and useful for 
showcasing their local solidarity and political standpoint.  
How long Cantonese can help them maintain this battle front against the central 
government is an open question, because as we have learned from the South China Morning Post 
article, more and more Hong Kong children adopt Putonghua as their first language. 61  Is 
Shanghairen’s linguistic loss a precedent of what is going to happen in Hong Kong? Or will Hong 
                                                          
59 “Uphold the Umbrella” (Chengqi Yusan) on YouTube. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_23GElzJFo 
60 Greenberg, Alissa. "A Year after the Umbrella Revolution, Calls for More Autonomy, Even Independence, Grow 
in Hong Kong". Time. September 27, 2015. Retrieved February 17, 2016, from http://time.com/4049700/hong-kong-
independence-occupy-umbrella-localist  
61 How much dissent from local Hongkongers will we hear from the South China Morning Post in the future remains 
a question.  One of Hong Kong’s most influential English language daily newspapers, it has for decades reported 
aggressively on political scandals and human-rights cases censored by the Chinese central government. But in 
December 2015, it was bought by the Mainland China internet giant, Alibaba, which according to a New York Times 
article, aimed to discipline this newspaper’s negative portrayal of China. See Barboza, David. “Alibaba Buying South 
China Morning Post, Aiming to Influence Media”. New York Times. December 11, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/dealbook/alibaba-scmp-south-china-morning-post.html 
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Kong take another path, such as Errington observed in Indonesia, that the linguistic stand of 
political and business elites contributed to the preservation of the traditional Javanese linguistic 
tradition (1991:422-3). So now the question becomes, would the central government’s Hong Kong 
delegates’ use of Cantonese slow down the decline of this linguistic heritage?  
Coming back to the political message underlying language choice, Woolard concludes 
from her study on the linguistic situation in Catalonia in the 1980s that “cultural legitimacy fails 
because political legitimacy is not achieved” (1985:742). How this applies to Hong Kong in terms 
of cultural identity and linguistic heritage after the central government crushed the “Umbrella 
Revolution” invites future research.  
The rapid endangerment of the Shanghai dialect over the last two decades, has kept pace 
with Shanghai’s rise to global city status. I question, in the face of such changes, if urban linguistic 
community is a neglected issue for studies on modernization and globalization. Studies in other 
contexts have shown again and again the loss of ancestral languages when a rural or indigenous 
region was overtaken by colonial, ethnically dominant or national culture. Global cities studies 
have shown that municipal governments, developers and local entrepreneurs often use local urban 
characteristics, for example, vernacular culture and architecture to gain a competitive edge, to 
stand out among other global or globalizing cities. The unique case of Shanghai and the Shanghai 
dialect lies not only in the city’s history as a cosmopolitan metropolis, but also in the authoritarian 
state’s participation in neoliberalism and globalization. As shown in this study, in the place of 
vernacular culture, a national language and a state-reinvented national culture takes dominance, 
and are promoted in the name of facilitating the process of globalization.  
It is time that studies of globalizing cities, especially of those located in the so-called Global 
South, pay attention to the role of the national states and the fate of urban linguistic communities. 
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Findings in this study about experiences of the urban displaced, and changing social dynamics 
when massive internal migrants settle in a nationally and regionally more developed city apply to 
a whole spectrum of urban areas. Within mainland China, the Cantonese speaking Guangzhou 
(Canton) could see this study’s immediate implication in terms of the preservation of a linguistic 
cultural heritage and regional identity amidst the city’s demographical changes and the state-led 
globalization process.  
Abroad, mega cities in India, such as Mumbai, which emerges from a colonial past and has 
a historical waterfront similar to the Bund of Shanghai, has embarked on a state-initiated global 
city building process. What kind of linguistic, cultural and geographical losses the diverse locals 
would need to endure, when Mumbai realizes its dream to become the next Shanghai?62  My 
findings about the price that locals pay when a national identity is imposed on a historically 
cosmopolitan metropolis are also applicable to Istanbul under the current authoritarian-leaning 
Erdoğan administration. Future research is needed to investigate the conflicts between a top-down 
homogenous national identity, a standardized national language, and the fate of vernaculars and 
regional identities against the backdrop of intensified globalization.   
                                                          
62 This inspiration has been reported as early as on April 6, 2005 in an India Times article by Josy Joseph titled 
"What will make Mumbai into a Shanghai?" A more recent example is an article on Business Standard by Rajat 
Ghai published on January 29, 2014 titled "When will Mumbai become Shanghai?" 
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Appendix I: 
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese 
Language63 
 
(Adopted at the 18th Meeting of Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 
October 31, 2000 and promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s Republic of 
China on October 31, 2000) 
 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is enacted in accordance with the Constitution for the purpose of promoting 
the normalization and standardization of the standard spoken and written Chinese language and its 
sound development, making it play a better role in public activities, and promoting economic and 
cultural exchange among all the Chinese nationalities and regions. 
Article 2   For purposes of this Law, the standard spoken and written Chinese language means 
Putonghua (a common speech with pronunciation based on the Beijing dialect) and the 
standardized Chinese characters. 
Article 3  The State popularizes Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters. 
Article 4  All citizens shall have the right to learn and use the standard spoken and written Chinese 
language. 
The State provides citizens with the conditions for learning and using the standard spoken and 
written Chinese language. 
Local people's governments at various levels and the relevant departments under them shall take 
measures to popularize Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters. 
Article 5 The standard spoken and written Chinese language shall be used in such a way as to be 
conducive to the upholding of state sovereignty and national dignity, to unification of the country 
and unity of the nationalities, and to socialist material progress and ethical progress. 
Article 6 The State promulgates standard norms of the spoken and written Chinese language, 
administers its use in the community, supports the teaching of and scientific research in the 
language in order to promote its normalization, enrichment and development. 
Article 7 The State rewards the organizations and individuals that have made outstanding 
contribution in the field the standard spoken and written Chinese language. 
Article 8 All the nationalities shall have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and 
written languages. 
                                                          
63 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. Database of Law and Regulations. 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383540.htm 
 244 
 
The spoken and written languages of the ethnic peoples shall be used in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Law on Regional National Autonomy and other laws. 
 
Chapter II Use of the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language 
Article 9 Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be used by State organs as the 
official language, except where otherwise provided for in laws. 
Article 10 Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be used as the basic language 
in education and teaching in schools and other institutions of education, except where otherwise 
provided for in laws. 
Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be taught in schools and other institutions 
of education by means of the Chinese course. The Chinese textbooks used shall be in conformity 
with the norms of the standard spoken and written Chinese language. 
Article 11 Publications in Chinese shall be in conformity with the norms of the standard spoken 
and written Chinese language. 
Where foreign languages need to be used in publications in Chinese, necessary explanatory notes 
in standard Chinese shall be applied. 
Article 12 Putonghua shall be used by the broadcasting and TV stations as the basic broadcasting 
language. 
Where foreign languages need to be used as the broadcasting languages, the matter shall be subject 
to approval by the broadcasting and television administration under the State Council. 
Article 13 The standardized Chinese characters shall be used as the basic characters in the service 
trade. Where both a foreign language and the Chinese language are used in signboards, 
advertisements, bulletins, signs, etc., as is needed by the trade, the standardized Chinese characters 
shall be used as far as the Chinese Language is concerned. 
People working in the service trade are encouraged to use Putonghua when providing services. 
Article 14 The standard spoken and written Chinese language shall be used as the basic spoken 
and written language in the following circumstances: 
(1) spoken and written language for broadcasting, films and TV programs; 
(2) written language for the facilities in public places; 
(3) written language in signboards and advertisements; 
(4) names of enterprises and other institutions; and 
(5) packaging and specifications of commodities marketed in the country. 
Article 15 The standard spoken and written Chinese language used in information processing and 
information technology products shall be in conformity with the norms of the State. 
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Article 16 Where the relevant provisions of this Chapter are concerned, local dialects may be used 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) when State functionaries really need to use them in the performance of official duties; 
(2) where they are used in broadcasting with the approval of the broadcasting and television 
administration under the State Council or of the broadcasting and television department at the 
provincial level; 
(3) where they are needed in traditional operas, films and TV programs and other forms of art; and 
(4) where their use is really required in the publishing, teaching and research. 
Article 17 Where by the relevant provisions of this Chapter are concerned, the original complex 
or the variant forms of Chinese characters may be retained or used under the following 
circumstances: 
(1) in cultural relics and historic sites; 
(2) the variant forms used in surnames; 
(3) in works of art such as calligraphy and seal cutting; 
(4) handwritten inscriptions and signboards; 
(5) where their use is required in the publishing, teaching and research; and 
(6) other special circumstances where their use is approved by the relevant departments under the 
State Council. 
Article 18 The "Scheme for the Chinese Phonetic Alphabet" shall be used as the tool of 
transliteration and phonetic notation for the standard spoken and written Chinese language. 
The "Scheme for the Chinese Phonetic Alphabet" is the unified norm of the Roman letters for 
transliterating the names of Chinese people and places as well as Chinese documents and is used 
in the realms where it is inconvenient to use the Chinese characters or where the Chinese characters 
cannot be used. 
Chinese phonetic alphabets shall be used in primary education. 
Article 19 All staff members who need to use Putonghua as their working language shall have the 
ability to speak Putonghua. 
The Putonghua level of those who use Putonghua as their working language, such as broadcasters, 
program hosts and hostesses, actors and actresses of films, TV series and plays, teachers and State 
functionaries shall reach the respective standards set by the State; those who have not yet reached 
such standards shall receive different training, as the case may be. 
Article 20 Putonghua and the standardized Chinese characters shall be taught in classes for 
foreigners who are learning Chinese. 
 
Chapter III Administration and Supervision 
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Article 21 The department in charge of the work related to spoken and written language under the 
State Council shall be responsible for planning, guiding, administering and supervising the work 
related to the standard spoken and written Chinese language. 
The departments concerned under the State Council shall administer the use of the standard spoken 
and written Chinese language in their own departments. 
Article 22 Local departments in charge of the work related to spoken and written language and 
other departments concerned shall administer and supervise the use of the standard spoken and 
written Chinese language within their own administrative areas. 
Article 23 The administrative departments for industry and commerce under the local people's 
governments at or above the county level shall administer and supervise the use of spoken and 
written language in the names of enterprises and commodities as well as in advertisements. 
Article 24 The department in charge of the work related to spoken and written language under the 
State Council shall issue standards for the test of Putonghua at different grades. 
Article 25 The department in charge of the work related to spoken and written language under the 
State Council or other departments concerned shall make arrangements for the examination of the 
translation of the proper nouns like the names of foreigners and foreign places and the scientific 
and technical terms into the standard spoken and written Chinese language. 
Article 26 Any citizen may make criticism and put forward suggestions where the use of spoken 
and written language is at variance with the norms of the standard spoken and written Chinese 
language and is in violation of the relevant provisions in Chapter II of this Law. 
Where persons mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 19 of this Law use the language in 
violation of the relevant provisions of Chapter II of this Law, the units concerned shall, by way of 
education, criticize the persons who are directly responsible; anyone who refuses to put it right 
shall be handled by the units concerned. 
Where the characters used in the facilities and signboards in public places of cities and in 
advertisements are in violation of the relevant provisions of Chapter II of this Law, the 
administrative departments concerned shall give orders for them to be corrected; anyone who 
refuses correct them shall be given a disciplinary warning and be urged to put them right within a 
time limit. 
Article 27 Anyone who, in violation of this Law, interferes with other persons' learning and using 
of the standard spoken and written Chinese language shall be ordered by the relevant 
administrative departments to put it right within a time limit and be given a disciplinary warning. 
 
Chapter IV Supplementary Provisions 
Article 28 This Law shall go into effect as of January 1, 2001. 
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Appendix II 
List of Annual National Putonghua Promotion Week Themes 1998-2015 
Issued by the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
 Period Theme 
First September 13-19th, 1998 Speaking Putonghua, Starting from Me. [shuo 
Putonghua cong wo zuo qi] 
Second September 12-18th, 1999 Promote Putonghua, Welcome New Century. 
[tuiguang Putonghua, yingjie xin shiji] 
Third September 10-16th, 2000 Promote Putonghua, Walk into New Century. 
[tuiguang Putonghua, mai xiang xin shiji] 
Fourth September 9-15th, 2001 Propagate Law on the Standard Spoken and Written 
Chinese Language, Strongly Promote Putonghua, 
and Facilitate Standardization of Spoken and 
Written Chinese. [xuanchuan guangche guojia 
tongyong yuyan wenzi fa, dali tuiguang Putonghua, 
cujin yuyan wenzi guifanhua] 
Fifth September 15-21st, 2002 Propagate Law on the Standard Spoken and Written 
Chinese Language, Strongly Promote Putonghua, 
Facilitate Standardization of Spoken and Written 
Chinese, and Welcome the 16th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China. 
[xuanchuan guangche guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi 
fa, dali tuiguang Putonghua, cujin yuyan wenzi 
guifanhua, yingjie dang de shiliu da zhaokai] 
Sixth September 14-20th, 2003 Strongly Promote Putonghua, Work Together to 
Achieve Moderate Prosperity. [dali tuiguang 
Putonghua, qixin xieli beng xiaokang] 
Seventh September 12-18th, 2004 Putonghua – Link of Emotions, Bridge of 
Communication. [Putonghua: qinggan de niudai, 
goutong de qiaoliang] 
Eighth September 11-17th,2005 Achieve Smooth Communication, Build a 
Harmonious Society. [shixian shunchang jiaoliu, 
goujian hexie shehui].   
Ninth September 10-16th,2006 Putonghua: Promotion for Fifty Years, Widespread 
in the New Century. [Putonghua: wushi nian 
tuiguang, xin shiji puji] 
Tenth September 9-15th, 2007 Construct Harmonious Linguistic Life, Carry 
Forward Excellent Chinese Culture. [goujian hexie 
yuyan shenghuo, hongyang zhonghua youxiu 
wenhua] 
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Eleventh September 14-20th, 2008 Construct Harmonious Linguistic Life, Create 
Shared Spiritual Homeland. [goujian hexie yuyan 
shenghuo, yingzao gongyou jingshen jiayuan] 
Twelfth September 13-19th, 2009 Love Spoken and Written Language of the 
Motherland, Construct Harmonious Linguistic Life. 
[re’ai zuguo yuyan wenzi, goujian hexie yuyan 
shenghuo] 
Thirteenth September 12-18th, 2010 Standardize the Use of Spoken and Written Chinese 
Language, Carry Forward Excellent Chinese 
Culture and Tradition. [guifan shiyong guojia 
tongyong yuyan wenzi, hongyang zhonghua youxiu 
wenhua chuantong] 
Fourteenth September 11-17th, 2011 Improve Competence of the Standard Spoken and 
Written Chinese Language, Carry Forward 
Excellent Chinese Culture and Tradition. [tisheng 
guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi yingyong nengli, 
hongyang zhonghua youxiu wenhua chuantong] 
Fifteenth September 14-20th, 2012 Strongly Promote the use of Standard Spoken and 
Written Chinese Language. [dali tuiguang he guifan 
shiyong guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi] 
Sixteenth September 11-17th, 2013 Promote Putonghua, Build the China Dream 
Together. [tuiguang Putonghua, gong zhu zhongguo 
meng] 
Seventeenth September 15-21st, 2014 Speak Putonghua Well, You, I and He realize the 
Dream. [shuo hao Putonghua, yuan meng ni wo ta] 
Eighteenth September 14-20th, 2015 Promote Putonghua according to the Law, Increase 
the Country’s Soft Power. [yu fa tuiguang 
Putonghua, tisheng guojia ruan shili] 
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